South Korean Strategic Thoughts Toward Regional Security Community

1. South Korean Strategic Thoughts Toward Regional Security Community October 2, 2009 Stanford University

2. Ⅰ. Developmentof SK Strategic Thinking Polarized Cold War Era Vigilance & Dependence • Vigilance - Threat of attack or subversion by NK • - ensuring military support against NK and its backers • Dependence • Choosing sides and depending on one patron • Necessity to station large numbers of US forces and support • US strategic objectives • China’s emergence as a third pole (albeit slowly and lesser) • - Since 1971-72 China abandoned autarchy and in 1982 it sought • Equidistance b/w US-USSR. • Japan’s new insistence on becoming a regional leader • Since mid-1980s Japan sought some autonomy from the US • USSR’s move to end the cold war Background of shift In Strategic Thinking (Transition )

3. Ⅰ. Developmentof SK Strategic Thinking Post Cold War Era Initiatives & Coordination • * Vigilance and Dependency still remained • * Initiatives: • nordpolitik(북방정책), globalization(세계화), diplomatic diversification • (외교다변화), new diplomacy(신외교), Sunshine Policy(햇볕정책), • NEA era(동북아시대), NEA central state(동북아중심국가), • regional balancer(지역균형자) • * Coordination • -Coordination with US and Japan, seeking strategic flexibility • Shifts in the foreign policy of China and Russia • * Alliance Framework vs. Multilateral Regional Framework • Dichotomy b/w traditional bilateralism and emerging regionalism? • Bi-multilateral cooperative framework? • (search of multilateralism on the basis of the alliance with the US)

4. II. SK Strategic Thoughts toward NEA Challenges • The world’s only divide country – confusing the meaning of • nationalism and rapid shifts in views of reunification • Unparallel location at the crossroads of 4 great powers • : How to operate as a middle power among 4 assertive great • powers and a belligerent NK • 3) Strategic thinking intertwining historical legacies and • territorial claims, (+ domestic divide) • -- obstructing forward-looking strategic calculations -

5. III. New Security Governance in NEA? Asymmetric Governance in NEA Security Vs Economy • Security • Entrenched bilateralism (Multilateralism as a compliment rather than • as a substitute for bilateralism) • U.S. unilateralism  the rise of nationalism •  prevent the development of multilateralism • Norms - Informal diplomacy, personal contacts, respect • for the principle of nonintervention • Economy • The economic crisis  the rise of nationalism & mercantilism • Need to revitalize the state

6. IV. Security Implications of Regionalism in NEA Security Implications of Emergent Regionalism in NEA/EA EAC w/o the US • East Asian Community (EAC) without the US • - Ties with China would intensify • - China’s role would increase • A Network of Bilateral Alliances • - Assertive rhetoric about universal values • A Maritime coalition called “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” • (Aso taro) • - (Positions of China and Russia?) US Involvement

7. IV. Security Implications of Regionalism in NEA Troika vs. G-2 US-China -Japan Troika • Joint leadership of the future involving Troika (initiated by Japan) • Japan - checking the rise of China • China - negative about it at first, but began to assess as a valuable • conduit to involve with US • US - auseful structure to deal with China and Japan at the same time • Korea – concern about the discussion process in major NEA issues • without including Korea

8. IV. Security Implications of Regionalism in NEA Troika vs. G-2 US – China G-2 • Joint leadership of the future involving the US and China • Preconditions: • 1) US recognizes the stronger china’s power and stake and • engage (not contain) China • 2) China bears global responsibility and accept the status quo • Japan : Negative • China: Reluctant – G2 idea is a new “China Containment” • The discussion of G2 could increase US and other nations’ • weariness about China’s rise • (against its foreign policy of Taoguang Yanghui, • bide our time, build our capacities)

9. V. SK’s Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism • Cold War: remained ambivalent about the strategic value of • participating in regional multilateral regimes. (한미동맹, 반공) • Post Cold War: Advancing regionalism, multilateralism •  SK presidents’ priority issue • given the presence of 4 assertive great powers and complicated • achieving reconciliation (reunification) -

10. V. SK’s Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism • some economic regionalization, but little political or security • regionalism. • Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam advocated “open regionalism,” • whether Asia-Pacific, East Asia or Northeast Asia oriented, • in the context of internationalization and globalization campaigns. • Kim Dae-jung aimed to create an EAC (with open regionalism) by • engineering the ASEAN + 3 formula (more engaged with the region), • while Roh Moo-hyun put priority on addressing Northeast Asian • issues (more inward-directd) -

11. VII. SK’s Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism • Korea’s regional idea in reality • : developed primarily from the perspectives of a geographic domain that includes • Korea, Japan, and China. • Successive governments' policies toward regionalism • : inward-oriented and directly related to promoting the development of • inter-Korean relations • : adopting a protectionist approach in trade cooperation. • - Regional Initiatives/Cooperation without the US? -

12. VI. SK’s Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism • limits in applying the functionalist approach in NEA. •  the difficulty of enhancing integration through cooperation in • areas of low politics eventually leading to cooperation • on issues of high politics. • Bi-Multilateral Cooperation Framework -

13. The prospect of a nuclear North Korea poses a serious concern/threat to the security of Northeast Asia and East Asia as a whole • The countries in Northeast Asia have finally converged to deal with the problem VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks? Theform of Six Party Talks (since 2003) • The future of the Six Party Talks is still rather precarious • Wither to the Six Party Talks?  a Northeast Asia Regional framework towards a Northeast Asian community? • Bi-Multilateral Cooperative Mechanism is recommendable to deal with NK? (esp. the Bilateral mechanism between NK and US)

