Societal Aspects of the 2008 Super Tuesday Tornado Outbreak

Societal Aspects of the 2008 Super Tuesday Tornado Outbreak Kevin Barjenbruch* and Julie Demuth** *NWS Salt Lake City WFO **NCAR Societal Impacts Program IWT Workshop: Using the WAS*IS Approach January 22, 2009

NWS service assessments…then • Conducted to evaluate NWS performance during significant (high-impact) events • Usually convened just once or twice a year • Team composition: experts from both inside and outside the National Weather Service

NWS service assessments…then • THEN: Inward focus on procedures, actions, equipment • Internal review of operations in National Centers, WFOs, CWSUs, RFCs • Informal external review of information with partners • Quantitative assessment • Damage, verification, fatalities, injuries, etc.

NWS service assessments…now • NOW: Inclusion of external focus via societal impacts analyses • Super Tuesday, Mother’s Day, Midwest floods • Qualitative assessment • Information sources, perceptions, decision-making

Desired outcomes of NWS SAs • Use findings, recommendations, best practices to: • Improve delivery of hazard information (format, content, media) to our customers and partners • Improve clarity of hazard information • Focus research and training • Allocate resources Provide better and more understandable weather information so that people will take action to protect life and property!

Impacts of the tornado outbreak • 87 tornadoes • 5 EF-4 tornadoes • 1 tornado had a 122-mile long path • 57 fatalities • most since May 31, 1985 • 13th overall • 350+ injuries • $520M damage

February 5-6, 2008, tornado outbreak • National Weather Service (NWS) predictions • Excellent long lead-time info: • First outlook issued 6 days prior • Day before, outlook mentioned “potentially strong and long-track tornadoes” 18 min 1 min • Mixed quality short lead-time info: T • Mean official tornado warning lead time of 18 minutes • Some problems with timely downstream warnings • Uncertainty wording for confirmed tornadoes

Ubiquitous questions • This was a well-warned event, with good information… • … why did so many people die? • … why don’t people do what they’re “supposed”to do … to make the “right”decision? We get frustrated when we put “good” weather information out there and people don’t make the “right” decisions!

The “right” decision … in a tornado • Why might someone not take shelter from a tornado? . . . • What is the “right” decision? • Is there a “right” decision? • How and why do decisions get made?

Bottom line … if you want to study human beings, you’d better have a high tolerance for ambiguity!

Societal impacts scope • The task – To try to understand why so many people died and the details of those fatalities • An opportunity – To gather empirical information about people’s actual warning response behaviors . . . Can learn so much by having people walk you through their knowledge, thoughts, actions … by letting them tell you their stories!

Research objectives • For the fatalities, wanted to gather info about: • Age, gender, warning received, warning source, warning heeded, shelter sought, structure where they died, availability of safer shelter • For the survivors, wanted to assess: • what info people had, how they interpreted it (knowledge) • how people perceived the situation (perceptions) • what decisions people made (decision-making) • what information they had about the fatalities This is a highly interdependent, iterative process

Methodology • Semi-structured interviews with the public • Targeted, convenience, and snowball sampling • 41 interviews by 3 sub-teams in the 6 WFOs visited • We did 17 public interviews over 4 days in the field, another day on the phone • Audio recorded with consent

Some of the questions • When did you first realize there was a threat of a tornado? • How did you learn about the threat? (sources, environmental cues) • What were you thinking after you received that information? (trust? confusion? uncertainty? barriers to action?) • What did you do next? (confirmation?) • Have you ever been in a similar type of extreme-weather situation in the past? (experience, false alarms) • Did anything from that experience influence what you did during this most recent event? • Have you ever been warned about an extreme weather event in the past that did not occur? • Think back over the entire tornado event, from the time you learned there was a tornado threat through when the tornado actually occurred. • Do you feel that any of the information you received was unclear? • Is there any other information you would have liked to have had?

