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Shengyu Zhang The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Quantum strategic game theory. Shengyu Zhang The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Why we are here?. Understanding the power of quantum Computation: quantum algorithms/complexity Communication: quantum info. theory … This work: game theory. Game: Two basic forms. strategic (normal) form.

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Shengyu Zhang The Chinese University of Hong Kong

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  1. Quantum strategic game theory Shengyu Zhang The Chinese University of Hong Kong

  2. Why we are here? • Understanding the power of quantum • Computation: quantum algorithms/complexity • Communication: quantum info. theory • … • This work: game theory

  3. Game: Two basic forms strategic (normal) form extensive form

  4. Game: Two basic forms • n players: P1, …, Pn • Pi has a set Si of strategies • Pi has a utility function ui: S→ℝ • S = S1 S2 ⋯  Sn strategic (normal) form

  5. Nash equilibrium • Nash equilibrium: each player has adopted an optimal strategy, provided that others keep their strategies unchanged

  6. Nash equilibrium • Pure Nash equilibrium: a joint strategy s = (s1, …, sn) s.t. i,ui(si,s-i) ≥ui(si’,s-i) • (Mixed) Nash equilibrium (NE): a product distribution p = p1  …  pn s.t. i,si’Es←p[ui(si,s-i)]≥Es←p[ui(si’,s-i)]

  7. [ ( ) ] [ ( 0 ) ] E E ¸ u s s u s s ( j ) ( j ) i i i i i ¡ ¡ i ¢ ¢ s p s s p s ; ; Ã Ã ¡ i i ¡ i i Correlated equilibrium • Correlated equilibrium (CE): p s.t. i,si, si’ • CE = NE ∩ {product distributions} Nash and Aumann: two Laureate of Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences

  8. Why correlated equilibrium? Traffic Light Game theory natural • 2 pure NE: one crosses and one stops. Payoff: (0,1) or (1,0) • Bad: unfair. • 1 mixed NE: both cross w.p. 1/101. • Good: Fair • Bad: Low payoff: both ≃ 0.0001 • Worse: Positive chance of crash • CE: (Cross,Stop) w.p. ½, (Stop,Cross) w.p. ½ • Fair, high payoff, 0 chance of crash.

  9. Why correlated equilibrium? Game theory natural Math nice • Set of correlated equilibria is convex. • The NE are vertices of the CE polytope (in any non-degenerate 2-player game) • All CE in graphical games can be represented by ones as product functions of each neighborhood.

  10. Why correlated equilibrium? Game theory natural Math nice • [Obs] A CE can found in poly. time by LP. • natural dynamics →approximate CE. • A CE in graphical games can be found in poly. time. CS feasible

  11. “quantum games” • Non-local games • EWL-quantization of strategic games • J. Eisert, M. Wilkens, M. Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. Lett., 1999. • Others • Meyer’s Penny Matching • Gutoski-Watrous framework for refereed game

  12. EWL model J J-1 Φ1 s1 u1(s) |0 ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ Φn sn un(s) |0 States of concern What’s this classically?

  13. EWL model Classically we don’t undo the sampling (or do any re-sampling) after players’ actions. J J-1 Φ1 s1 u1(s) |0 ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ Φn sn un(s) |0

  14. EWL model J J-1 Φ1 s1 u1(s) |0 ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ Φn sn un(s) |0 and consider the state p at this point

  15. CPTP Our model Φ1 s1 u1(s) ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ρ Φn sn un(s) • A simpler model, • corresponding to classical games more precisely. and consider the state p at this point

  16. Other than the model • Main differences than previous work in quantum strategic games: • We consider general games of growing sizes. • Previous: specific games, usually 2*2 or 3*3 • We study quantitative questions. • Previous work: advantages exist? • Ours: How much can it be?

  17. Central question: How much “advantage” can playing quantum provide? • Measure 1: Increase of payoff • Measure 2: Hardness of generation

  18. First measure: increase of payoff • We will define natural correspondences between classical distributions and quantum states. • And examine how well the equilibrium property is preserved.

  19. Quantum equilibrium quantum classical C1 s1’ u1(s’) Φ1 s1 u1(s) p → s ρ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ Cn Φn sn’ un(s’) un(s) sn classical equilibrium: No player wants to do anything to the assigned strategy si, if others do nothing on their parts - p = p1…pn: Nash equilibrium - general p: correlated equilibrium quantumequilibrium: No player wants to do anything to the assigned strategy ρ|Hi, if others do nothing on their parts - ρ = ρ1… ρn: quantum Nash equilibrium - general ρ: quantum correlated equilibrium

  20. |ψp = ∑s√p(s) |s (quantum superposition) Correspondence of classical and quantum states quantum classical s1’ s1 Φ1 C1 p→s ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ρ ⋮ ⋮ sn’ sn Cn Φn p: p(s) = ρss (measure in comp. basis) ρ ρp = ∑s p(s) |ss| (classical mixture) p: distri. on S ρ s.t. p(s) = ρss (general class)

  21. |ψp = ∑s√p(s) |s Preservation of equilibrium? Obs: ρ is a quantum Nash/correlated equilibrium  p is a (classical) Nash/correlated equilibrium quantum classical p: p(s) = ρss ρ ρp = ∑s p(s) |ss| p ρ s.t. p(s) = ρss Question: Maximumadditive and multiplicative increase of payoff (in a [0,1]-normalized game)?

  22. |ψp = ∑s√p(s) |s Optimal Optimal Maximum additive increase quantum classical Additive p: p(s) = ρss ρ Open: Improve on |ψp? ρp = ∑s p(s) |ss| p ρ s.t. p(s) = ρss Question: Maximumadditive and multiplicative increase of payoff (in a [0,1]-normalized game)?