14. NK: Talks are dead (April 2009). • Never return to 6PT despite the pressures from China and Russia • Lee Myung-Bak’s proposal – “5 Way Format/Approach” • US engaging in direct talks with NK after discussion with SK, • China, Japan, and Russia VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks? • China, Russia, Japan – within the 6PT, reluctant to accept the • five way format (SK and the US initiative with them left on the sidelines) • China- continue to remain cautious, if not reluctant • Russia – became supportive since the SK-Russia summit in July 2009

15. NK:willing to resolve its nuclear and other issues through bilateral or • multilateral talks (9.18 to Chinese Special Envoy, Dai Bingguao) • - acceptance of the US premise of bilateral negotiation with the 6PT? VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks? • Kim Jong Il (“Master of Brinkmanship”) • Softening its stance • to US: possibility of bilateral talks (didn’t mention about the 6PT) • to Korea: possibility of summit • to China: possibility of the return to the 6PT

16. VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks? NK-US-China Meetings • Initiated by China and agreed by NK • China’s position after NK’s nuclear tests • : tensions b/w China’s emerging role as a global actor with increasing • int’l responsibilities and prestige and a commitment to NK as an ally • : NK’s allegiance is important China as a ‘bulwark’ not only against • US military dominance of the region but also against the rise of • Japan’s military • : Concern about the possibility of the rapid progress in NK-US relations, • without including China (giving more leverage to NK) • North Korea : “sitting on the fence and playing double” • to US: normalization and acknowledgement of US hegemony in the region • to China: need NK to earn time to build power

17. VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks? “Korea’s time is Now” • President Lee Myoungbak (Oct 1, 2009) • His government will take charge of inter-Korean affairs, esp, NK nuclear issue • It is about time Korea present our own visions and perspectives re. NK • Grand Bargain proposal • - step-by-step approach on the nuclear standoff is no longer effective • – giving up NK’s nuclear program in return for aid • and security guarantees • - political slogan for domestic purposes? Real message to Nk and outside? • US – “not aware of the proposal” (Kurt Campbel, assistant secretary of state for EA) • - “no conceptual difference b/w a grand bargain and “a comprehensive • package,” backing Lee’s proposal (James Steinberg Deputy Secretary of State) • (Lee: So what if a US official does not know?_

18. How to pursue the five-way format within the 6PT framework? • - resume talks among 5 countries, with open invitation to NK? • concurrent UN and individual sanctions against NK? • (UNSCl Resolution 1874) VII. Wither to 6 Party Talks? Direct Bilateral Talks prior to the resumption of the 6PT - A visible shift in format, but not in substance?

19. VIII. Domestic Split in Korea Conservatives vs. Progressives • Kim Jong-Il's recent conciliatory gestures (“a charm offensive”) • brought about further disputes • -Conservatives: • Opposition to dialogue for denuclearization – “a waste of time” • They argue that NK would never give up nuclear weapons • They believe in the efficacy of sanction (NK giving way to international • pressure) • Progressives: • No other option to resolve the issue except negotiation • No way to grasp NK intention without the engagement • The dismantlement of NK nuclear program still possible through • an exchange of denuclearization for rewards

20. IX. Conclusion • 1) For the 6Pt to succeed, bilateral US-NK talks are indispensible. • Yet, the purpose of the bilateral talks should be limited to bring • NK to the 6PT (not repeating the case of the 1994 Agreed Framework) • 2) SK (with other 4 nations) would reject the exclusion from the • process of denuclearizing NK • 3) With NK’s increased nuclear capabilities, the economic cost of • denuclearization has become much higher • – sharing the burden of cost among 5 participants is wiser • - -

21. IX. Conclusion 4) NK – no sign of change in NK’s intent to further develop its nuclear program until it is recognized as a nuclear state ; try distract international coordination regarding NK nuclear issues. International consensus remain steadfast in rejecting NK as a nuclear power and achieving the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula 5) NK’s attempt to make deals about nonproliferation (and arms reduction) instead of denuclearization, in its bilateral or multilateral talks, should be rejected. -

22. X. Tasks for SK Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism Tasks * Realistically, SK’s success depends heavily on what strategic choice the North makes and on regional dynamics mostly beyond its control 1) Reentering Asia : historical task including reconciliation with Japan : geographical realities - reconciling the alliance with the US with geographical realities of a state sandwiched between three big powers -

23. X. Tasks for SK Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism Tasks 2) Engagement toward the North in light of reciprocal actions and region-wide developments (reunification as a long-term goal) 3) Alliance with the US as the ‘realistic” foundation for relations with NK and a significant factor in shaping ties to others in NEA 4) East Asian core triangle (managing Sino-Japanese rivalry as the pivotal third party) 5) Recognize enduring appeal of championing regionalism, building consensus toward multilateralism -

24. X. Tasks for SK Strategic Thoughts toward Regionalism 6) China continues to have more leverage over NK than any other countries. SK should make a “multi-dimensional” approaches to strengthen SK-US-Japan trilateral coordination (한미일공조) to develop SK-China-Japan cooperation (한중일 협력) to initiate SK-US-China trilateral dialogue (Track 1 and Track 1.5) (한미중 삼각대화) 7) Efforts need to be made to galvanize domestic support Political reconciliation at home for a clear, consistent strategy -