How Can the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Itself Reinforce “Assurance” and “Dissuasion?”

1. How Can the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Itself Reinforce “Assurance” and “Dissuasion?” John R. Harvey National Nuclear Security Administration Presentation to IFPA-Fletcher Conference “Implementing the New Triad: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Forces in 21st Century Deterrence” 15 December 2005

2. Basic Issue • Major NPR insight: Defense R&D and manufacturing base is key leg of “New Triad” of strategic capabilities for achieving defense policy goals. • assure • dissuade • deter • defend/defeat • Nuclear weapons enterprise is critical element of that base. • Key question: How might we “convey” operations/activities of the nuclear enterprise to better achieve defense goals? • focus is on “assure” and “dissuade.”

3. “Its not just the forces . . . “ • Defense R&D/manufacturing infrastructure permits U.S. to sustain and modernize forces and adapt them to new or emerging threats. • Key features that draw respect (the “wow” factor) world-wide • excellence of scientific/engineering personnel engaged in defense R&D, • ability to bring advanced defense technology rapidly to the field, • demonstration of capabilities in warfare or other venues. • There has been a demonstrable impact on U.S. national security in numerous cases including end of Cold War.

4. Some historical examples • Manhattan Project and the end of WW II • Space program (leveraged off of military programs) • Strategic modernization program of 1970’s, early 80’s • MX, Trident, B-1/2, cruise missiles, stealth, SDI, etc. • key factor in convincing Soviets that arms race with U.S. was futile. • Desert Storm demonstration of high-tech weapons, C3I, ability to organize large-scale military operations and move forces to theater • “wake up call” for Russia, China, others that they were far behind • possible impetus for “asymmetric response” from rogue states • Other examples • Bosnia and Kosovo • Afghanistan • Iraq War II • May have been key factor in Libya’s decision to give up WMD pgms

5. Role of defense R&D and industrial base in achieving defense policy goals • Assure allies/friends of U.S. commitments • sustaining/modernizing robust and credible nuclear “umbrella” • demonstrable capability and will to use discriminate conventional force when interests threatened • achieve objectives with very low unintended impacts • Dissuade adversary from challenging U.S. interests • ability to produce in quantity--even with smaller U.S. nuke forces, adversary would conclude that his buildup could not occur more quickly than U.S. could respond • ability to innovate--small builds of special purpose weapons (e.g., B-61-11) to counter specific high-value targets, • BMD capabilities could discourage ballistic missile acquisition.

6. What are the elements of a “responsive nuclear infrastructure”? • Excellent, trained, well-managed workforce • Enhanced science and technology base including modern, maintained research facilities • Efficient, modern, “right-sized” manufacturing facilities • Revamped business practices and technical processes that permit rapid and flexible response to emerging needs • Frequent, end-to-end exercise of key capabilities • to remain highly responsive • to train the next-generation workforce

7. What are the goals of a “responsive infrastructure”? • Job 1: Assure stockpile safety, reliability, performance • Respond rapidly to stockpile “surprise.” • Respond “in time” to changes in the international security environment. • Reinforce “assurance” and “dissuasion” by conveying our capabilities to friends and potential adversaries • an often unstated goal that we now explore • how to get our arms around this issue?

8. Basic Approach: Strategic Communications • Context-specific, targetted effort of N/W enterprise to convey information to allies, friends, potential adversaries that we: • are paying attention to sustaining our nuclear deterrent, • seek, if need be, to modernize that deterrent to ensure that we can hold high-value targets at risk, • have the capabilities and commitment to do both. • “Context-specific”: that is, seek to influence specific decisions of specific countries • Caution--must be consistent with U.S. national values and law • source of information clear • no public deception campaign or disinformation • rather, enhanced transparency into certain ongoing programs

9. Basic Approach (continued) • Identification of opportunities to convey: • excellence of our scientific and technical personnel, • commitment to achieve the tools for stockpile stewardship, • efforts to restore the capability/capacity of our manufacturing base, • commitment to warhead LEPs and advanced development work, • commitment to achieving stockpile transformation and RI. • Increased transparency in nuclear posture and programs: • congressional testimony and associated debate, • public presentations to diverse domestic and foreign audiences, • access to foreign media to witness major programmatic events • rocket-sled tests • activities at the U1A sub-critical experimental facility at NTS • test readiness exercises (rad-chem, Unicorn, etc) • nuclear forensics and attribution capabilities • selected declassification of information

10. An example: nuclear attribution • Problem: Nuke detonation on U.S. soil with no clear origin • Goal: Dissuade rogue states from transfering nuke warheads to terrorist groups • Fact: From nuclear test programs (both foreign and domestic), national labs have developed extensive rad-chem forensics capabilities and fissile materials data bases • Elements of a “dissuasive” strategy • provide selected insights into lab forensics/attribution capabilities, • declaratory policy: retaliation will be directed at source of nuke (corollary: “you lose a weapon, you better tell us”) • Risk: Inadvertant release of sensitive information about how well we can attribute.

11. Another example: RRW • Problem: Concern about long-term safety/reliability of Cold War stockpile. • Goal: Assure allies that we intend to sustain nuclear weapons capabilities into indefinite future. • Fact: Ambitious RRW program underway to mangage risk coupled with reasonably strong support from Congress. • Elements of an assurance strategy • brief allies on the program • convey strong interest at the national labs in advancing this effort • Risk: Heralding the program could stimulate opposition.

12. Downside Risks • Information is blunt instrument not easily “directed.” • could stimulate what we seek to dissuade • Compromise of sensitive information • Generate accusations of “managing the news” • Ruffle the feathers of the “NPT Article VI crowd” • Facilitate CI targetting of programs/personnel

13. What next? • Develop further the ideas and concepts articulated in this very preliminary briefing. • Possible goal: Establish within the nuclear enterprise “centers” for conveying messages of “assurance” and “dissuasion” targetted to specific foreign audiences. • Challenge 1: Getting the scientists and engineers at NNSA labs and plants to be sensitive to the broader defense policy implications of their day to day activities. • Challenge 2: Finding the right balance between transparency and operational and information security.

14. Back-Up Slides

15. What are the specific goals for an RI? • On appropriate timescales: • dismantle warheads; • ensure warheads available to augment op-deployed force; • identify, understand, and fix stockpile problems; • design, develop, certify, and FPU refurbished or replacement warheads; • maintain capability to design, develop, and FPU new or adapted warheads; • produce required quantities of warheads; • sustain underground nuclear test readiness. • An RI must also: • ensure an economically sustainable nuclear weapons enterprise; • demonstrate nuclear competencies that assure allies, dissuade adversaries, and ensure against technological surprise.