The political aspects of monitoring radioactive materials in the environment of our region

1. The political aspects of monitoring radioactive materials in the environment of our region E. Wirth, M Zähringer Federal Office for Radiation Protection, Freiburg, Germany Topical Day on monitoring of radioactivity in the environment 12-13 April 2011, Oslo, Norway

2. The political aspects of monitoring radioactive materials in the environment and • The special aspects of the Baltic Sea Region. • (man made radioactivity only)

3. Site specific monitoring Limitation of the dose to the public: 1mSv per year from nuclear installations Derived maximum permissible releases per year fro NPP: Atmopsphere 3 x 1010 Bq/a arosolbound radionuclides 10 x 1010 Bq/a iodine-131 10 x 1015 Bq/a noble gases (+ C-14 +H-3) Waste water 5 x 1010 Bq/a fission and activation products 5 x 1013 Bq/a H-3 Similar limits are specified for enrichment plants, fuel fabrication plants, research reactors or repositories accordingly.

4. Monitoring of effluents (stack and waste water) Environmental Monitoring According to “Richtline zur Emissions- und Immissionsüberwachung kerntechnischer Anlagen“ The regulator has to control the measurements. Immission monitoring ensures that maximum permissible releases are not exceeded. The measurement program is not dense and frequent enough for a proper dose estimation of man but gives an independent additional check that doses calculated from emissions are indeed below the limit. Licencee has to demonstratre that dose limits are met. Emission monitoring ensures that maximum permissible releases are not exceeded. Conservative environmental dose model uses the measured annual release rates as input to prove that dose limits are met.

5. Decided in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident Purpose: assess contamination in the environment and dose From recognizing unknown sources from accidental releases with impact in longer range (>25km) Goal: Keep doses as low as reasonably achievable, i.e. be precautionary General environmental monitoring According to: „Strahlenschutzvorsorgegesetz“

6. IMIS Routine Monitoring Program Purpose also: Excersise and Training

7. IMIS Accidential Monitoring Program

8. German network of 1800 GDR probes Great interest of the public after the Fukushima accident, though no signal to be expected. Timeliness important, not verified data (!)

9. 1953 first detection of weapon test fallout at Schauinsland Kr-85 monitoring since 1973 -> Global fissile material inventory (reprocessed Weapon-Pu) Participation in CTBT verification Strong CTBT support of EU (Joint action) Strong support for scientific and civil use of CTBT data Trace analysis

10. Aspects for the Baltic Sea Region Densitiy of German GDR network comparable to NL, A, CH, B but much more than F,E,GB and others. This shows different aproaches, i.e equal distribution vs. focus on populated areas

11. The EU monitoring program

12. Agree on common objectives, not on unified programmes Clarify what can be achieved by environmental monitoring (and what cannot …) How to overcome differences