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Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil War: Understanding Post-War Violence and Ethnic Separation

Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil War: Understanding Post-War Violence and Ethnic Separation. Carter Johnson Tbilisi June 24, 2011. Presentation Overview. Motivation Conventional theory of partition and civil war termination Focus on separating ethnic minorities

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Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil War: Understanding Post-War Violence and Ethnic Separation

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  1. Partition as a Solution toEthnic Civil War:Understanding Post-War Violence and Ethnic Separation Carter Johnson Tbilisi June 24, 2011

  2. Presentation Overview • Motivation • Conventional theory of partition and civil war termination • Focus on separating ethnic minorities • Case Study of Georgia-Abkhazia and Moldova-Transnistria (1994-1998) • Develop alternative explanation • Refine Ethnic Security Dilemma • Focus state building and balance of power

  3. Ethnic Civil War Termination Partition gaining acceptance in policy communities Sudan, Kosovo, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Afghanistan No consensus on partition’s effectiveness (Mearsheimer, Sambanis, Kaufmann, Downes) Controversy over the need for ethnic separation

  4. Literature on Civil War Termination • Negotiated Settlements: Power-Sharing/Autonomy (Horowitz, Ghai, Lijphart, O’Leary) • Peacekeeping/3rd Party Security Guarantees (Walter, Fortna, Sambanis, Doyle) • Realpolitic/Military Victory • (Luttwak, Toft)

  5. Conventional Partition Argument Ethnic Security Dilemma: • Ethnic civil war rigidly divides ethnic groups and prevents post-war cooperation • Pockets of ethnic minorities “left-behind” partition line create • offensive opportunities • defensive vulnerabilities

  6. Triadic Political Space 3 1 2

  7. Method • Structured Comparative Case Studies • Georgia-Abkhazia (1994-1998) • Moldova-Transnistria (1993-1997)

  8. Sources • Interviews • Civilian • Military/Police • Government • Militants • Archival Material

  9. Abkhazia1994-1998 Counter-Intuitive Cooperation: • Ethnic Georgian civilians demonstrate (limited) cooperation with Abkhaz authorities • Ethnic Georgians demonstrate aversion to cooperation with Georgian militants Evidence from Abkhaz officials, Georgians in Gali, and Georgian militants in Zugdidi

  10. What Militants Said • “We didn’t know which [Georgians] were ours and which were theirs.” Georgian Militant 1 (June 2008) • “Of course they [Georgians in Gali] interfered (meshali) in our operations, the [expletive] traitors – they should be shot.” Georgian Militant 2 (March 2008) • “After a couple of years we began talking amongst ourselves in Russian, so locals [in Gali] would think we were Russian or Abkhaz.” Ethnic Georgian Militant 3 (July 2008)

  11. Abkhazia’s “Six Day War”May 1998 Joint invasion of: • Non-state militants • Unofficial military • Official Ministry of Interior troops Where do the invade? • Only lower Gali region

  12. Partial Invasion: Lower Gali

  13. Comparative State-Building: Lower and Upper Gali • Lower Gali has limited (non-existent) Abkhaz state presence by May 1998 • Geography of lower Gali enables increased attacks • Increased attacks lead to lower security in lower Gali • “They [Abkhaz militia] didn’t want to patrol lower Gali, of course they were scared, I lost a lot of men.” RuslanKishmaria, Abkhaz President’s Special Envoy to Gali • RAND: 24 Security officers per 1,000 inhabitants • Gali: 3.5 per 1,000 in 1997 • Upper Gali experienced little conflict 1994-1998 • “By 1995 we found a way to get along [nashliobshiiiazyk]” Georgian resident of Upper Gali, Feb.2008

  14. Conclusion from Georgia-Abkhazia • Ethnic identity does not predict ethnic cooperation after war as easily as during war. • Ethnic preferences and behavior diverge when incentives are powerful enough. • Invading forces only targeted where no effective state existed, where balance of power was in Georgia’s favor. • Where state strength was relatively high, no invasion took place despite “advantage” of compact ethnic kin groups.

  15. Moldova-Transnistria • Pre-War State Consolidation • 1989-1991: Transnistria Separates • Geographically Limited Conflict (1992) • War limited to two urban centers • Limited destruction of security apparatus • Post War attempts at destabilization by Moldova quickly discovered and ended. “We tried [armed groups], but they only caused us problems so we stopped.” AnatolPlugaru, former head of Moldova’s security services in post-war period

  16. Conclusion • Results do not challenge the ethnic security dilemma: ethnic separation may be a sufficient condition for peace. • Results suggest that separation not required to maintain peace if: • State building is achieved • Balance of power can be maintained

  17. Q & A johnsoncarter@gmail.com

  18. Ethnic Separation and Recurring Violence

  19. Contribution of this Research • Theoretical • Ethnic separation remains a sufficient but not necessary condition for establishing peace • Importance of state building and balance of power as able to trump ethnic separation • Empirical • Collected original cross-national data on partition • 9 months field research (Georgia & Moldova)

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