Data analysis • Analyzed iteratively, cooperatively by 2 coders • Coded with Excel • Pre-determined categories • Categories created inductively during analysis • Caveats and considerations!! • Balance between scientific rigor and rapid operational needs • First step, hopefully leading to more related work in the future (more in-depth studies, various weather contexts, etc.)

Findings − knowledge • People get information from multiple sources • Majority via television • Also commonly from other people (family, friends, neighbors, co-workers) • People get information multiple times • NOAA Weather Radio was used, but not common • Tornado sirens are useful, but… • Misconceptions about sirens as a warning device • Local EMs confirmed this is a problem; one is actively trying to correct this via newspaper and radio • Misconceptions about what sirens mean

Findings − perception • Integration of seasonality, weather salience, situational awareness about the event • Majority of people associate tornado outbreaks as occurring in March or later… • … so many minimized threat because they perceived it as being outside “traditional” tornado season • … BUT, for many people, situational factors (e.g., unusually warm temps) heightened their awareness

Findings − perception (cont) • Personalization of the threat • People often seek confirmation of the threat; a single source of info will not necessary spur protective action • E.g., Atkins, AR, woman and couple • Many people recognize a risk exists, but believe that their personal risk is less or that they aren’t at risk at all (optimism bias) • E.g., Hardin County, TN, family; Arkansas family

Findings − decision making • NOT a singular event • Happens numerous times throughout the warning process • Implicit part of people’s gathering and interpreting weather information to evaluate their risk

Findings − sheltering • Sheltering definitions • Safer = safer relative to one’s current location (e.g., frame home is “safer” than mobile home) • Safest = a basement, storm cellar, or safe room • Decision to shelter • Vast majority of people who received warning heeded it and sought shelter in best location available to them … • … but less than half of people had a “safest” shelter available • Very few people who received a warning opted not to shelter

Findings − 57 fatalities • Collected as much good data as we could • Nearly 2/3 of victims were in mobile homes • 15 in houses, 4 in warehouse, 1 in vehicle, 1 unknown • Warning and shelteringinfo for victims • Of the 18 people we had warning info about • 11 people heeded the warning, 3 did not, unknown for 4 • 10 people sought shelter, 5 did not, unknown for 3 • … but most did not have an safest sheltering option • 8 people did, 34 did not, unknown for 15 • … and many did not have a safer sheltering option • 17 did, 21 did not, unknown for 19

Opportunities – National Scope • Establish a ‘pool’ of societal impacts experts • Communication, sociologists, anthropologists, economists, GIS specialists, etc. • Develop a common set of societal impacts survey questions, tailored as appropriate • NWS should consider adding a Societal Impacts Program to operational branches of NWSH and Regions, to organize and focus these efforts

Opportunities – Regional/WFO Scale • Gather impacts/socio-demographic data for local events • Utilize academic community for research initiatives • Resource for survey methods, questions, analyses • Utilize COMET grants, NSTEP process • Build partnerships! • This workshop is a great first-step!

Broader lessons learned • Value of having some exposure to quantitative and qualitative research • Emergency managers are invaluable • Partnerships among social scientists, research meteorologists, operational meteorologists, broadcasters, emergency managers and other practitioners, policy makers, etc. • Building this community! • Interest and willingness to work together, to listen, learn, exchange ideas!

Discussion questions • Would more definitive wording (call to action statements) in warnings & statements may prompt better protective response? • Should we continue with the watch / warning / advisory methodology? • Should mandatory protective action be taken at longer lead times (e.g., evacuating mobile home parks, dismissing classes, large-venue considerations)? • Should local, state, and federal governments partner (legislate?) to build local shelter facilities?

Acknowledgements • Super Tuesday service assessment team members • Especially Mike Vescio, Daniel Nietfeld • NWS • NCAR Societal Impacts Program and WAS*IS • Contact • Kevin Barjenbruch (kevin.barjenbruch@noaa.gov) • Julie Demuth (jdemuth@ucar.edu) www.sip.ucar.edu

Societal Aspects of the 2008 Super Tuesday Tornado Outbreak