EXPLAINING PARTY SYSTEMS ii

1. EXPLAINING PARTY SYSTEMS ii Lijphart 62-77 and 143-170 Lipset and Rokkan, Duverger, Cox

2. Guiding Questions • Which factors do sociological approaches of party systems emphasize? • What is a cleavage? • How are they translated into party systems? • What are electoral systems? • What are SMD systems? PR systems? Differences? • How do electoral systems shape party systems? • What is Duverger’s Law?

3. Sociological Accounts • Lipset and Rokkan 1967 • What shapes party systems?: • Social cleavages. • Although not all cleavages result in parties. • Cleavages: social divisions separating a given society. • Research question: • Why do we see two party systems in Anglo-American systems and multiparty systems in Europe? • Answer: • Resolution of historical conflicts (cleavage patterns) explain differences.

4. Explaining European Party Systems: Critical Junctures and Critical Cleavages • Lipset and Rokkan 1967 • How do we get from cleavages, to parties, to party systems? • Exogenous shocks to the system (critical junctures) make certain cleavages salient. • Parties form in response • The timing of societal conflict coupled with which side “wins” shapes political parties. • These cleavage patterns in turn, shape party systems (i.e. which types of parties exist within a system). • Variation in cleavage patterns explains differences across systems. • Identifies four major cleavages which shape European party systems. • Shaped by national revolutions and industrialization. • First three cleavages shape the center and the right; the last cleavage shapes the left.

5. Critical Junctures: National Revolutions CENTER-PERIPHERY STATE-CHURCH • Protestant Reformation • Control by the center vs. control by the localities. • Centralized state vs. ethnic, religious, linguistic communities in the periphery. • Shapes: conservatives, separatists, (liberals) • National Revolutions • Post 1789-French Revolution • State control of education vs. Church control. • Shapes: Christian Democrats

6. Critical Junctures: Industrial Revolution LAND-INDUSTRY OWNER-WORKER • Industrial Revolution • 19th century. • Primary vs. secondary economy • Agriculture vs. manufacturing • Tariffs vs. free enterprise? • Shapes: agrarians, (liberals). • Russian Revolution • Post 1917 • Integrate workers vs. repressing labor. • Allow access to system. • Join an international movement? • Shapes: socialists and communists.

7. OWNER LABOR DIVIDED SOCIALISTS OPPRESSED COMM-Y WORKER LABOR UNITED SOCIALISTS INTEGRATED COMM-N OWNER WORKER LABOR UNIFIED SOCIALISTS INTEGRATED COMM-N OWNER WORKER LABOR DIVIDED SOCIALISTS OPPRESSED COMM-Y OWNER WORKER LABOR UNIFIED SOCIALISTS INTEGRATED COMM-N

8. Freezing of Party Systems • Lipset and Rokkan 1967 • Modern party systems of reflect the same patterns of cleavage structure observed in the 1920’s. • After universal suffrage, no further expansion of the electorate. • Cleavage patterns and their resulting party systems are “frozen” • Has fostered a great deal of debate within the literature.

9. Evaluating Lipset and Rokkan STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES • Shows the importance of societal context in party formation. • Explains why parties form. • Explains why we see certain types of parties in some systems but not in others. • Rise of post materialist parties (Greens) challenges the freezing hypothesis. • Suggest that institutions really do not matter. • But then why do politicians tweak them? • No predictive ability. • How do we know when a “critical juncture” will occur?

10. Institutional Accounts and Electoral Systems • Institutional accounts of party systems frequently link the number of political parties to the electoral system • Electoral systems: • Translates vote shares into seat shares in the allocation of political offices. • Shapes party systems, partisan composition, representation, coalition formation, etc. • Two types of electoral systems: plurality (SMD/plurality/majoritarian) and proportional (PR). • Dis-proportionality is higher in SMD systems than in PR systems. • Differences exist within PR systems which also affect proportionality.

11. SMD/Plurality/Majoritarian Systems • Referred to as single member district (SMD) or “first past the post” • A single candidate is elected in each electoral district (district magnitude =1). • Whoever receives the most votes, wins. • Generally manufactures a majority for the largest parties. • Gerrymandering can reduce electoral turnover. • Denies representation to smaller parties to provide stability in coalition creation. • Used in the United Kingdom for parliamentary elections. • Used with a runoff system in France.

12. SMD/United Kingdom • Parties nominate candidates for each constituency. • 650 seats at the last election • Whoever gets the most votes in a district, wins. • Doesn’t matter if the candidate has a majority or not. • Typically manufactures a majority for either the Conservatives or Labour. • Although this didn’t happen in 2010 • UK uses PR for most other local and regional elections

13. Proportional Representation • Various types of PR exist. • Closed/Open List • STV • Candidates are elected by party list in multi-member districts (district magnitude >1). • Parties receive a number of seats proportional to their percentage of the vote. • Various methods of allocation. • Electoral threshold determines which parties gain access to the legislature. • Allows for more proportionate outcomes, but makes coalition formation more difficult. • Most European systems use some form of PR.

14. PR/Closed List: Belgium • Parties create electoral lists for each district. • Citizens vote party in the voting booth • Parties receive roughly the same percentage of seats as their vote share. • Order of list determines which individuals get elected. • Voters do not have any influence over the list order. • Threshold: 5 %

15. PR/Open List: Netherlands • Parties create electoral lists for each district. • One large district of 150 seats. • Open list allows voters to express a preference for certain candidates over others on a party list. • Allows for “re-arranging” party representation. • All parties receiving more than .67% get representation.

