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CONGRESS AND EXTERNAL ACTORS. I. The Federal Bureaucracy II. The President III. Interest Groups IV. The Courts (if time allows). WHY CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT?. Congress’ Powers over Bureaucracy 1.) Creation/reauthorization/reorganization 2.) Funding
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CONGRESS AND EXTERNAL ACTORS I. The Federal BureaucracyII. The PresidentIII. Interest Groups IV. The Courts (if time allows)
WHY CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT? • Congress’ Powers over Bureaucracy • 1.) Creation/reauthorization/reorganization2.) Funding • Why Does Congress Delegate So Much Power to the Bureauracy?1.) lack of technical expertise2.) ethical problems in implementation3.) shifting responsibility4.) unanticipated/changing circumstances • Structure of Federal Bureaucracy • Effects of Divided Government on Delegation
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: The Big Picture • The Principal-Agent Problem • “Police Patrol” vs. “Fire Alarm” Oversight • Congress Equips itself for the 20th Century 19461.) Administrative Procedures Act (APA)2.) Legislative Reorganization Act • DHS Creation involved minor congressional reorganization
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT TECHNIQUES • 1.) Oversight hearings by standing committees (mandatory oversight plans) • 2.) General oversight committees: House Govt. Reform and Oversight Cmttee, Senate Homeland Security and Govt. Affairs • 3.) Special investigative committees • SIDE NOTE: Witch hunts, fishing expeditions, or genuine oversight? Watkins v. US (1957)
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT TECHNIQUES • 4.) The regular authorizations/appropriations process • 5.) Legislative Veto (incl. committee veto and one-house veto) • INS v. Chadha (1983) • --Congressional Review Act of 1996 • 6.) Inspectors General
OVERSIGHT TECHNIQUES cont’d 7.) Whistleblowers and Ordinary CitizensFederal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (2006) (a.k.a “Google the government” Act 8.) Mandated reports by executive agencies to Congress 9.) Confirmation process for political appointees
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT • Brief history: early presidential involvement in legislation rare and unwelcome • Progressive Presidents: TR and Wilson • The institutionalized “legislative presidency” FDR ---use of OMB for legislative functions • Eisenhower: established OCR
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT • Political Scientists Try to Explain/Predict Presidential Success with Congress1.) Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power (1960) • Power = persuasion = bargaining • Reasons why bargaining model fell out of favor: difficulty in quantifying/testing; changes in Congress (e.g. multiple referral); growth of media; polling, and transparency; budget problems; divided government 2.) Samuel Kernell’s Going Public (1986) inspired by early Reagan success
CONGRESS and PRESIDENT cont’d • 3.) Congress-Centered models (1990s)---success determined mainly by party/ideology • ---approval/popularity among public is not correlated with congressional success (examples) • Applying what we’ve learned about Congress to presidential success • A.) Importance of majority statusB.) Differences between House and SenateC.) Causes and consequences of changes in party unity over time
CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT cont’d • LATEST RESEARCH • 1.) How and why presidential popularity may matter after allresearch by Brandice Canes-Wrone Who Leads Whom? 2.) More sophisticated measures of presidential “success”
CONGRESS AND INTEREST GROUPS • Growth in Interest Group presence in DC---who? why? • What are the goals of lobbying? What behaviors are they trying to influence? • 1.) DIRECT LOBBYING – what is it? • Who does it? • a.) “hired guns” b.) “in-house” lobbyistsc.) citizen-lobbyists • Advantages and disadvantages of each type of lobbyist
CONGRESS AND INTEREST GROUPS • 2.) INDIRECT LOBBYING • Grassroots, Astroturf, and Grasstops • 3.) PAC CONTRIBUTIONS • Why is so much lobbying and PAC $$$ concentrated on known supporters? • 4.) “FEELGOOD” PR CAMPAIGNS5.) UNCONVENTIONAL TECHNIQUES
CONGRESS AND INTEREST GROUPS • Lobbying Regulation • 1.) 1946 Lobbying Act – why it failed (US v. Harris, 1954)2.) Lobby Disclosure Act of 1995 • Does Lobbying Subvert “the Public Interest”?Differences in lobbying dynamics across policy areas: concentrated vs. dispersed costs vs. beneftis
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS • Congressional Influence on CourtsI.ConfirmationsA.) District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeal--”Senatorial courtesy”--Increasing delays; threat of “nuclear option” in 2005 • Why have lower court nominations become so politicized?1.) increasing involvement in hot-button issues2.) small size of Supreme Court docket3.) recruitment of SC justices from lower courts
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS • B.) Supreme Court Politicization began earlier----but when? Early rejections---Abe Fortas 1968 ---Haynesworth and Carswell Little objection to Scalia and Rehnquist upgrade 1986 THE BORK PHENOMENON 19871.) Democrats regain Senate 19862.) Qualified and ethical, but long paper trail3.) “Critical nomination” THOMAS NOMINATION 1991 – ideology and ethics
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS • II. Congressional Influence on Size, Shape JurisdictionA. Reconstruction manipulationB. FDR’s court-packing scheme and recent threatsWhy doesn’t Congress mess with the SC more than they do? • III. Impeachment
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS • Courts’ Influence on CongressI. As Referee between Exec and Legis. • A.) Cases where Court stopped unwanted Exec infringement on Legis power--Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (1952)--Why/how Court avoids ruling on War Powers • B.) Cases where Congress improperly exercised exec functions • INS v. Chadha (1983), Bowsher v. Synar (1986) • C.) Cases where Congress delegated too much of its own power to ExecSchecter Poultry v. US (1935), AFL-CIO v. Amer. Petro. Institute (1980), Clinton v. City of New York (1998)
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS • II. Court Rules on Constitutionality of Congress’ Own ProceduresA.) Refusal to seat members: Powell v. MacCormack (1969)B.) Franking privilege(CEPC v. Runyon, 1992; DC Circuit Court of Appeals) • C.) Congressional investigations: McGrain v. Daugherty (1927); Watkins v. US (1957) • D.)“Speech and Debate” clause: Gravel v. US (1972); Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979)
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS • III. Judicial Review and Statutory InterpretationJud. Review started with Marbury v. Madison (1803); Dred Scott (1857) • RECENT DEVELOPMENTS in Jud. Review---Becoming more frequent! (see table) • Interstate Commerce Clause: US v. Lopez (1995), US v. Morrison (2000)’; States’ sovereign immunity (11th Amendment): Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett (2001)
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS • Examples of Statutory Interpretation---Title IX (passed in 1972), interpreted in Grove City v. Bell (1984), interpretation overturned in 1987 (Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987)
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS • WHO HAS THE LAST WORD? • Congressional Responses to Federal laws struck down 1953-1997No response -- 28%Simple repeal of legislation – 14%Pass new/amended legislation – 47%Amend Constitution – 1%
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS • NO RESPONSE EXAMPLES--Printz v. US (1997) and the “Brady Bill”—struck down a provision that was temporary anyway • --Marshall v. Barlow (1978) struck down a statute “as applied” rather than “on its face” • SIMPLE REPEAL EXAMPLES--Subversive Activities Control Act ---created in 1950, struck down in 1965, left for dead--Marijuana Tax Act
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS • NEW LAW/AMENDED LAW EXAMPLES • ---Gun Free School Zones version 2.0---Social Security Act (benefits for illegitimate children)---FECA: spending only limited for candidates receiving Federal funds • CONGRESSIONAL ANTICIPATION OF COURT CONCERNSex. McCain-Feingold Act 2002: regulate timing more than contentNO ADVISORY OPINIONS: why not? • (Governance project mentioned in text---small step in that direction)