High-Assurance Security/Safety on HPEC Systems: an Oxymoron?

1. High-Assurance Security/Safety on HPEC Systems: an Oxymoron? HPEC Poster 30-SEP-2004 W. Mark Vanfleet Senior NSA/IAD Security Analyst wvanflee@restarea.ncsc.mil Bill Beckwith Objective Interface Systems CEO/CTO bill.beckwith@ois.com This presentation represents joint research between the Air Force, Army, Navy, NSA, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Objective Interface, Green Hills, LynuxWorks, Wind River, GD, Rockwell Collins, MITRE, U of Idaho

2. The Whole Point of MILS Really simple: • Dramatically increase the scrutiny of security critical code • Dramatically reduce the amount of security critical code High-Assurance, Real-Time MILS Architecture

3. Orange Book vs.MILS Architecture Network I/O File systems Device drivers MAC Auditing DAC Monolithic Applications User Mode Monolithic Kernel Damage Limitation Periods Processing Information Flow Data isolation Privilege Mode Kernel High-Assurance, Real-Time MILS Architecture

4. Orange Book vs.MILS Architecture CSCI (Main Program) Mathematical Verification Network I/O File systems Device drivers MAC Auditing DAC User Mode Middleware Partitioning Kernel Information Flow Data isolation Privilege Mode Periods Processing Damage Limitation Kernel High-Assurance, Real-Time MILS Architecture

5. PartitioningCommunication System Zero-copy Secure Communications Channel A C PCS PCS F D B High-Assurance, Real-Time MILS Architecture

6. Partitioning the Channel A B MILS Rapid-IO C D E F High-Assurance, Real-Time MILS Architecture