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GLOBAL COVERAGE Looking Back – Looking Ahead. Boyd Sutton. Outline. A Look Back What we were asked to do and how we did it What we found What we recommended What happened Some Thoughts for the Future Recommendations Pitfalls. What We Were Asked to Do.
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GLOBAL COVERAGELooking Back – Looking Ahead Boyd Sutton
Outline • A Look Back • What we were asked to do and how we did it • What we found • What we recommended • What happened • Some Thoughts for the Future • Recommendations • Pitfalls
What We Were Asked to Do • Define “Global Coverage” and related terms • Define a process for accomplishing “adequate” Global Coverage • Table options for: • Alternative strategies • Collection and analysis objectives • What “baseline” knowledge we need to maintain • Approach to “surge” • Measuring progress and performance
Cartoon • Robert’s scanner broke • Caption is: • “Remember when we had just one big problem? • Today we see hundreds of destabilizing situations in what we can now call • THE NEW WORLD DISORDER
How We Went About It • Interviewed more than 70 people • Senior policy and military customers • NSC, State, Defense, Treasury, USTR • JCS, Commands • Senior intelligence managers and workers • Production agencies • Collectors and reporters • Reviewed lots of documentation
Customers’ Needs • Fairly simple: can be listed on one page • Vast majority can be substantially met with open sources of information • But this demands precision collection, expert knowledge, and processing
Basic Requirements • Political—who is in, who is out • Economic • Diplomatic • Military • Societal • Infrastructure • Geospatial • US Interests
Selected Key Findings • Consensus in GC’s importance • But few at lower levels aware of DCI’s strong support • Poor communication from DCI downwards • Customer believed appropriate balance of effort should be 70/30 • Intelligence managers believed it should be 90/10 • Poor communications with customers
Selected Key Findings • Broad consensus among customers regarding needs • But none among intelligence managers • Poor communication • Turf issues • Divergent views of what intelligence program resources should be included • Strong military position that all “their” resources “off limits” • Turf trumps common interest
Selected Key Findings • Widespread concern regarding open sources • How viewed by senior managers • How used by analysts • Current and projected resources • Need to look seriously at “commercial industry of open source providers” • Acquire processed “knowledge” not just information
Framework • Effective program requires clear, universal understanding on three key points: • Strategic intent: what do you want to achieve? • Definition of “global coverage” – what should it mean to everyone? • Community framework: overall concept
Strategic Intent • Three options: • Global Intelligence • “Full service” but on a limited scale • Enough coverage so there are few surprises • Focused Attention • Avoid defined categories of “major” surprises. Accept others, respond well • Quick Reaction • Accept many surprises, and focus on efficient response.
Definition • What is “Global Coverage?” Two options. • UNIVERSAL meaning of GC: • General information for all countries, everything that is not a hard target issue • RESTRICTED meaning of GC: • Intelligence for a defined set of countries • Which countries? • What substance?
Framework • What are the pillars of Global Coverage? ONE OPTION. No other came close. • Minimum baseline • Knowledge, expertise, resources routinely applied • Watch • Focus of routine attention to meet warning objectives • Surge • Focused increase in resources to address a developing situation • Routine Services • Servicing customers’ routine (non-crisis) needs
Conclusions/Recommendations • If everything is a priority, nothing is…. • First, decide on strategic intent • Second, focus on what is essential • Requirements versus “desirements” • Difficult but explicit decisions about which risks are acceptable and which are not • Develop a common language • Consistent definitions—common understanding
Conclusions/Recommendations • Establish a common framework—the pillars • Minimum baseline—what to “know” all the time • Watch—what to watch all the time • Surge—how to get better fast, when needed • Routine services—juggling customers’ non-crisis needs • MAKE EXPLICIT CHOICES ABOUT HOW YOU ARE GOING TO HANDLE EACH • If you cannot measure it, you cannot manage it. • Regular program of evaluation • “Trust but verify”—the Achilles’ heel of management
What Happened? • NOTHING! • DCI said “thanks” and shelved the study • Only “decision” was to decide nothing • Several senior managers praised report • Only copies disseminated were those I circulated for comment.