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Cross-Cultural Relations Between Civilian and Military Organizations Melinda Hofstetter Center for Disaster Management a

Cross-Cultural Relations Between Civilian and Military Organizations Melinda Hofstetter Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Tulane University Washington, D.C. Perception is Reality !. PERCEPTIONS NGOs HAVE OF THE MILITARY :. PERCEPTIONS NGOs HAVE OF

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Cross-Cultural Relations Between Civilian and Military Organizations Melinda Hofstetter Center for Disaster Management a

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  1. Cross-Cultural Relations Between Civilian and MilitaryOrganizationsMelinda Hofstetter Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Tulane University Washington, D.C.

  2. Perception is Reality !

  3. PERCEPTIONS NGOs HAVE OF THE MILITARY :

  4. PERCEPTIONS NGOs HAVE OF MILITARY ACTIONS • KILL, WOUND AND MAIM NON-COMBATANTS. • DESTROY HOMES, CROPS, AND LIVESTOCK. • DESTROY ESSENTIAL CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE. • DISPLACE MASSIVE NUMBERS OF NON-COMBATANTS. • THREATEN OR PERPETRATE RAPE, TORTURE, GENOCIDE AND OTHER GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. • LEAVE BEHIND QUANTITIES OF BOMBLETS, OTHER UXO, MINES, AND DEPLETED URANIUM WHICH CONTINUE TO KILL AND MAIM NON-COMBATANTS LONG AFTERTHE CONFLICT HAS ENDED. S. ARCHER/ 9/2000

  5. PERCEPTIONS NGOs HAVE OF MILITARY ACTIONS • MILITARY HAVE GREATER CAPABILITIES IN • SECURITY, LOGISTICS, TRANSPORT, HEAVY • EQUIPMENT, AND COMMUNICATIONS THAN DO • MOST IOs AND/OR NGOs • ARRIVAL OF EXTERNAL MILITARY UNITS IN A • COMPLEX EMERGENCY RESULTS IN INCREASED • WORLDWIDE MEDIA COVERAGE • INCREASED MEDIA COVERAGE MEANS • INCREASED VISIBILITY AND INCREASED • FUNDING S.ARCHER : 9/2000

  6. PERCEPTIONS THE MILITARY HAVE OF NGOs

  7. PERCEPTIONS THE MILITARY HAS OF NGO ACTIONS • WILL NOT TAKE ORDERS FROM MILITARY EVEN IF THEIR PERSONAL SECURITY IS AT STAKE. • WILL BE RESISTENT TO THE CHANGES THE MILITARY’S ARRIVAL BRINGS. • WILL NOT BE WILLING TO COLLABORATE WITH THE MILITARY. • CONSTANTLY ASK MILITARY FOR HELP WHEN THEY CANNOT COPE ALONE WITH SECURITY, LOGISTICS, TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS NEEDS. • S. ARCHER 9/2000

  8. CAN YOU TELL THE DIFFERENCE ?(AKA: other reasons for “cultural antagonism”)

  9. CAN THEY ?

  10. SOLDIERS DRESSED LIKE THIS BRUTALIZED AND KILLED THEIR FAMILIES, FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS.

  11. THE FUTURE IS HERE ! “The U.S. military/NGO relationship is a fundamental trait of our present and the era into which we are entering.”

  12. THE FUTURE IS HERE ! Both are mission driven. Both are synergistic. They shouldn’t be antagonistic. But attitudes can cause them to be so. It’s the perception!!! LTC M.M. Smith, USA

  13. Cooperation: “Unity of Effort” IO/NGO Activities Military Efforts

  14. Independent Decentralized Authority On-The-Job Training Few Field Manuals Long-term Perspective Field Experience Highly Disciplined Hierarchical Command Extensive Branch Training Doctrinal Publications “End-State” Approach Combat Experience NGO Culture Contrasted With Military Culture

  15. NGO/IOMILITARY • C3A C3I • •COOPERATION• COMMAND • COORDINATION •CONTROL • CONSENSUS •COMMUNICATIONS • ASSESSMENT• INTELLIGENCE

