HF Design for Operability and Maintenability

1. Technische Universität Berlin Presented at The PRISM Seminar, FG2 Athens, 3rd & 4th Sept, 2003 Dipl.-Ing. Simon G. Kariuki & Dr.-Ing. Katharina Löwe Technical University of Berlin HF Design for Operability and Maintenability

2. Technische Universität Berlin What is covered: • Background, why the need for HF in design. • HF Models for design, inspection and maintenance. • Examples where design ignored HF.

3. Technische Universität Berlin Human Factors Age (Current) Safety Management Systems age (Upto mid-1980s) Engineering/ Hardware age (Upto 1970s) Why Human Factor? Safety Improvement Time Industrial Revolution 2003

4. Technische Universität Berlin -Engineers -Chemists -Process Operators -Maintenance Technicians Designers Operator (User) Human Factors Experts -Ergonomists -Psychologists The Design Team Management Design Output

5. Technische Universität Berlin The Principle • Participatory design that involves operator (as the user) participation and task modelling at early stages. • To make all departments feel that they own the design process. • Human Factors are included from early stages and not to only for cosmetic purposes. • To train Engineers to be HF experts • To involve cognitive and physical ergonomists permanently & actively in design projects

6. Technische Universität Berlin Plant (Machine) Design Manage- ment Systems Task performance Human (User) Equipment reliability Training, Communication Operator (active errors) Design and Management (latent errors) OR Minimise error occurence Minimise consequences HF Design Guidelines Error causes Design solution to address error causes Local trigger Local trigger Undesired Event HF BARRIER

7. Technische Universität Berlin HF Iterative design Model Commissioning & Installation Review Evaluate Conceptual Design Basic Design Detailed Design Check

8. Technische Universität Berlin HF Iterative design Model Commissioning & Installation • Abstract of design • HF reviews • Overview of tasks Review Evaluate Conceptual Design Basic Design Detailed Design Check

9. Technische Universität Berlin HF Iterative design Model Commissioning & Installation • Abstract of design • HF reviews • Overview of tasks Review Evaluate Conceptual Design Basic Design Detailed Design Check • User profile: Biometrics • Task analysis • Critical tasks, Task scenarios • Subtasks formulation • Function analysis • Link analysis

10. Technische Universität Berlin HF Iterative design Model • HF training for contractors • Feedback for an improvement Commissioning & Installation • Abstract of design • HF reviews • Overview of tasks Review Evaluate Conceptual Design Basic Design Detailed Design Check • User profile: Biometrics • Task analysis • Critical tasks, Task scenarios • Subtasks formulation • Function analysis • Link analysis

11. Technische Universität Berlin HF Iterative design Model • HF training for contractors • Feedback for an improvement Commissioning & Installation • Abstract of design • HF reviews • Overview of tasks Review Evaluate Conceptual Design Basic Design Detailed Design Check • User profile: Biometrics • Task analysis • Critical tasks, Task scenarios • Subtasks formulation • Function analysis • Link analysis

12. Technische Universität Berlin • Detailed presentation of design • Application of HF guidelines • Task analysis review Detailed design Review Check Evaluate

13. Technische Universität Berlin • Detailed presentation of design • Application of HF guidelines • Task analysis review Detailed design Review • Simulation • Prototyping • Operator testing & training • Cognitive walkthroughs Check Evaluate

14. Technische Universität Berlin • Detailed presentation of design • Application of HF guidelines • Task analysis review Detailed design Review • Simulation • Prototyping • Operator testing & training • Cognitive walkthroughs • Specifications • Error causes & precursor Analysis and mitigation • Evaluate results • New concepts needed? Check Evaluate

15. Technische Universität Berlin • Detailed presentation of design • Application of HF guidelines • Task analysis review • Are the error causes & precursors designed out? • Are they guarded against? • Warn against? • Training to avoid error occurrence? Detailed design Review • Simulation • Prototyping • Operator testing & training • Cognitive walkthroughs • Specifications • Error causes & precursor Analysis and mitigation • Evaluate results • New concepts needed? Check Evaluate

16. HF Main Areas Technische Universität Berlin Process Control & Monitoring Control Room Design Field Control Panels Alarm Management Control Panel Design Display Design Maintainability and Operability Accessibility issues Process Equipment Line Valves & Relief Valves Pipes, hoses and connectors Fasteners, gaskets and seals Automation Fault Management False Alarms Training Process Operations& Layout Process (Equipment) Layout Pathways design Work Environment Ventilation, Air Conditioning Noise reduction Lighting and Glaring Work space layout Designing to reduce Human Error Precursors = HF Guidelines

17. Technische Universität Berlin Analysis of accidents TUB Internet Survey Uth, 1999

18. Technische Universität Berlin Fatality due to maintenance accidents Lees, 1996

19. Technische Universität Berlin Inspection Model Decision & Response Steps Initiate Access Search Action Example HF Design Requirement

20. Technische Universität Berlin Inspection Model Decision & Response Initiate Access Steps Search • Read & understand work card • Select inspection tools. • Calibrate if necessary (NDI equipment) Action Example • Work card design • Permit –to-work procedures HF Design Requirement

21. Technische Universität Berlin Inspection Model Decision & Response Access Steps Initiate Search • Read & understand work card • Select inspection tools. • Calibrate if necessary (NDI equipment) • Locate area on the plant • Move to work site Action Example • Work card design • Permit –to-work procedures HF Design Requirement • Proper & clear labelling. • Avoid difficult-to-reach areas. • Easy & safe isolation. • Purging

