Attempting Escape: A Network Based Analysis of North Korean Refugees

1. Attempting Escape:A Network Based Analysis of North Korean Refugees Capt Krysta Anthony LT Kevin Kerno

2. Historical Background • History of North Korea • Human rights issues • What is the rest of the world doing?

3. North Korean Escapees • 1,500 North Koreans escaped in 2012 • So what’s the big deal? • Extremely arduous/perilous journey • Difficult to travel within in North Korea • Geography • Government agents • Sex Traffickers • Kidnappers • China illegally deports North Korean refugees • Classifies North Korean refugees as “economic immigrants”

4. How does one escape? • The “New Underground Railroad” • Who is helping • What makes it up • How it works • Where do the refugees go? • China first • Then exit into Mongolia and Southeast Asia • Reaching South Korea

5. General Escape Routes

6. Map of North Korea

7. Problem Statement What are the best routes for North Korean escapees to take when fleeing from North Korea?

8. Research Questions • What is the shortest route an escapee can take to fully escape? • What is the safest route an escapee can take? • What general route provides the highest likelihood of escape? • Where are the most likely points of interdiction both inside of North Korea and in China? • How can resources be allocated to assist North Korean refugees escape?

9. Challenges in Creating Network • Limited published information and data • Most information is word of mouth and anecdotal • Pieced multiple accounts and sources together • Utilized Google Earth • Utilized geographical data, topographical maps, and intuition

10. Assumptions/Project Limitations • Three starting points in North Korea that represent southern, central, and northern regions • Considering a single escapee • All edge probabilities within North Korea are the same • Similar for border crossings and within China • Only considered straight line distances • The only escape paths out of NK are into China • If in China, an escapee must escape to Mongolia or Southeast Asia to be considered safe • Average speed refugees moving is 10 km/hr for 14 hours per day

11. Overview of Network • Nodes: Cities, towns, villages, border crossing points, and airports in North Korea, China, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia • Edges: Straight line routes between the above nodes • Super sink to Escape from Bangkok, Ulaanbaatar, Vientiane, Manila and Seoul • Edge Costs: Initially the straight line distance in kilometers • Then assigned probabilities of evading authorities to each edge

12. Network

13. Shortest Path Escape Route Start Point: Haeju Total Distance: 2244 km Start Point: Kyo-Hwa-So 4 Total Distance: 2139 km Start Point: Pungsan Total Distance: 2279 km

14. Analysis: Basic Model • Shortest path routes in terms of distance from three starting points within North Korea • Results • All paths lead to Chinggis-Khaan International Airport in Mongolia • Refugee must travel over 2200 km • Conclusion • Average total travel time with no delays would be 17 days • Tumen River crossing is longest

15. More Realistic Edge Costs • Scaled the overall edge lengths • To determine edge probabilities we took the following into account: • Where the edge is located (i.e. North Korea, China, between North Korea and China, etc.) • What locations the edge is linking • The overall edge length in km • Rate of capture on an edge (percent): • 20%/hour: North Korea Edges • 30%/hour: North Korea into China border crossing • 10%/hour: China edges

16. More Realistic Edge Costs • To generate edge probabilities we applied the following transformation

17. More Realistic Edge Costs • We then take the –ln of the probability of evading to use as our new edge costs: • Now, the goal is to maximize the overall probability of escape

18. Probabilistic Escape Route Start Point: Haeju POE: 11.4% Start Point: Kyo-Hwa-So 4 POE: 16.0% Start Point: Pungsan POE: 5.9%

19. Analysis: More Realistic Model • Highest probabilities of escaping from the three starting points • No interdiction • Results • Highest probability of escape: 16.0% • Lowest probability of escape: 5.9% • Conclusions • All escape routes through Capital International Airport in Beijing • Tumen River crossing most dangerous

20. Interdiction • Forms of attack • North Korean agents and government informants • Chinese agents and government informants • Kidnappers • Sex traffickers • Human trafficking organizations • Modeled attacks on an edge by placing a “checkpoint” on that edge

21. Implementing Attacks • “Checkpoint” encompasses all above forms of attack • No “checkpoints” outside of China and North Korea • Checkpoints are not 100% effective • Each “checkpoint” causes a 6-hour delay • Looked at a varying number of checkpoints to determine effect on safest path

22. Probabilistic Escape Routes with 5 Checkpoints Start Point: Haeju POE: 1.40% Start Point: Kyo-Hwa-So 4 POE: 2.07% Start Point: Pungsan POE: 1.10%

23. Analysis: More Realistic Model with Interdiction • Highest probabilities of escaping from the three starting points with attacks • Results • Highest probability of escape: 2.04% • Lowest probability of escape: 1.10% • Non-nested solutions • Conclusions • “Checkpoints” do not alter paths, only drastically decrease probability of escape • Tumen River crossing most dangerous

24. Operator Resilience Curve

25. Network Design • Adding resources to certain routes • Increasing probabilities of successful border crossing • Increasing the number of border crossings • Increasing the number of guides • Paying off government agents • With more resources, more escapees could escape through Beijing airport • Enhances their chances of escape • Avoids hundreds of miles of ground travel

26. Network Design: Additional Resources along Pungsan Route

27. Conclusions and Insights • Shortest path escape path greatly different than probability-based escape path • Tumen River Route • Longest of shortest path in distance • Most dangerous probabilistically • Addition of resources triples probability of escape • Keys to increasing the probability of escape • Get escapees to the Beijing airport • Add additional resources in China

28. Additional Research Opportunities • More detailed/accurate network • Roads, railways, bus routes, etc. • Changing probabilities • Lower escape probabilities out of concentration camps • Vary probabilities in China • Use maximum flow to solve the problem • Further implementation of network design aspects

29. Questions