War in the Waikato

1. THIS IS A LAYERED ACTIVITY WITH AT LEAST 4 ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE SAME CONTENT DO NOW: Read TEXT P 6 bottom, then P7 and 8. Make notes of key ideas in the margin as you go From P 14 write down the names of the major Battle sites Write heading from P 16, read text in box, jot down key ideas in own words Watch video and write DOWN page but in FOUR columns PEOPLE IDEAS PLACES EVENTS Fill in and copy template notes for homework. Return to me Monday Watch Powerpoint and associate image with P I P E Take down key ideas from Powerpoint Write paragraph Write essay! War in the Waikato

14. Waikato PARAGRAPH • ________ ______ replaced Gore-Browne as Governor in October 1861 and went about pursuing both peace and war. His target was the K__________ in the ________ region who he, and the settlers, saw as the major threat to Pakeha authority in New Zealand. Grey used propaganda concerning possible Kingitanga attacks on ________ to persuade Britain to send imperial troops to New Zealand. • In July, 1863 Grey ordered all Maori north of the Mangatawhiri stream to swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown. Two days later colonial troops invaded the Waikato. • Governor Grey was able to mobilise about 18___ troops in total during this phase of the wars. Kingite Maori, alongside their Maori allies numbered approximately 4 000. • The Colonial forces worked their way down the Waikato river attacking fortified pa such as M_________, R_________ and capturing the important Kingitanga settlements of Ngaruawahia and Rangiaowhia. The final stage of the Waikato campaign saw General C________ focus his troops on the Tauranga area where Kingite supporters were based. British forces were slaughtered at Gate Pa before securing a victory at Te Ranga in the final battle of the war.

15. War in the Waikato Grey's Peace Policy Grey set up runanga or new institutions to give the chiefs local administrative powers. When the Maori chiefs did not use it to sell land it lost its appeal.

16. War in the Waikato • Grey also tried flattery and gifts, his 'flour and sugar' policy , but pensions and gifts could not solve the problems of a declining population, social disruption and poverty .

17. War in the Waikato War Policy • At the same time Grey prepared for war. • He was uneasy about the formidable, independent, central tribes. The limited support the King Movement had given to the Taranaki war had demonstrated its military muscle.

18. War in the Waikato • He built roads into the Waikato and planned for gunboats on the Waikato River. He kept the troops from the Taranaki War, supplementing them with an extra 3000 men.

19. War in the Waikato Grey and Cameron made careful preparations for the invasion of the Waikato. • Armed and armored steamers were acquired for the Waikato river. • The Great South Road and protective forts were built. • A supply organization was built. • A military telegraph linked Auckland to the front. • Three extra regiments and other reinforcements were 'prised' out of the Imperial Government

20. War in the Waikato • Cameron's revelation to London that Grey's allegedly imminent 'Maori Rebellion' had not persuaded the settlers to spend any money on their own defence came too late to stop the flow of imperial resources.

21. War in the Waikato • Numbers of imperial troops rose from about 8000 in July 1861 to about 12000 in May 1864. About 3/4's of these troops were available for the Waikato war.

22. War in the Waikato • The Colonial Government contributed a few hundred colonial regulars  the Forest Rangers and the Colonial Defence Force cavalry  and a substantial number of militia and volunteers from Auckland.  These were gradually replaced by Military settlers - The Waikato militia - mainly men from the Australian and Otago goldfields on the promise of confiscated Maori land.

23. War in the Waikato Events Leading to War • Grey decided the Waitara should be returned to its Maori owners. But first he occupied the Tataraimaka block which had been seized by Taranaki tribes. The angry Atiawa unsuccessfully ambushed government troops at Oakura. The Waitara was officially returned in May 1863.

24. War in the Waikato • Grey blamed the Kingites for the Oakura ambush. He also claimed they had a plot to invade Auckland. • On 11 July 1863 he ordered the invasion of Waikato.

25. War in the Waikato Causes of Conflict in the Waikato • The long-term cause was the basic antagonism of Maori and Pakeha. The settlers and even the missionaries welcomed war. They wanted to subjugate Maori nationalism. Their argument was that the 'rule of Pakeha law should prevail'.

