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Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels. Phase III Ground Safety Review 22 Feb 2010. Review of Hazard. Hazard to be controlled is structural failure of Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs). Structural failure from overpressurization. Structural failure from damage to overwrap.

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Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels

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  1. Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels Phase III Ground Safety Review 22 Feb 2010

  2. Review of Hazard • Hazard to be controlled is structural failure of Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs). • Structural failure from overpressurization. • Structural failure from damage to overwrap. • AMS-02 has three COPVs • Xenon Tank and Carbon Dioxide Tanks for the TRD Gas Supply. • Warm Helium Tank for the Cryomagnet.

  3. TRD Gas Tanks • Xenon and CO2 is stored in two COPVs in Box S. • Both tanks were manufactured by Arde’ and are duplicates of previous designs. • Xenon tank was previously used on ISS Plasma Contactor Unit (PCU) • CO2 tank was previously used on X-33.

  4. TRD Gas Supply Installed Configuration

  5. TRD Tanks Damage Protection • TRD tanks inspected by Arde’ after manufacturing and found to be free of defects. • Fiberglass covers installed to protect tank surface during ground handling and installation. Removed on three occasions. • Allow installation of the tank heaters. • Allow potting of the tank thermostats and fit check of MLI. • Allow final installation of the tank MLI. • Covers will remain on until flight MMOD shields installed, which will protect tanks from incidental contact.

  6. TRD Heaters and Thermostats • Heaters and thermostats were added to the outside surface of the tanks. • Procedure reviewed by MIT and Arde’. • Work done by MIT technician with Arde’ QA present. • Tanks reinspected and proof pressure test redone after installation.

  7. TRD MLI Installation and Final Inspection • At GSRP request, inspectors from WSTF reinspected the tanks just prior to final MLI installation. • During removal of temporary covers and installation of MMOD shield, quality support reviewed all steps per WSTF instructions.

  8. TRD Gas Supply Installed Configuration

  9. Warm Helium Tank • Warm Helium Tank is also a COPV manufactured by Arde’. • Tank is identical to previous design used on Pegasus vehicle. • Tank was designed for MDP of 5800 psi in Pegasus application, but AMS-02 will only pressurize to 2900 psi.

  10. Warm Helium Tank Installed Configuration

  11. Warm Helium Tank Damage Protection • Warm Helium Tank was inspected at Arde’ prior to shipment and found to be free of defects. • Upon delivery to SM, tank was stored in its shipping crate physically separate from main work area. • Tank was installed on Vacuum Case concurrently with its rigid MMOD shield, which protects the tank from incidental contact. • MMOD shield was removed once at CERN to allow final inspection of tank by WSTF inspectors.

  12. COPV Structural Analysis and Testing • Tanks have all been verified against AIAA-S-081 design requirements. • Required burst factor of 1.5 x MDP • Xenon tank: 3.1 x MDP • CO2 tank: 2.0 x MDP • Helium tank: 2.5 x MDP • Required proof test to 1.5 x MOP • Xenon tank: 1.8 x MOP • CO2 tank: 3.3 x MOP • Helium tank: 2.5 x MOP • MDP used in all calculations is the on-orbit MDP. Max temperature, and therefore pressure, is considerably higher than KSC operations.

  13. Stress Rupture Calculations • Scott Forth/ES4 calculated stress ratios for all three COPVs based on flight MDP • Warm Helium Tank 0.365 @ 2900 psi • TRD CO2 Tank 0.5 @ 3200 psi • TRD Xenon Tank 0.5 @ 3000 psi • TRD numbers use conservative assumptions for strain at failure during qualification burst testing. Additional data being requested from manufacturer which may improve these numbers.

  14. Proof Test Requirements • KNPR 8715.3 para 13.18.1c and d require an inspection and proof pressure test prior to first pressurization at KSC. • All COPVs will arrive at KSC filled. No top-offs of these vessels are currently planned. • COPVs will have already demonstrated structural integrity for KSC environment. • All vessels will have already held pressure for months. • Thermal environment from thermal/vac testing will envelope anything seen at KSC. • All vessels will have seen vibration environment from multiple plane and truck transports. • Tanks will not be emptied and refilled.

  15. Special Ground Handling Requirements • KNPR 8715.3 paras 13.8.1e, f, and g have special handling requirements if tanks are pressurized above 1/3 design burst pressure. • None of the AMS-02 tanks will pass this limit: • Xenon Tank: Burst pressure 9300 psid, MOP 2500 psid (26.9%) • CO2 Tank: Burst pressure 6400 psid, MOP 1440 psid (22.5%) • Warm Helium Tank: Burst pressure 8700 psid, MOP 2900 psid (33.3%)

  16. Proposed Safety Controls • AMS-02 COPVs are low risk for sudden failure. • Tanks have been fully certified to all design and analysis requirements in KNPR 8715.3 and AIAA-S-081. • Tanks will be filled prior to arrival and will have held pressure for months. • Tanks will be protected by MMOD shields during all KSC operations. • Tanks will never be loaded above 1/3 of burst pressure. • No additional controls apart from standard pressure vessel regulations should be required.

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