Our Legacy of Neglect:

1. Our Legacy of Neglect: The Longfellow Bridge and The Cost of Deferred Maintenance (Photo by Christopher Penler)

2. The Longfellow Bridge Today • The bridge was constructed out of granite and steel in 1906, using methods which are now outdated. • The bridge carries over 49,500 vehicles per day plus an estimated 97,000 daily MBTA Red Line transit passengers.

3. Deterioration of the Bridge The most recent inspection of the bridge was done in September 2006. • Some of the original deck sections contain large rust holes ( with 100% section loss) and the arch ribs also have heavy rusting and section loss. • The stringers, floor beams and posts are rated as “4-Poor”, on a scale of 1 to 9 (1-imminent failure to 9-excellent).

4. Deterioration of the Bridge • The substructure consists of the 10 granite piers in the river and the 2 abutments. • The pier walls have random areas of cracked and missing mortar joints. Four of the piers have vertical cracks extending down through four courses of granite block and some have vertical cracks extending all the way down to the water line.

5. Maintenance History of the Longfellow The Longfellow has undergone two repair projects since 1907; first in 1959, then again in 2003. • The 1959 project included some structural repairs and replacements and cost an estimated $2M. • The 2003 project included structural repairs, graffiti removal, sidewalk repairs and lighting, at a cost of $3.2M.

6. Construction and Maintenance Spending • Based on the ENR Construction Cost Index, the 1959 rehabilitation would be equivalent to $19.7M and 2002 rehabilitation equivalent to $3.8M in 2007 dollars. • Thus the historical spending to date is $272.5M.

7. Fixing the Longfellow Bridge could cost up to $200 million, or more… • Costs may escalate based on engineering findings. • Symptomatic of a larger problem: Commonwealth’s assets suffer from a maintenance backlog in the tens of billions of dollars. • We lack a comprehensive, state-wide system to manage assets, as well as the funding and political will to properly maintain our assets. There is nothing to stop the problem from growing worse.

8. The Cost of Longfellow’s Deferred Maintenance • In January 2006, the Executive Office of Transportation, stated that “[t]he current $70 million price tag could rise to $100 million.” • Currently, the official Massachusetts Highway Department estimate is $180 million. • Transportation Finance Commission, issued on March 28, 2007, estimated repair costs at $200 million. • Findings of engineering study may radically escalate this estimate.

9. A New Bridge? • With an approximate total cost of $480 million (historical cost + estimated cost of repairs), a new replacement bridge begins to appear economically rational, but unreasonable due to the bridge’s significance. After the existing bridge has been rebuilt or repaired, will we again let it deteriorate without proper maintenance, or will it be properly maintained?

10. Asset Life-Cycle • It is expected that there is a 40 percent drop in quality over 75 percent of an asset’s lifetime, then a more precipitous drop in the final quarter of the asset’s life. • Maintenance can restore the condition of an asset before its condition reaches the inflection point and begins to decline rapidly. • The effect of not maintaining an asset is called “running to ground”.

11. What Could Have Been Done • The Longfellow Bridge suffered from a lack of annual maintenance compounded over many years. • Major repairs were undertaken in 1959 and lesser repairs in 2002, but years of neglect have caught up with the structure. • The following three scenarios evaluate different levels of investment in maintenance that could have been implemented upon completion of the bridge.

12. Scenario 1 Invest 1 percent of the bridge’s capital cost each year in a maintenance program. • If an investment of 1 percent each year in maintenance was made that would be equivalent to a total of $62.7 million in today’s dollars. • With the addition of a projected $80 million in current rehabilitation costs (equal to 40% of the estimate), the total savings (relative to the actual scenario) would be approximately $80 million.

13. Scenario 2 Invest 2.5 percent of the bridge’s capital cost each year in a maintenance program • By investing 2.5 percent each year in maintenance that would be equivalent to a total of $156.8 million in today’s dollars. • With the addition 20% of the rehab cost, the total savings would be $26.7 million.

14. Scenario 3: Reality Actual Scenario: No annual maintenance program, but a major rehabilitation in 1959 followed by lesser repairs in 2002. • Capital depreciation is assumed to be 100 percent of the rehabilitation cost, currently set at $200 million. The total cost to keep the bridge in good repair is $223.5 million • But these cost estimates mask the reality of the bridge’s poor condition

15. Maintenance Scenarios

16. Statewide Backlog of Deferred Maintenance • Total depreciated value of state assets at $24.9 billion in June 2006. • Our study estimates a deferred maintenance backlog of at least $17 billion. • This deferral of maintenance is caused by: • Unwillingness to prioritize maintenance over new projects • Diffusion of responsibility for assets across the public sector • Incentives that discourage spending on maintenance

17. Maintenance Backlogs

18. Disincentives for Maintenance • Due to the current system, any maintenance spending from an agency’s operating budget results in a reduction of funds available for programs. • By neglecting maintenance (and potentially running assets to failure), operating funds can be maximized. • The eventual failure of the building-related assets will result in an emergency disbursement of capital funds, which come from DCAM’s budget and will not impact the agency’s operating budget.

19. Current Asset Management • The Commonwealth does not have overarching systems in place to: • Adequately inventory assets • Assess their condition • Estimate the cost of deferred maintenance • DCR now utilizes FAMIS, the Facility Administration and Maintenance Information System, for their own assets, with the exception of major bridges including the Longfellow. • Longfellow will become part of the PONTIS bridge maintenance system includes data and analytical models for an inventory of the state's bridges.

20. Options for Improving Maintenance • The lines of responsibility for maintenance should be clarified. • The DCAM should be empowered to fulfill its statutory ability to monitor the maintenance of non-transportation, non-park assets. • A report should be issued yearly on the status of assets by department, including maintenance progress and funding. • The Governor’s Office and the Executive Office of Administration and Finance should highlight the importance of maintenance to program managers and reward them and their programs for improvements in maintenance practices.

21. Conclusions • The lack of maintenance, and its resultant cost, on the Longfellow is symptomatic of a problem that stretches across the assets owned by the Commonwealth. • We lack a centralized system to comprehensively manage our assets. • There is no state-wide plan in place to stop the problem from growing worse. • A regular program of maintenance would have extended the bridge’s useful service life and lowered overall rehabilitation costs.

22. Recommendations • Only build new structures and expand the transportation network with a comprehensive life-cycle management plan in place. • The Executive Office of Administration and Finance should prepare a report on asset conditions, condition trends, maintenance efforts and maintenance plans for each department and authority by asset class and actively reward those agencies that are addressing the problem. • Each state agency should include in its annual operating budget an amount equal to 2 percent of replacement value for such capital asset

23. Recommendations • A Commonwealth Facilities Maintenance Reserve Fund should be established, beginning with only 0.1 percent of the general fund in the first year and rising 0.1 percent per year to 1 percent of the general fund in the 10th year • The Commonwealth and its political subdivisions should consider utilizing the GASB 34 “Modified Approach” to promote active asset management. • The Governor should establish general principles for infrastructure maintenance to be followed by all state infrastructure agencies • Governor should charge the Executive Office of Transportation and Public Works, and the Division of Capital Asset Management with responsibility for establishing a process to more fully develop and oversee maintenance and reporting guidelines