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Single-peaked Preferences. Preferences are single-peaked if the alternatives can be ordered so that the further away an alternative lies from an individual's ideal point" the less the individual likes it. Often a reasonable assumption, e.g., preferences over government spending. Single-peaked Pre
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1. Arrow’s Theorem Asks the question ‘Are there any good choice rules?’
Good means:
Not Dictatorship
Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives
Weakly Paretian
No Preference Restrictions
2. Single-peaked Preferences Preferences are single-peaked if the alternatives can be ordered so that the further away an alternative lies from an individual’s “ideal point” the less the individual likes it.
Often a reasonable assumption, e.g., preferences over government spending
3. Single-peaked Preferences
4. Single-peaked Preferences
5. Single-peaked Preferences If preferences are single-peaked Majority Rule, for example, can satisfy all of Arrow’s conditions!
Although helpful, single-peaked preferences do not solve all our problems:
Rarely do we vote on a single-issue. Government spending, e.g., involves deciding a tax-rate and on what to spend.
6. Dimensionality of Choice Choices involving two or more issue dimensions run into problems with transitivity (or acyclicity).
7. McKelvey’s Chaos Theorem
8. Strategic Voting “Not voting for once ideal point”
Why? Individuals may benefit from “misrepresenting their preferences”.
Ex: Voting for third party candidates in single-member plurality rule districts.
Gibbard-Satterwaithe Theorem: Strategic voting is always possible if there are more than two alternatives.
9. Other forms of strategic action Control of the agenda: Under certain circumstances a control of the agenda can mean control of the outcome.
Strategic Candidacy/Introduction of Amendments: Introducing new alternatives may influence outcomes
Strategic Issues: Forcing a simultaneous vote on two issues may influence outcomes.
10. Riker’s Conclusions Conclusion 1: No accurate or fair aggregation methods.
Conclusion 2: Any outcome lacks ‘meaning’ because a) we don’t know preferences & b) can therefore not preclude strategic behavior.
11. Riker’s Conclusions Populism: What people want should be.
Riker argues that we can not possible determine what the people want and, thus, populism is a hopeless ideal.
Liberalism: Only requires that it is possible to get rid of ineffective officials.
12. Populist Institutions Since elections are assumed to be an expression of the “General Will” government institutions must ensure the enactment of the “General Will”.
Absence of constitutional restraints
No external restraints: Independent Courts
Party discipline necessary
Majority Party
13. Liberal Institutions Regular Elections.
Constitutional Restraints associated with Liberalism but not logically necessary.
Recognizes, however, the need for institutions that guarantee regular elections: Checks & Balances, etc.
14. The Threat of Populism Riker’s prescription is clear but he still fears populist tendencies.
Politicians mobilizing support
‘Disillusioned’ Voters
The American system of government reduces risk of populist tendencies
Forces coalition building
Incremental
Localism – weak parties
15. The Threat of Populism Wonders about the British system (Westminster). Strong powers of Prime Ministers = threat of dictatorship.
Yet no-one would consider Britain undemocratic! Coincidence?
Or are there more than one way of achieving democratic governance?
16. What is the best system ? Riker, like many others, would argue the U.S.
Not quite democratic around mid-60’s (Dahl):
Switzerland
Chile
U.S
Death penalty: only the U.S. among western countries.
17. Other factors (more subjective) Western European countries:
Democratic
Social security
Health insurance
Education
Coincidence ?
Culture ?
18. Patterns of Democracy Unlike Riker, Lijphart is not attempting to define democracy.
Rather, recognizing different types of democracies, populist or liberal, Lijphart addresses the question whether some perform better than others.
19. Patterns of Democracy Riker: Liberalism vs. Populism
Lijphart: Majoritarian vs. Consensual
Liberalism ? Majoritarian
U.K. majoritarian but populist
Riker: Concern with perception of what a vote means
Lijphart: Concern with institutions
20. Patterns of Democracy All of the democracies that Lijphart considers satisfy Riker’s minimal requirement: Elections.
Lijphart’s simple plan:
Pick out all long lasting democratic countries
Classify them as majoritarian or consensual
See who does best on a variety of criteria
21. Majoritarian vs. Consensual Government by the people or for the people.
In other words: Governance by representatives or according to their preferences.
Riker’s response ?
22. Government by and for the People Basic question: To whose interest should the Government be responsive ?
One Possibility: The Majority
Pros: Intuitively appealing – the alternative is government by the minority.
Another Possibility: As many as possible.
Majority a minimum requirement.
Include as many minorities as possible.
23. Majoritarian Model Concentration of power in the hands of a bare majority – sometimes plurality
Exclusive
Competitive
Adversarial
24. Consensual Model Rule and Institutions aim at broad participation:
Inclusive
Bargaining
Compromise
‘Negotiation Democracy’
25. Ten Differences Executive-parties Dimension
Concentration of Executive Power
Executive-Legislative Balance of Power
Two-party or Multiparty system
Majoritarian vs. PR Electoral System
Pluralism vs. Corporatism
26. Ten Differences Federal-Unitary Dimension
Centralized vs. Federal Government
Unicameral vs. Bicameral
Flexible vs. Rigid Constitutions
Judicial Review of Legislation
Independence of Central Banks
27. The extremes Pure Majoritarian Countries:
The U.K.
New Zealand (until 1996)
Barbados
‘Pure’ Consensual Countries:
Switzerland
Belgium
‘The E.U.’
28. The U.S. & PR Democrats
Republicans
Greens
Libertarian
Far/Christian Right ?
Ethnic Parties:
Black ?
Hispanic ?
Asian ?
29. Values What do we know about ‘American Values’ ?
Are ‘American Values’ in any sense defined by political leaders/parties ?
If so, do we have any evidence that the parties aggregate values/ preferences in a fair or a non-arbitrary manner ?
30. The U.K. The Majoritarian model usually identified with the U.K. – hence its alternative moniker: “Westminster model”
However, New Zealand was even a better example of a majoritarian system.
31. The U.K. Concentration of Executive Power
One-party
Bare Majority
Coalitions extremely rare
Executive-Legislative Balance of Power
Parliamentary Government
Cabinet dominance
Control of Majority
Disciplined Parties
32. The U.K. Party system
Two dominant parties
Labour and Conservatives
Liberals & Social Democrats = Liberal Democrats
Disproportionality