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Arrow s Theorem

Single-peaked Preferences. Preferences are single-peaked if the alternatives can be ordered so that the further away an alternative lies from an individual's ideal point" the less the individual likes it. Often a reasonable assumption, e.g., preferences over government spending. Single-peaked Pre

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Arrow s Theorem

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    1. Arrow’s Theorem Asks the question ‘Are there any good choice rules?’ Good means: Not Dictatorship Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives Weakly Paretian No Preference Restrictions

    2. Single-peaked Preferences Preferences are single-peaked if the alternatives can be ordered so that the further away an alternative lies from an individual’s “ideal point” the less the individual likes it. Often a reasonable assumption, e.g., preferences over government spending

    3. Single-peaked Preferences

    4. Single-peaked Preferences

    5. Single-peaked Preferences If preferences are single-peaked Majority Rule, for example, can satisfy all of Arrow’s conditions! Although helpful, single-peaked preferences do not solve all our problems: Rarely do we vote on a single-issue. Government spending, e.g., involves deciding a tax-rate and on what to spend.

    6. Dimensionality of Choice Choices involving two or more issue dimensions run into problems with transitivity (or acyclicity).

    7. McKelvey’s Chaos Theorem

    8. Strategic Voting “Not voting for once ideal point” Why? Individuals may benefit from “misrepresenting their preferences”. Ex: Voting for third party candidates in single-member plurality rule districts. Gibbard-Satterwaithe Theorem: Strategic voting is always possible if there are more than two alternatives.

    9. Other forms of strategic action Control of the agenda: Under certain circumstances a control of the agenda can mean control of the outcome. Strategic Candidacy/Introduction of Amendments: Introducing new alternatives may influence outcomes Strategic Issues: Forcing a simultaneous vote on two issues may influence outcomes.

    10. Riker’s Conclusions Conclusion 1: No accurate or fair aggregation methods. Conclusion 2: Any outcome lacks ‘meaning’ because a) we don’t know preferences & b) can therefore not preclude strategic behavior.

    11. Riker’s Conclusions Populism: What people want should be. Riker argues that we can not possible determine what the people want and, thus, populism is a hopeless ideal. Liberalism: Only requires that it is possible to get rid of ineffective officials.

    12. Populist Institutions Since elections are assumed to be an expression of the “General Will” government institutions must ensure the enactment of the “General Will”. Absence of constitutional restraints No external restraints: Independent Courts Party discipline necessary Majority Party

    13. Liberal Institutions Regular Elections. Constitutional Restraints associated with Liberalism but not logically necessary. Recognizes, however, the need for institutions that guarantee regular elections: Checks & Balances, etc.

    14. The Threat of Populism Riker’s prescription is clear but he still fears populist tendencies. Politicians mobilizing support ‘Disillusioned’ Voters The American system of government reduces risk of populist tendencies Forces coalition building Incremental Localism – weak parties

    15. The Threat of Populism Wonders about the British system (Westminster). Strong powers of Prime Ministers = threat of dictatorship. Yet no-one would consider Britain undemocratic! Coincidence? Or are there more than one way of achieving democratic governance?

    16. What is the best system ? Riker, like many others, would argue the U.S. Not quite democratic around mid-60’s (Dahl): Switzerland Chile U.S Death penalty: only the U.S. among western countries.

    17. Other factors (more subjective) Western European countries: Democratic Social security Health insurance Education Coincidence ? Culture ?

    18. Patterns of Democracy Unlike Riker, Lijphart is not attempting to define democracy. Rather, recognizing different types of democracies, populist or liberal, Lijphart addresses the question whether some perform better than others.

    19. Patterns of Democracy Riker: Liberalism vs. Populism Lijphart: Majoritarian vs. Consensual Liberalism ? Majoritarian U.K. majoritarian but populist Riker: Concern with perception of what a vote means Lijphart: Concern with institutions

    20. Patterns of Democracy All of the democracies that Lijphart considers satisfy Riker’s minimal requirement: Elections. Lijphart’s simple plan: Pick out all long lasting democratic countries Classify them as majoritarian or consensual See who does best on a variety of criteria

    21. Majoritarian vs. Consensual Government by the people or for the people. In other words: Governance by representatives or according to their preferences. Riker’s response ?

    22. Government by and for the People Basic question: To whose interest should the Government be responsive ? One Possibility: The Majority Pros: Intuitively appealing – the alternative is government by the minority. Another Possibility: As many as possible. Majority a minimum requirement. Include as many minorities as possible.

    23. Majoritarian Model Concentration of power in the hands of a bare majority – sometimes plurality Exclusive Competitive Adversarial

    24. Consensual Model Rule and Institutions aim at broad participation: Inclusive Bargaining Compromise ‘Negotiation Democracy’

    25. Ten Differences Executive-parties Dimension Concentration of Executive Power Executive-Legislative Balance of Power Two-party or Multiparty system Majoritarian vs. PR Electoral System Pluralism vs. Corporatism

    26. Ten Differences Federal-Unitary Dimension Centralized vs. Federal Government Unicameral vs. Bicameral Flexible vs. Rigid Constitutions Judicial Review of Legislation Independence of Central Banks

    27. The extremes Pure Majoritarian Countries: The U.K. New Zealand (until 1996) Barbados ‘Pure’ Consensual Countries: Switzerland Belgium ‘The E.U.’

    28. The U.S. & PR Democrats Republicans Greens Libertarian Far/Christian Right ? Ethnic Parties: Black ? Hispanic ? Asian ?

    29. Values What do we know about ‘American Values’ ? Are ‘American Values’ in any sense defined by political leaders/parties ? If so, do we have any evidence that the parties aggregate values/ preferences in a fair or a non-arbitrary manner ?

    30. The U.K. The Majoritarian model usually identified with the U.K. – hence its alternative moniker: “Westminster model” However, New Zealand was even a better example of a majoritarian system.

    31. The U.K. Concentration of Executive Power One-party Bare Majority Coalitions extremely rare Executive-Legislative Balance of Power Parliamentary Government Cabinet dominance Control of Majority Disciplined Parties

    32. The U.K. Party system Two dominant parties Labour and Conservatives Liberals & Social Democrats = Liberal Democrats Disproportionality

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