280 likes | 441 Views
2. How Serious is the Problem?. It is worldwide in scope, affecting both developed and developing nations In the US, annual hazardous waste generation is about 36.3 million tons per year or 0.13 tons per personRisks are nontriviale.g., Love Canal . 3. Overview of Recent Policy. Resource Conservat
E N D
1. Managing Hazardous Solid Waste and Waste Sites Chapter 17
2. 2 How Serious is the Problem? It is worldwide in scope, affecting both developed and developing nations
In the US, annual hazardous waste generation is about 36.3 million tons per year or 0.13 tons per person
Risks are nontrivial
e.g., Love Canal
3. 3 Overview of Recent Policy Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 (Subtitle C)
Established ‘cradle-to-grave’ management; delegated nonhazardous waste control to states
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (reauthorized RCRA)
Some shift toward waste reduction and improved treatment
Strengthened standards
4. 4 Overall Policy Approach (RCRA) Command-and-control
Primary responsibility is at federal level (EPA)
Emphasizes waste management more than source reduction (pollution prevention)
5. 5 Components of Cradle-to-Grave Management System Identification of hazardous waste
A waste is hazardous if it falls into one of two categories
characteristic wastes: have attributes posing substantial risk
In the US, characteristics are: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, toxicity
listed wastes: pre-identified by EPA as having met certain criteria, such as the presence of toxic or carcinogenic constituents.
National manifest system for tracking
Once wastes are ready for transport, generator must prepare a document, called a manifest, that identifies the hazardous material and all parties responsible for its movement
6. 6 Components of Cradle-to-Grave Management System (continued) Permit system
This controls waste management for transport, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs)
Standards for TSDFs
General regulatory standards: apply to all types of TSDFs and control functions like inspections, emergency plans, and participation in the manifest program
Technical regulatory standards: outline procedures and equipment requirements for specific types of facilities
7. 7 Evolving To Pollution Prevention 1984 amendments suggest some movement toward prevention and away from land disposal
Land disposal of untreated hazardous waste is essentially prohibited
8. Economic Analysis of Policy
9. 9 4 Elements of the Analysis Risk-based uniform rules of identification
Benefit-based uniform standards
Failures of the manifest system
Market implications of the 1984 land restrictions
10. 10 Risk-Based Uniform Identification Absence of risk-benefit analysis
Risk-based -- no consideration for balancing risk with benefits of the material before it becomes waste
Result: allocative inefficiency
All waste materials are controlled with same stringency regardless of their value to society
Identification criteria are applied uniformly
No adjustments allowed for degree of toxicity or for the amount of waste that poses a hazard
Result: allocative inefficiency
Potential for underregulation of more toxic wastes and overregulation of less toxic wastes
11. 11 Benefit-Based Uniform Standards Standards are benefit-based
No cost considerations
particularly problematic for long-term rulings such as post-closure procedures
Result: allocative inefficiency
Standards applied uniformly
No consideration for site-specific differences
Result: cost ineffectiveness
12. 12 Failures of Manifest System Strict CAC ? no incentives
Solely benefit-based
No consideration for costs of administration, compliance, etc.
Result: allocative inefficiency
Limited scope
only 4 - 5% of U.S. hazardous waste are moved off site and therefore subject to manifest system
High compliance costs
Potential incentive to illegally dispose
13. 13 Market Implications of 1984 Land Restrictions Landfilling had become predominant form of disposal because it was believed to be a lower cost alternative, due in part to scale economies
Error was that external costs were ignored
Policy response was 1984 land restrictions
Land use restrictions raise MPC, reducing landfilling activity, which lowers external costs in that market
Issue: How is landfilling reduction achieved?
If through source reduction, society gains
If through alternative practice, such as incineration, the net effect is unclear because that practice adds external costs
14. Effect of Land RestrictionsSource Reduction or Alternative Practice?
15. Market-Based Policy
16. 16 Waste-end Charge A fee in place at time of disposal based on the quantity of waste generated
To achieve efficiency, the charge must be set equal to the MSC of hazardous waste services at the efficient output level to cover MPC of the waste facility plus MEC from associated pollution
Real-world examples
Australia, Austria, Belgium, and Finland charge a fee on hazardous waste
35 U.S. states charge a tax on hazardous waste
17. Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites Superfund
18. 18 Overview of Policy Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 1980 (Superfund)
Established CERCLIS, a national inventory of hazardous waste sites
CERCLIS is used to identify the worst sites and place them on National Priorities List (NPL)
Established a $1.6 billion fund to clean up and recover damage
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) 1986
Reauthorized CERCLA
Increased fund to $8.5 billion
Mandated federal action on 375 sites within a 5-year period; promotes permanent clean-up
19. 19 Overview of Policy (continued) Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001(known as Brownfields Act)
Amends CERCLA
Outlines exemptions from Superfund liability
Authorizes grant funding of up to $200 million annually for assessment and abatement of brownfield sites
Abandoned or underutilized properties that are less contaminated than Superfund sites, but redevelopment is complicated by (potential) presence of contamination
20. CERCLIS and NPL Sites
21. 21 Superfund ProceduresResponse/Cleanup: National Contingency Plan (NCP) The substance release is identified and the National Response Center is notified
Site is listed in CERCLIS
EPA responds
Removal Action: to restore immediate control
Remedial Action: to achieve permanent solution
Hazard Ranking System (HRS)
If site gets a risk ranking > 28.50 out of 100 in the HRS, it is placed on the NPL
22. 22 Superfund Procedures (continued)Response/Cleanup: National Contingency Plan (NCP) Site is listed on the Construction Completion List (CCL) when:
all immediate threats are addressed
all long-term threats are under control
Site is deleted from the NPL when the EPA and the state jointly determine that no further remedial actions are needed
23. Steps in a Superfund Cleanup
24. 24 Compensation and Liability EPA has authority to force those responsible to correct the problem and pay for damage
The law identifies potentially responsible parties (PRPs) as:
Current or former owners or operators of a site and all parties involved in disposal, treatment, or transport of hazardous substances to site
Economically, the intent is to internalize the externality
25. 25 Emergency PlanningTitle III of SARA Public must be informed of production and release of hazardous substances according to Title III of SARA
Each state sets up an emergency plan in the event of a hazardous release
Various reports about hazardous substances are required by law
Resulting data forms the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) published annually by EPA
26. Analysis of Policy
27. 27 Assessing Superfund’s Performance CERCLA of 1980 was a national failure
$1.6 billion cleaned up only 8 sites
Slow progress removing NPL sites
As of 2005, only 293 have officially been removed from the NPL
Average cost of remedial action is $25 million per site
Problem of “how clean is clean”
Sites are brought to a uniform level of cleanliness
Debate is whether this decision should be risk-based or benefit-cost based
28. 28 Two Major Flaws in Superfund Poor information and reporting practices
An initial lack of awareness about the extent of the problem
Inadequate knowledge of abatement technology
29. 29 Two Major Flaws in Superfund Absence of market incentives
Feedstock taxes that financed Superfund were targeted to be revenue producing, not as an incentive to reduce use of hazardous materials
Definition of PRPs’ liability is disincentive for individuals to come forward
Strict liability: a party is responsible even if negligence is not proven
Joint and several liability: single party is responsible for all damages even if contribution is minimal
Outcome is resource misallocation from cleanup to litigation procedures