Horgan and Tienson

1. Phenomenology and Intentionality PIC is too strong for propositional attitudes “Mental states of the sort commonly cited as paradigmatically intentional (e.g. cognitive states such as beliefs, and conative states such as desires), when conscious, have phenomenal character that is inseparable from their intentional content” (HT 520). Some kind of covariation relation is necessary to make PI plausible. But any kind of covariation must be too strong for non-perceptual propositional attitudes. Therefore, PI is too strong for non-perceptual propositional attitudes. It is implausible that everyone who entertains p has the same phenomenology. Consider, for example, HT’s example of wondering whether it is meatloaf for dinner tonight…. Abstract Horgan and Tienson (2002) argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states which is not established by Horgan and Tienson’s arguments; that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief; and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content / fixer of truth conditions. • Horgan and Tienson • The Principle of Phenomenal Intentionality (PI): “There is a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone” (2002, 520). • HT call this sub-species of content phenomenal intentional content (PIC). • They argue for PI by showing that “any two possible phenomenal duplicates have exactly similar intentional states vis-à-vis such content” (524). To do this they use a representative example: you and your phenomenal duplicate having the experience of seeing a picture hanging crooked. • HT argue this phenomenology is sufficient • to determine “conditions of accuracy,” which they equate with narrow truth conditions. • They argue that not only perceptual experience but perceptual belief have this phenomenal intentional content. • They argue that “a wide range of propositional-attitude states whose content goes well beyond the presentations of perceptual experience itself” (525) also have phenomenal intentional content. • Thus, they say, any experiencing creature that undergoes “the distinctive phenomenal what-it’s-like of believing that a picture is hanging crooked” (526) thereby believes that there is a picture hanging crooked. • PIC is too weak for perception • The identification or conflation of phenomenal with phenomenal intentional perceptual states does not follow from HT’s argument. • HT do not provide any reasons to think that a given phenomenal intentional content must always be associated with a given phenomenal state—that is, that fixing the narrow content of a perception determines its phenomenology. • So their PIC is consistent with all the following having the same PIC as me (and each other) when looking at an orange: • a spectrum-invert • a blind person wearing Bach-y-Rita’s tactile stimulation machine • a zombie • So PIC does not support PI: phenomenology does not constitute content in the right way. • What we require is some reason to think that orange experiences are ‘of’ orange because they are like this rather than like that (like other colour experiences, for example, or experiences from other sensory modalities): i.e. a kind of covariation. Compositionality Constraints “[S]ensory-phenomenal experience, by itself, determines conditions of accuracy” (HT 524). This requires a kind of isomorphism between phenomenology and intentionality such that the components of propositions which determine the proposition’s truth conditions are reflected by components of phenomenology which combine to determine truth conditions. At a minimum there must be some phenomenal difference to capture the different (narrow) truth conditions of all possible propositions. But since phenomenology doesn’t have the right kind of separable parts, and since its parts are not compositional like those of a proposition, it is not possible for it to be structurally isomorphic with a proposition. E.g.: consider HT’s Quinean example “Rabbits have tails.” Andrew Bailey T. Brad Richards Philosophy Department University of Guelph Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1, Canada abailey@uoguelph.ca www.uoguelph.ca/~abailey