CHINA’S CHANGING MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

1. CHINA’S CHANGING MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

2. BASIC FEATURES OF CHINA’S MEDIA ENVIRONMENT • A controlled media environment where government exercises central control over most aspects of the media BUT • A rapidly changing media environment where a number of outlets increasingly push the envelope

3. HOW MEDIA CONTROL WORKS Oversight of media from highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party

4. HOW CHINA CONTROLS ITS MEDIA

5. HOW CHINA CONTROLS ITS MEDIA Potitburo Central Committee Propaganda Department Organization Department International Department United Front Work Department

6. BASIC PILLARS OF THE CHINESE PROPAGANDA SYSTEM RENMIN RIBAO—Party daily XINHUA—Official news agency CCTV—Official television network

7. WHAT CONTROLLED MEDIA LOOK LIKE Central media carefully crafted to send messages about government policy priorities Central media tends to be formulaic When reading this media, you need to learn to read between the lines, decode the signals

8. LOOSENING OF SOME CONTROLS FROM 1990s • Commercialization and cutting of subsidies for many publications, television networks • Development of new technologies—Internet cell phones and satellite TV-- and greater access to these technologies • China’s accession to WTO in 2000, requiring China to partially open its market to Western media firms • Professionalization of journalism

9. IMPACT OF COMMERCIALIZATION • Created need to develop content that would appeal to readers, advertisers • Creation of a small but increasing number of quasi-commercial publications that occasionally tend to push the envelope in their reporting Caijing Caixin Xinjing Bao Guandong-based publications Nanfang Dushi bao Nanfeng Chuang

10. PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: NANFANG DUSHIBAO12 December 2010

11. PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: NANFANG DUSHIBAO 1 June 2010

12. PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: XINJINGBAO 4 JUNE 2010

13. PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: XINJINGBAO, May 2012 “In the still of the deep night, removing that mask of insincerity, we say to our true selves “I am sorry.””

14. IMPACT OF WTO ACCESSION Reorganization of television networks • Creation of a number of regional companies that have often pushed the envelope on programming to attract viewers • Hunan Satellite TV’s “Supergirl” program

15. IMPACT OF THE INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA Chinese Communist Party’s Ambivalent Approach to the Internet • Tool for economic development, better disseminating party line But • Efforts to restrict sensitive content that cross party red lines

16. CHINESE INTERNET CONTROLS External – Great Firewall Internal – Party retains ability to shut down sectors of Internet within the country Censorship Guiding public discussion – 50 Cent Cadre

17. RAPID GROWTH OF CHINESE INTERNET USE

18. INTERNET PENETRATION IN CHINA

19. CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA LANDSCAPE

20. MEET SINA WEIBO

21. MEET SINA WEIBO

22. FOREIGN MINISTRY’S SINA WEIBO PAGE

23. GOVERNMENT MICROBLOGS ON SINA WEIBO

24. MEET QQ (TENGXUN) WEIBO

25. LOCATION MATTERS

26. CENSORSHIP ON SINA WEIBO s.weibo.com, 5 Nov 2012

27. CENSORSHIP ON QQ (TENGXUN) WEIBO t.qq.com, 5 Nov 2012

28. CENSORSHIP ON SINA WEIBO An image deleted from Sina Weibo. The text reads, “Smashing special provisions [for Party leaders] is better than boycotting Japanese goods,“ 21 September 2012 (http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/09/27/27607/)

29. CENSORSHIP http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pTJmtfjVerw

30. THE LIMITS OF CONTROL? • But • The Internet is so large that even with all the party’s resources, some sensitive postings still get through, however briefly • Increasingly savvy social media users adept at getting around party controls

31. ANALYZING CHINA’S CONTROLLED MEDIA: BASIC PRINCIPLES • Authoritativeness of media vehicles—helps determine level of leadership involvement • Comparison of shifts in media formulas and patterns to help identify policy shifts • Examine media aimed at different audiences to decode policy signals aimed at specific audiences • Look for signals of policy debate, early signs of policy shifts in lower level, less authoritative media

32. AUTHORITATIVENESS Basic point: All media are NOT created equal • Authoritativeness: the degree to which a report in controlled media reflects the views of the highest levels of the PRC party and government • Examination of the levels of authoritativeness through which PRC media sends messages can shed light on the degree of leadership involvement in and concern over an issue

33. LEVELS OF AUTHORITATIVENESS IN PRC MEDiA • Major party documents, government work reports • Statements by PRC leaders—the higher the leader’s rank, the more authoritative the statement is 3. Renmin Ribao Editorials • Renmin Ribao Commentator Articles 5. Signed articles in Renmin Ribao—level of authoritativeness depends on who signs them

34. LEVELS OF AUTHORITATIVENESS—PUBLIC DOCUMENTS • Government statements • Foreign Ministry statements • Statements by Foreign Ministry spokesman, other government spokespersons

35. COMPARISON OF MEDIA FORMULAS AND PATTERS Basic point: Never take anything at face value • PRC controlled media tends to be formulaic • Comparison of changes in formulas over time can provide insight into changing PRC policy priorities and views • Applies not only to language used in PRC media, but to images, patterns of TV coverage, and placement in a media outlet

36. CHINA’S CHANGING DESCRIPTIONS OF ITS TIES WITH NORTH KOREA “Closer than lips and teeth ( 1950s-early 1990s) “Brotherly Countries” ( 2000) “Friendly neighbors” (July 2006) “Normal State-to State relations” (April 2009)

37. CHANGING MEDIA PATTERNS China Daily website, cartoon in Chinese on North Korean missile launch, entitled “Unrealistic Forward Movement, “ 14 April 2012

38. DECODING MESSAGES AIMED AT SPECIFIC AUDIENCES The PRC sometimes uses media outlets aimed at specific audiences to send policy signals to those audiences • China’s official English-language newspaper China Daily • Xinhua’s English-language service

39. IDENTIFYING SIGNS OF POLICY DEBATE Lower-level, less authoritative media sometimes provide signs of debate • These media are not controlled as rigorously as central media • But because all PRC media are controlled to some extent, views would not appear without some degree of official support, especially in government-affiliated think-tank journals • CAVEAT: While these articles may reflect thinking in some officials circles, they do not speak for the Chinese Government or represent its official, consensus position

40. IDENTIFYING SIGNS OF POLICY DEBATE Some specialized publications allowed greater scope for debate • Mainly on economic issues • Also some foreign policy issues—relations with Japan, DPRK, China’s role in the world

41. ROLE OF PRC-OWNED HONG KONG MEDIA Beijing sometimes uses this media to air issues, send signals it deems too sensitive to discuss in domestic media Early signs of tougher line toward DPRK Early signs of opening to the KMT

42. ROLE OF PRC-OWNED HONG KONG MEDIA WARNING:Not everything in PRC-owned Hong Kong media is a policy signal from Beijing or a sign of debate Articles are more likely to be signals if they: • Quote or are authored by a well-connected PRC scholar • Are picked up by other PRC-owned Hong Kong media outlets • Are picked up or quoted in lower-level mainland media

43. SUMMING UP • When reading PRC central media, always remember: • Not all media are created equal—pay attention to authoritativeness • Never take anything at face value • Media environments are dynamic and constantly changing • Never take anything for granted

44. Marcella B Northeast Asia Program, Senior Analyst MarcellB@rccb.osis.gov Jonathan L Northeast Asia Program, Open Source Officer JonathaL@rccb.osis.gov