  23. |ψp = ∑s√p(s) |s Optimal Optimal Maximum multiplicative increase quantum classical multiplicative p: p(s) = ρss ρ Open: Improve on |ψp? ρp = ∑s p(s) |ss| p ρ s.t. p(s) = ρss Question: Maximumadditive and multiplicative increase of payoff (in a [0,1]-normalized game)?

  24. X £ ( ) ( ) ( ) n n l R D A P T Y V Y i X ¡ 2 T u a a r : : m n r a p £ i j i j ( ) ( [ ] ) n n i l P V R E A P E p p i ; ¡ 2 2 r m a : a r : m a x a p p p n i j j i j i j i ; ; ; [ ] i j 2 n ; [ ] i j 2 n ; X T [ ] 8 Y p p i º t 2 s a p p n [ ] ( [ ] ) i j j j 8 h l d T i i i j 0 1 0 1 · · t . . ; 2 s a n e g a m e s - n o r m a z e i j . . ; ; , . [ ] j 2 n X [ ] ( ) 8 d b i i i i i j 1 0 ¸ t t 2 p p n p s a s r u o n = i j i j ; ; ; . i j X X 0 [ ] ( ) 8 l d l b i i i i i i j ¸ t 2 a p a p n p s a c o r r e a e e q u r u m 0 i j i j i j i j ; ; ; . j j X [ ] ( f g ) 8 E I E E P O V M i i 0 º t 2 n s a m e a s u r e m e n = i i i n ; ; . i Optimization • The maximum increase of payoff on |ψp for a CE p: • √pj is short for the column vector (√p1j, …,√pnj)T. Non-concave

  25. Small n and general case • n=2: • Additive: (1/√2) – 1/2 = 0.2071… • Multiplicative: 4/3. • n=3: • Additive: 8/9 – 1/2 = 7/18 = 0.3888... • Multiplicative: 16/9. • General n: • Tensor product • Carefully designed base case

  26. Second measure: hardness of generation • Why care about generation? • Recall the good properties of CE. • But someone has to generate the correlation. • Also very interesting on its own • Bell’s inequality Game theory natural Math nice CS feasible

  27. Correlation complexity rA r rB t s • Two players want to share a correlation. • Need: shared resource or communication. • Nonlocality? Comm. Comp.? • No private inputs here! • Corr(p) = min shared resource needed • QCorr(p): entanglement RCorr(p): public coins • Comm(p) = min communication needed • QComm(p): qubits RComm(p): bits Alice Bob x y (x,y)  p

  28. Correlation complexity back in games Φ1 s1 u1(s) ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ seed Φn sn un(s) Correlated Equilibrium

  29. r rA rB Correlation complexity Alice Bob x y (x,y)  p • Question: Does quantum entanglement have advantage over classical randomness in generating correlation? • [Obs] Comm(p) ≤ Corr(p) ≤ size(p) • Right inequality: share the target correlation. • So unlike non-local games, one can always simulate the quantum correlation by classical. • The question is the efficiency. size(p) = length of string (x,y) complexity-version of Bell’s Theorem

  30. Separation • [Thm]  p=(X,Y) of size n, s.t. QCorr(p) = 1, RComm(p) ≥log(n). [Conj] A random with n

  31. 1 ( ) ( ) d ( ) e R C R C l k P ( ) ( ) ( ) l k Q C l k P Q i o m m o r r r a n p p o g · · = = + r a n o r r r a n o g p m 2 n o g 2 2 4 ¹ Q Q Q P ± : = Tools: rank and nonnegative rank • [Thm] • P = [p(x,y)]x,y • [Thm] • rank(M) = min {r: M = ∑k=1…r Mk, rank(Mk)=1} • Nonnegative rank(of a nonnegative matrix): rank+(M) = min {r: M = ∑k=1…r Mk, rank(Mk)=1, Mk ≥ 0} • Extensively-studied in linear algebra and engineering. Many connections to (T)CS. entrywise

  32. Explicit instances • Euclidean Distance Matrix (EDM): Q(i,j) = ci – cjwhere c1, …, cNℝ. • rank(Q) = 2. • [Thm, BL09] rank+(Q∘Q) ≥ log2N • [Conj, BL09] rank+(Q∘Q) = N. (Even existing one Q implies 1 vs. n separation, the strongest possible)

  33. Conclusion • Model: natural, simple, rich • Non-convex programming; rank+; comm. comp. • Next directions: • Improve the bounds (in both measures) • Efficient testing of QNE/QCE? • QCE ←natural quantum dynamics? • Approximate Correlation complexity • [Shi-Z] p: QCorrε(p) = O(log n), RCommε(p) = Ω(√n) • Characterize QCorr? • Mutual info? No! p: Ip = O(n-1/4), QCorr(p) = Θ(log n) Thanks

  34. General n • Construction: Tensor product. • [Lem]

  35. · 2 ¸ 2 · ¸ 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i ¡ c o s ² s n ² s n ² c o s ² s n ² U P = = 1 4 ( ) ( ) ( ) i l 0 4 ( ( ) ) o g n N s n ² c o s ² i 1 c o s ² ¡ 2 e w u s n ² = ~ ( = ) l O 1 1 ¡ o g n = l 2 ( ( ) = ) o g n l d O i 1 2 4 ¡ 2 u s n ² = ~ ( = ) l O 1 o g n = Base case: additive increase Worse than constant • Using the result of n=2? • Additive: ε2log2(n)-ε1log2(n) = 1/poly(n). • Need: ε2 and ε1 very close to 1, yet still admitting a gap of ≈ 1 when taking power. • New construction:

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