26. War in the Waikato • Grey, like Gore Browne, wanted to establish British authority more effectively. Grey saw the Oakura ambush as a rejection of British authority.

27. War in the Waikato • The settlers and financiers coveted the rich lands of the Waikato.

28. War in the Waikato The Opposing Armies • The British Force:In1864 Grey had 14000 men. Of these, 4000 were colonial forces, 9000 were Imperial soldiers, a few hundred were pro-British Queenites (Arawa). • Total mobilisation is estimated at 18 000 men. They were commanded by Lieutenant- General Cameron. Itwas one of the best prepared and organised British campaigns.

29. War in the Waikato • The Maori Force: With limited written evidence estimates of their strength have varied greatly. Cycles of concentration and dispersal were characteristic. On three occasions forces of 1000-2000 men assembled for up to three months. Total Maori mobilisation is estimated as 4000 warriors. • This would only have been possible with a high degree of co-operative action.

30. War in the Waikato • Leaders were Rewi Maniapoto of Ngati Maniapoto, Wiremu Tamehana of Ngatihaua, and Tikaokao of Ngati Maniapoto.

31. War in the Waikato Proclamation of War • On 9 July 1864, Grey issued a Proclamation calling on all Maori living north of the Mangatawhiri river to take the oath of allegiance to Queen Victoria or retire beyond the river. • Those who resisted were liable to have land confiscated. This did not reach the Waikato until after Cameron's troops had crossed the Mangatawhiri.

32. War in the Waikato INVASION • The invasion commenced with a small victory at Koheroa in July 1863.  But the advance was then held up for 3 months by a Defensive line of modern pa at Meremere.  when Cameron finally assembled enough men to protect his communications and take Meremere the Maori simply abandoned it. • From this point on though Cameron's main advantage began to make itself felt  a large and constant flow of resources.

33. War in the Waikato The Fighting • The Maori force used guerilla tactics, killing settlers in outlying districts, and attacking communication lines. • Cameron had to tie up three-quarters of his men in protecting communications. • The Maori aim was to block Pakeha progress into the Waikato.

34. War in the Waikato The Sequence of Fighting • Meremere: A Maori force of about 1500 men constructed a pa and held up the British advance for 14 weeks, then dispersed.

35. War in the Waikato • Rangiriri:Cameron was able to mount a continuous offensive and he caught the Maori army only 1/2 assembled at Rangiriri, the second Maori defensive line, on 20 November.  Cameron's army was able to take a lightly held part of the fortifications but seven assaults against the rest failed with 13 casualties.  The Maori partly evacuated, although 18 were taken prisoner. • Its capture opened up the Waikato.

36. War in the Waikato • Ngaruawahia: was occupied by the British on 9 December. Cameron offered terms which were rejected.  however Ngaruawahia held no military or economic significance, and Maori did not submit.  instead they fortified their third and greatest Waikato line - Paterangi.

37. War in the Waikato • Paterangi: was by-passed by a brilliant British maneuver. This allowed Cameron into the heartland of the Waikato. Rangiaowhai was burned and sacked.

38. War in the Waikato • Paterangi was an awesome moden pa with extensive trench systems; Cameron realised storming it was impossible so he outflanked it in February 1864.

39. This allowed Cameron into the heartland of the Waikato.  He marched 1200 troops around it at night and sacked the nearby Maori town of Rangiaowhia  He then withdrew to await the Maori response. Tamihana knew the superiority of British troops in regular warfare and so withdrew from the Paterangi line.

40. War in the Waikato • The Paterangi operations gave the British one of the three main agricultural heartlands of the Waikato tribes. They also represented the first permanently damaging defeat suffered by Maori in the New Zealand Wars.

41. War in the Waikato • Orakau: Rewi Maniapoto, forced into a defensive stand on a un- suitable site, resisted five assaults before attempting an audacious breakout.

42. War in the Waikato End of Waikato War • Cameron decided against advancing further into the rugged hill country of the Ngati Maniapoto. War came to an indecisive end in 1864.