22. Technische Universität Berlin Inspection Model Decision & Response Access Search Steps Initiate • Read & understand work card • Select inspection tools. • Calibrate if necessary (NDI equipment) • Move eyes or probe on search areas • Locate area on the plant • Move to work site Action Example • Work card design • Permit –to-work procedures HF Design Requirement • Clear access routes. • Good lighting • Reachable locations • Proper & clear labelling. • Avoid difficult-to-reach areas. • Easy & safe isolation. • Purging

23. Technische Universität Berlin Inspection Model Decision & Response Steps Initiate Access Search • Re-examine area of indication and mark as a defect if necessary. • Write a Non routine repair (NRR) • Read & understand work card • Select inspection tools. • Calibrate if necessary (NDI equipment) • Move eyes or probe on search areas • Locate area on the plant • Move to work site Action Example • Training of maintenance personnel. • Work card design • Permit –to-work procedures HF Design Requirement • Clear access routes. • Good lighting • Reachable locations • Proper & clear labelling. • Avoid difficult-to-reach areas. • Easy & safe isolation. • Purging

24. Technische Universität Berlin Repair/Maintenance Model Site Access Part Access Steps Initiate Reset Buy-back Action Example HF Design Requirement

25. Technische Universität Berlin Repair/Maintenance Model Site Access Part Access Initiate Steps Reset Buy-back • Make tools ready, collect parts, inspect parts Action Example • Well design parts stores with parts clearly, logically labelled & numbered HF Design Requirement

26. Technische Universität Berlin Repair/Maintenance Model Site Access Part Access Steps Initiate Reset Buy-back • With tools, parts, equipment • Isolate equipment/ plant • Make tools ready, collect parts, inspect parts Action Example • Well design parts stores with parts clearly, logically labelled & numbered • Sufficient pathways to worksite with all required tools & equipment included • Easy & Safe Isolation HF Design Requirement

27. Technische Universität Berlin Repair/Maintenance Model Part Access Site Access Steps Initiate Reset Buy-back • Isolate equipment. • Open the parts that need repair • Make tools ready, collect parts, inspect parts • With tools, parts, equipment • Isolate equipment/plant Action Example • Well design parts stores with parts clearly, logically labelled & numbered • Sufficient pathways to worksite with all required tools & equipment included • Easy & Safe Isolation HF Design Requirement • Accessibility of part. to avoid working at awkward positions • Easy &safe isolation • Purging

28. Technische Universität Berlin Repair/Maintenance Model Site Access Part Access Reset Steps Initiate Buy-back • Isolate equipment. • Open the parts that need repair • Adjust systems to specs and inspect adjustment. • Make tools ready, collect parts, inspect parts • With tools, parts, equipment • Isolate equipment/plant Action Example • Gauges and other indicators easily readable and shall be within eye reach • Well design parts stores with parts clearly, logically labelled & numbered • Accessibility of part. to avoid working at awkward positions • Easy &safe isolation • Purging • Sufficient pathways to worksite with all required tools & equipment included • Easy & Safe Isolation HF Design Requirement

29. Technische Universität Berlin Repair/Maintenance Model Site Access Part Access Buy-back Steps Initiate Reset • Isolate equipment. • Open the parts that need repair • Adjust systems to specs and inspect adjustment. • Make tools ready, collect parts, inspect parts • With tools, parts, equipment • Isolate equipment/plant • Examine if repair meets standards. • Close & document Action Example • Training of maintenance personnel. • Good communication • Gauges and other indicators easily readable and shall be within eye reach • Accessibility of part. to avoid working at awkward positions • Easy &safe isolation • Purging • Well design parts stores with parts clearly, logically labelled & numbered • Sufficient pathways to worksite with all required tools & equipment included • Easy & Safe Isolation HF Design Requirement

30. Technische Universität Berlin Repair/Maintenance Example Pasadena Incident, October 23rd 1989 Settling leg Loop reactor Schematic Product Take Off Valve

31. Technische Universität Berlin Settling leg of a reactor: General Piping Repair/Maintenance Example Pasadena Incident, October 23rd 1989 • Settling legs clogged by plastic material. • Frequent cleaning was needed. • The clogged leg is isolated but reactor keep on operating.

32. Technische Universität Berlin Repair/Maintenance Example Pasadena Incident, October 23rd 1989 • Valve operated by air. • Connectors for „open“ and „close“ were identical. DEMCOR Valve

33. Technische Universität Berlin Repair/Maintenance Example Pasadena Incident, October 23rd 1989 Consequences • Explosion with the force of 2.4 tons of TNT • 23 fatalities • More than 130 injuries • Nearly a billion dollars in asset damaged HF design questions • Was the isolation easy and safe? • Was the alarm system detectable, could it be discriminated? • Were the access/escape routes designed to contain an emergency situation, were they clearly marked?

34. Task • To fill tank 1: Close Valves 2 & 3 and open valve 1. Possible error: Either valve 1 or 2 or both valves are left open  Product to the wrong tank Operational example Technische Universität Berlin Product1 Tank 1 Valve 1 Product2 Tank 2 From loading rack Valve 2 Product3 Tank 3 Valve 3

35. Solution Technische Universität Berlin • Each filling pipe to have a different size or a special coupling • Work space big enough accomodate operators hands with PPE • Filling point lifted to avoid too much bending Each tank to be connected to filling point by an independent pipe

36. Conclusions Technische Universität Berlin • HF should be as old as the conceptual stage of a design process. • Iterative design process helps to reduce error causes before the whole design process is concluded. Most important is to eliminate the Myth: The Primary function of a design engineer is to make things difficult for the fabricator and impossible for the the serviceman.

37. Technische Universität Berlin Thank you for your kind attention