16. PR/STV: Ireland • Uses STV • 166 TD’s from 43 multimember constituencies. • Voters rank as many candidates as they wish. • 1 next to their favorite, 2 next to second choice, etc. • How do you determine who wins? • Candidates reaching quota are elected. • Quota: minimum number of votes to be elected.

17. PR/STV: Ireland • Candidates reaching quota on the first count are automatically elected. • Any extra votes for elected candidates are then shifted to second preferences. • Candidates in last place are eliminated. • Votes are redistributed to second preferences. • Counting continues until all seats are allocated.

18. What Could Have Been: UK Election 2010 ELECTION RESULTS WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN… • CONSERVATIVES: 306 (+97) • LABOUR: 258 (-91) • LIBERAL DEMS 57 (-5) • SNP 6 (NC) • PC 3 (+1) • OTHERS 19 (-2) • DUP 8 (-1) • SF 5 (NC) • SDLP 3 (NC) • ALLIANCE 1 (+1) • OTHERS 1 (+1) • Alternative Vote (AV): • Maintains ties to constituency-1 MP per district • Voters rank the candidates • Conservatives: 281 • Labour: 262 • Liberal Democrats: 79 • Others: 28 • Single Transferable Vote (STV): • Voters rank candidates-district magnitude higher than1 • Conservatives: 246 • Labour: 207 • Liberal Democrats: 162 • Others: 35

19. Mixed Systems: Germany • Mixed system • 299 seats elected by SMD and 299 seats elected by PR. • Voters cast two ballots: • 1) one for a candidate within their electoral district (SMD) • SMD seats attempt to create a personal mandate. • 2) one for a political party at the land level (PR). • PR seats attempt to ensure proportionality.

20. Mixed Systems: Germany • Parties must receive 5% of the national vote or win 3 constituencies to get their PR seats. • High threshold keeps far right parties out of office. • PR list vote attempts to compensate parties • 2009: Gr/B90 • Won one SMD seat (Berlin) • Received 10.7% of the national vote • Allocated 67 PR seats and 1 SMD seat. • Parties winning more seats at the SMD level than they are allotted by the PR level can keep them (excess mandates) • 2009: CDU/CSU • SMD totals in Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg exceeded what they would have been entitled to under PR. • 24 overhang seats were allocated to reflect this.

21. Institutional Accounts • Institutional discussions of party systems typically focus on electoral institutions. • Although other institutional factors may also be relevant towards explaining the number of political parties. • Duverger 1954 • Two party systems are preferable to multiparty systems. • Two party systems are “natural” as a “duality of tendencies” exist on any issue. • Center is an artificial construct which does not truly exist. • Always split by moderates of the left and right (i.e. superimposed dualisms). • Two party systems reflect natural dualism of political issues. • Preferable to multipartism

22. Dualisms • Duverger 1954 • Not all “dualisms” are created equal. • Certain dualisms can threaten democracy. • Technical dualism: • Differences between parties revolve around issues. • Legitimacy of system and institutions accepted by both parties. • Metaphysical dualism: • Differences between parties revolve around fundamentals of the regime (i.e. institutions, etc). • Threatens stability.

23. Electoral Institutions and Party Systems • Duverger 1954 • Duvergers' Law: “simple majority single ballot systems favours the two-party system” • Mechanical effects. • Psychological effects. • FPTP with a runoff does not reduce the number of parties. • Parties have incentives to compete in the first round and then coordinate in the second round. • Multiparty systems promoted by proportional representation. • PR systems lack the mechanical and psychological effects to reduce the number of parties. • All parties possess internal divisions of opinion (factions). • In systems with permissive electoral laws factionalization can result in the creation of center parties.

24. Overlapping Dualisms and Multipartyism • Multiparty systems can arise from: • 1) party factions • 2) overlapping dualisms. • Overlapping dualisms exist where several issues are salient, but duality of opinions on these issues do not overlap. • Example: French Fourth Republic • Three Dualisms • 1) Clerical-Anticlerical • 2) East-West • 3) Freedom-Planning

25. Evaluating Duverger STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES • FPTP does reduce the number of parties. • Although concentrated support can make a third party viable. • Runoff systems using FPTP result in multiparty systems. • Admits that while two party systems are “natural” electoral manipulation to reduce the number of parties may not always be wise. • Example: Italian First Republic., Israel. • Dualist” countries use FPTP • Suggests that the selection of certain institutions may be based on societal attributes. • Supportive of sociological explanations. • The types of parties contesting elections “matter” • Supportive of competition models.

26. Conclusions: Evaluating Sociological and Institutional Explanations • Both overlook the ability of party leaders to shape cleavage patterns. • Party leaders can exploit cleavages for electoral success. • Cox 1997 • Both cleavages and institutions matter • “Symbiotic relationship” exists between the two. • Electoral system provides an upper limit (or upper bound) on the number of political parties within a system. • Systems without multiple cleavages would not have multiple parties.

27. Next Unit • Theme: Party System Change: Realignment and Dealignment • Lijphart 78-89, Inglehart and Flanagan, Flanagan and Dalton