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‘It’s better to be safe 100 times than dead one time.’ – Mark Twain

‘It’s better to be safe 100 times than dead one time.’ – Mark Twain.

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‘It’s better to be safe 100 times than dead one time.’ – Mark Twain

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  1. ‘It’s better to be safe 100 times than dead one time.’ – Mark Twain

  2. An NFPA study (Fahy, 2002) observed that the death rates for the three major causes of fatal injuries to firefighters while inside structure fires (lost inside, structural collapse, and fire progress) have been rising.

  3. This same study points to a lack of experience as a potential cause of fireground fatalities from traumatic injury resulting from rapid fire progress or collapse.

  4. Training related fatalities have also been on the increase. AND Live fire training has typically been one of the leading types of training activity resulting in fatalities. (USFA, 2003)

  5. So...... Injuries and fatalities during LF training and during fireground operations are on the increase! Firefighter Experience Fireground Operations Live Fire Training

  6. Live fire training policies are defined by three interrelated components: National consensus standards: NFPA 1403, OSHA regulations, Local SOGs or SOPs

  7. NFPA 1403, 2007 edition NFPA 1403 places emphasis on addressing unsafe acts and conditions directly connected to accidents that have occurred during LF training.

  8. NFPA 1403, 2007 edition Training fire suppression personnel engaged in firefighting operations under live fire conditions. Provide a process for conducting live fire training evolutions to ensure that they are conducted in safe facilities and that the exposure to health and safety hazards for the firefighters receiving the training is minimized.

  9. NFPA 1403, 2007 edition NFPA 1403 is a compliance standard, not a competency standard. • The only competency addressed states... "qualified by the authority having jurisdiction to deliver firefighter training."

  10. Safe and effective live fire training is dependent on knowledgeable and experienced instructors.

  11. Instructors must have expertise in fire behavior and tactical operations. They must also understand how to pass this expertise on to their students.

  12. History of NFPA 1403

  13. Boulder, Colorado 26 Jan 1982

  14. 2 FFs die during search & rescue drills, Lt seriously injured • Combustible Fiberboard, Tires, Motor Oil thrown into burn pit just to produce smoke

  15. Mesa, AZ25 May 1985

  16. Firefighter severely burned while assisting with search & rescue drills using a burn barrel This is a picture of the FF on the day of the incident, wearing exactly what he had on at the time of the injury

  17. 1st Edition NFPA 1403 1986

  18. 1987 - Milford, Michigan

  19. Three FFs perish during an attempt at arson investigation training. No accountability and the use of multiple props simultaneously contribute to the fatal incident

  20. Parsippany, NJ1992

  21. Young FF is permanently disabled as a result of live fire training inside of a dilapidated school bus. The training took place two miles from a comprehensive training facility. The objective of the training was “to make them feel some heat.”

  22. 2nd and 3rd Editions of NFPA 1403 • 1992 - 1997

  23. Greenwood, Delaware Assistant Chief dies during burn down while using a pressurized garden sprayer in a room with several fires burning. • 2000 The use of a SCBA contributed to the fatality, since the chief was not used to wearing one during interior live fire training.

  24. Lairdsville, New York9 Sept. 2001

  25. Rookie FF dies during RIT training The 19 year old had been on the dept for less than 3 weeks before being placed above the inferno. The investigation would reveal that the young man’s SCBA was never turned on. The Assistant Chief that started the fire by pushing a couch and mattress against the bottom of the stairwell was criminally convicted of manslaughter.

  26. “He just joined August 20th. He was only on two controlled burns, and now he’s gone. It’s sad that we have to lose young guys like that.” -John Klein Lairdsville Fire Company Vice President

  27. Poinciana, Florida 2002

  28. Poinciana Two firefighters entered as a crew without a hose line to simulate a search and rescue operation looking for a mannequin dressed as a firefighter. A crew with a hose line was located in the next room by the doorway that led to the fire room. The deaths were the result of ‘smoke inhalation and thermal injuries suffered during the training exercise. The addition of the foam mattress to the fire load is one of many variables that could contribute to a flashover, but is not exclusive.

  29. Poinciana, Fla 2002 RIT IC

  30. 4th Edition of NFPA 1403 2002

  31. Miami-Dade 2003 Recruit Dies during advanced shipboard training drill

  32. Investigative Findings • Criminal charges not filed – but not closed. • 36 specific findings – • This was not a BFST Certified Training Facility. • Although not approved for gas, a gas-fueled fire was used in this training. • NFPA 1402 and 1403 were not complied with. (1403 was required by FAC)

  33. No Safety Officer, RIT, EMS stand-by or other emergency contingencies in place or planned. • Lack of command structure and plans, including no real Incident Commander. • Not all personnel assigned to these evolutions had specific training for “live-fire” training or familiarity with the structure. • The environment was determined to be excessively hot by the Lead Instructor, but the evolution was not terminated.

  34. There were two separate fires within the structure burning simultaneously. • The exercise was more advanced than for initial recruit training. • The Instructor-In-Charge failed to identify and correct safety hazards. • Instructors did not closely monitor trainee movement. • Instructors did not follow the trainees out to ensure they all reached the outside safely. • There was not a means of monitoring the temperature of the environment.

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