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Labour activism and the reform of trade unions in Russia, China and Vietnam. Simon Clarke and Tim Pringle University of Warwick. State socialist trade unions. Integral part of Party-state apparatus Primary functions to maintain labour discipline, encourage the production drive
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Labour activism and the reform oftrade unions in Russia, China and Vietnam Simon Clarke and Tim Pringle University of Warwick
State socialist trade unions • Integral part of Party-state apparatus • Primary functions • to maintain labour discipline, • encourage the production drive • administer state social welfare system • Protective functions • Represent individual worker in disputes • Monitor enforcement of labour law
Socialist market economy • Dualism: state-owned and private sector • Decentralisation of SOE management • Ambiguous role of unions • Unitary interest of enterprise (STK, WC) • Represent interests of workers • Aspirations to independence • Worker activism directed against state • China: post-Tiananmen crackdown • Russia: collapse of soviet system
Transition to capitalism • Transformed environment of trade unions • state no longer determines terms and conditions • employment relation transformed to contract • New industrial relations framework • Contrasting political status of unions • Workplace unions still management dominated • Little internal pressure for union change
Russian unions • Collapse of soviet system threatened survival of traditional unions • State needed the traditional unions • To administer traditional state functions • To channel and contain social unrest • Social partnership • Economic collapse demobilises workers • Activism confined to state sector, collusion with employers
Social Partnership • Partnerly relations with state and employer • Tripartite commission • Lobbying legislature and executive • Branch and regional agreements • Collective agreements • Dispute resolution • Negotiated settlement • Judicial resolution of disputes
Trade unions and worker activism • Trade unions channel conflict into symbolic protests and bureaucratic representation of worker interests • Weakness of unions is management dominance of primary organisations: still function as part of personnel department • Workplace militancy harnessed by small alternative unions
Revitalisation of workplace unions • Post-1998 economic and political stabilisation reduce political leverage of unions • Traditional unions have to revitalise workplace unions to establish legitimacy • Limited leverage over workplace unions • Constrained by commitment to social peace • Limited to servicing role: training, legal advice, lobbying, branch and regional agreements • Minimal organising: few members in new private sector
The challenge of alternative unions • Competition fosters revitalisation • Improved collective agreements • Support for individual disputes • Some collaboration with alternative unions • Mostly via ICFTU/ITUC and GUFs • Suppression of alternative unions • 2001 Labour Code • Collaboration with management victimisation • Alternative unions in terminal? decline
Best practice of traditional unions • Political representation of worker interests • Lobbying legislatures • Collaboration with state bureaucracy • Judicial representation • Facilitates negotiated resolution of individual and collective disputes • Collective bargaining • Sectoral and regional agreements set minimum terms • Genuine bargaining in booming sectors: energy, metallurgy
China and Vietnam • Unions under the leadership of the Party • No freedom of association • Restricted right to strike • China abolished in 1982 • Vietnam from 1994, only after mediation and arbitration, called by union, supported by majority of labour force, no legal strikes • ‘Illegal’ strikes pervasive and growing, limited repression
Changes in employment relations • Large lay-offs from SOEs – privatisation • Transition from permanent to contractual employment • Transition from state welfare to social insurance • Massive growth of private and foreign-owned enterprises • Employing migrant workers on low wages, short or no contracts, long hours, poor health and safety
Trade unions and the Party • Not mere puppets of the Party, unions have a powerful voice in the Party • Party has greater interest in reform of the unions than do the unions themselves • Party requires unions • To extend organisation to POEs and FIEs • To prevent strikes and social unrest • By mediating between worker and employer • And channelling disputes into bureaucratic and judicial channels
Collective agreements • ACFTU very active in promoting collective agreements, VGCL less so • Most collective agreements contain little beyond that provided by law • Terms largely dictated by management • Few sanctions for violation • Union can play consultative role, esp in SOEs • Some more effective collective agreements, especially in JVs
Judicial resolution of disputes • Baseline terms and conditions set by labour law • Mediation, arbitration stacked against workers, moribund in Vietnam • Massive growth in court actions in China • Strikes and protests reveal legal violations • Legal advice centres: NGOs and ACFTU • Indicate ineffectiveness of workplace trade union in monitoring employer legal violations • Buck passing between union and MoL
Reform of workplace unions • Controlled by management • Recognised as a problem, but • Higher union bodies have little leverage • Fear of loss of control • And provoking conflict • Support for collective bargaining • Trade union elections • Professionalisation of union
Trade union organising • Trade unions traditionally confined to state and collective enterprises • Pressure from Party to extend organisation to POE, FIE and migrant workers • Legal requirement to have a trade union • Mostly bureaucratic process, always top-down • Some rare exceptions, e.g. Wal-Mart • Sectoral/local unions for SMEs
SOE worker activism • SOE workers lost jobs, security and social and economic status • Protest contained/repressed early 1990s • China: laid-off workers protest escalated, peaking in 2002 – met with repression • State response: early pensions, xiagang, employment creation • ACFTU priority to job creation over wages
Strikes and protests • Increasingly migrant workers in POEs and FIEs • Strengthened by labour shortage • Fire-fighting role of state and tu • Confine strike to one enterprise • From repression to concession – ‘collective bargaining by riot’ • Labour bureau persuades employer to concede • Trade union persuades workers to return to work • Usually establish a trade union branch by agreement with management • Severe repression of organising beyond one enterprise
Worker activism and union reform • Worker activism has defined role of trade unions of maintaining political stability • By diverting protest into bureaucratic and judicial channels • Key is reform of workplace unions • Limited by management control, limited leverage and resources of higher levels • Compounded by fear of loss of control, encouraging activism
Trade unions and the Party-state • Unions in transition from state body to NGO • Party control • Imposes pressure on unions to reform to contain worker activism • But confines reform within strict limits, impedes reform of workplace unions • Union reform much more advanced in China than in Vietnam: greater political fear? • Prevents unions from mobilising politically
Freedom of Association • Gives workers capacity to by-pass management-dominated union • Provides competition for traditional unions • Traditional unions have ample resources to contain the alternative threat • Significant as a force for change rather than as replacement of traditional unions
Right to Strike • Issue is not is a strike legal, but is it effective • China and Vietnam: very effective in meeting workers’ immediate demands • Not effective as a means of building workers’ organisational solidarity because of absence of freedom of association
Post-socialist trade unions • Driving force of reform has been development of capitalist relations of production • Mediated by worker unrest • Need for trade unions to take on new roles, reinforced by anxieties of Party-state • Trade union reform confined within limits of social stabilisation • Main barrier to reform is inertia of apparatus and dependence of workplace union on management • Freedom of association critical factor • International collaboration has played an important role in Russia, limited possibilities in China and Vietnam • There is progress but it is very slow