  16. “Cultural” Problems • Perceptions • Lack of Compatible Doctrine • Lack of Common Interests • Lack of Communication • Lack of Prior Joint Experience

  17. NGO Pluses • Ability to single focus • Synergistic relationship to other NGOs • Experience and size for quick action • Impartiality (often problematic) • Experience in function or region

  18. NGO Challenges • Synergism is not always automatic to other NGOs • Narrow perspective and agenda • Minimum operational staff • Fiercely independent • Need for external support

  19. Military Culture • Highly structured and disciplined • Firm chains of command • Extensive specialty training • Policy and guidance are internal and external

  20. Military Considerations: • Mission Statement and Guidelines • Principles of Participants • Application of Peacekeeping Principles

  21. Military Challenges • Mandate • Force Structure • Rules of Engagement • National and International Law

  22. Non-NATO Partners Russia Ukraine UAE Jordan LithuaniaSweden Finland Austria Azerbaijan Argentina Morocco Slovakia Switzerland Georgia NATO Partners United States UK Germany France Italy Denmark Spain Poland Greece Canada Norway Hungary Belgium Turkey The Netherlands Portugal

  23. IOs and NGOs UN OSCE EU UNHCR ICTY UNICEF UNMIK-P IMC MSF WFP OXFAM CARE IRC ICRC KFOR Structure 43,000 Troops in Kosovo 7,000 Troops in FYROM 5,800 U.S Troops

  24. Aid Architecture United Nations Security Council U.N. Agencies & Programs Donor Nations & Organizations OCHA Affected Nation IOs NGOs U.N. Military

  25. Coordination Tools • Interpreters • Communications Compatibility • Common Boundaries • Functional Meetings • Co-location of “Headquarters”

  26. CIMIC and CMOCIMIC = Civil Military CooperationCMO = Civil Military Operations

  27. CIMIC/CMO is: • Cooperation with the local population • Cooperation with International Agencies • Cooperation with relief groups/NGOs

  28. CIMIC/CMO is Not: • Giving up military authority • Having IO/NGOs in charge at the tactical level

  29. THE CIVIL DIMENSION ASSUMES A PRIMARY ROLE IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS • CMO ASSUMES A PRIMARY ROLE FOR PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS. COMMUNITY GROUPS UN MISSION UNHCR RELIGIOUS GROUPS ICRC CARE UN WHO UN CIVPOL MSF UN WFP IOM

  30. CIMIC/CMO Tasks • Liaison With Civil Sector • Identification of Resources • Protocol • Information Exchange • Support Interoperability • Unity and Economy of Effort

  31. CIMIC/CMO Tasks • Foster Dialog • Ensure policies and operating procedures are understood (multiple levels) • Coordinate Requests • Military support (logistics; security) • Integrate efforts • Numerous contributing (competing?) organizations and groups

  32. MILITARY OPERATIONS CIVIL DIMENSION WAR PEACE CIVILIAN TASKS AND REQUIREMENTS A Civil Dimension exists in all military operations

  33. USG UN/IOs MOD Host Nation NGOs Religion Business Zone of Collaboration/Coordination

  34. Military: U.S. + ? NGO IO PVO UN Agencies CMOC US Gov’t Agencies ICRC HN/Local Populace

  35. Alphabet Soup CMCC CMOC CIMIC HACC HOC OSOCC HAC

  36. POPULATION NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS CMOC FORCE COMMANDER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES POLITICAL NATIONAL CIVIL- MILITARY RELATIONS MILITARY- MILITARY NATIONAL MILITARIES PARAMILITARY GROUPS

  37. Information Sharing • Open Source Information • Information versus Intelligence • Methods of acquiring: • Is this “collection”? • Analysis • Exchange • Dissemination

  38. CIMIC/CMO Challenges • Clash of cultures; goals; vocabulary • Lack of knowledge about each other • Lack of mutual respect • Lack of comparable doctrine & practice • Asymmetry • Military has power but is in support • Civilians “in charge” but not “in control” Perceptions!!!

  39. QUESTIONS ?

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