43. War in the Waikato • The Waikato Wars had no satisfying climax so two were invented  One was Orakau which was said to have crushed the King Movement  in fact further modern pa defended the remaining economic heartland's of Waikato  they were never taken and became the new aukati between what became known as the King Country and the Pakeha sphere.  The second occurred at Tauranga, where the Waikato fighting spilled over in 1864

46. An introduction The decision by Governor Grey to invade the Waikato in 1863 was taken because he wanted to assert his authority over the challenge from the Kingitanga. The Kingite challenge had been demonstrated with their involvement in the Taranaki War. Settler desire for land was another factor - covetting as they did the fertile Waikato valley. His flour and sugar policy at the same time as he created the infrastructure for war further demonstrated his strategy and reasoning. The immediate consequences were the progressive battles that made up the Waikato War which Kingitanga lost. Furthermore laws were passed that confiscated land. The raupatu legitimised by the law added insult to the injury caused by defeat.

47. Explain the factors that contributed to the decision made by Governor Thomas Gore Browne to pursue the purchase of the Waitara block in 1860. Evaluate the consequences of this decision on race relations in Taranaki up to 1863 In the period after the initial Pākehā settlement of New Plymouth, several blocks of land had been purchased from Taranaki and Te Ati Awa hapū. Most of this land was inland and covered in bush. Pākehā settlers were eager to acquire the more fertile land around the Waitara River, which flowed into a river mouth harbour. New Plymouth lacked a decent harbour. The settlers were jealous that 4000 Māori in Taranaki owned 800 000 hectares while the original New Zealand Company purchase for New Plymouth was just 1400 hectares. In one of his dispatches, Gore Browne alleged that Māori had far more land than they needed and that the settlers would get hold of it (recte si possint, si non quocunque modo)(fairly, if possible, if not, then by any means at all). The establishing of Kingitanga in 1858 was viewed by most Pākehā as a land-holding movement. This was a time when the populations of Auckland and New Plymouth were increasing. Governor Thomas Gore Browne believed that Māori needed to be taught a sharp lesson.

48. Governor Gore Browne believed the rumours that Māori who wanted to sell land were being intimidated by a pupuri whenua land league. In 1859, he had announced that any Māori wanting to sell land were able to do so without the consent of their chiefs. (This was a direct breach of Article Two of the Treaty, which affirmed chiefly authority.) • Governor Gore Browne saw the dispute over the sale of the Waitara block as an issue of sovereignty. When Te Teira offered the land for sale, the paramount chief of the area, Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake, objected. He argued that Te Teira didn’t have the mana or support needed to make the sale.

49. When the survey began, Wiremu Kingi’s supporters disrupted it by pulling out the survey pegs. • In February, Governor Gore Browne declared martial law and troops were sent in from New Plymouth. Waitara was occupied by troops, and Kingi’s pa Te Kohia was bombarded. The Te Ati Awa garrison abandoned the pa with little loss. • Wiremu Kingi had not initially supported the establishment of Kingitanga, but he now sought an alliance with Te Wherowhero. Kingitanga sent a force of volunteers to support Kingi in Taranaki. This was significant as it showed that Kingitanga would support Māori landholders in their disputes against the British. (Governor Grey later used Kingitanga’s involvement in the Taranaki War as part of his excuse to invade the Waikato). • On 27 June 1860, Te Ati Awa and their allies inflicted some heavy losses on British troops at the twin pa of Puketakauere and Onukukaitara near Waitara. On 6 November the British troops gained their first success when they drove Ngāti Haua and Waikato from their defences at Mahoetahi.

50. In July 1860, Governor Gore Browne convened the Kohimarama Conference, at which he attempted to undermine Wiremu Kingi and the Kingitanga (neither Kingi nor Te Wherowhero were invited) by having other North Island chiefs reaffirm aspects of the Treaty of Waitangi. • For almost three months, early in 1861, General Pratt led more than 2000 men on an advance by the means of a sap (trench) and a series of redoubts against Māori occupying pa and rifle pits at the bush edge on the bank of the Waitara River. • The conflict remained unresolved as neither side was strong enough to defeat the other, and a ceasefire was agreed in March 1861. Māori continued to control the Tataraimaka block but lost control of some of the land around Waitara. • When Governor Grey reoccupied the Tataraimaka block before giving up land at Waitara, there were further incidents around New Plymouth. • Tension continued in the late 1860s with the rise of the Pai Marire prophetic movement.