1 / 60

Churchill, Roosevelt and the "Grand Alliance"

Churchill, Roosevelt and the "Grand Alliance". World War Two and Anglo-American relations. WW2 & US / UK. Roosevelt wrote to Churchill at the very beginning of the war: "My dear Churchill,

Download Presentation

Churchill, Roosevelt and the "Grand Alliance"

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Churchill, Roosevelt and the "Grand Alliance" World War Two and Anglo-American relations

  2. WW2 & US / UK Roosevelt wrote to Churchill at the very beginning of the war: "My dear Churchill, It is because you and I occupied similar positions in the World War that I want you to know how glad I am that you are back again in the Admiralty ... I shall at all times welcome it if you will keep me in touch personally with anything you want me to know about" (Sept 11 1939)

  3. WW2 & US / UK The two men continued corresponding throughout the war Churchill "former naval person"

  4. WW2 & US / UK The United States began the war on a strongly isolationist footing. Many saw the war between Germany, Britain and France as a resumption of the "European Civil War" which had begun in 1914 and which had ultimately required US involvement (contrary to the principles of the Montoe Doctrine). The "America First" movement campaigned hard and effectively to keep the US out.

  5. WW2 & US / UK A number of Neutrality Acts were passed to restrict arms sales to belligerents. 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1939. However 1939 Act allowed "cash and carry": i.e. British could buy from US in cash and transport the matériel themselves. The burden soon became difficult to bear.

  6. WW2 & US / UK Phoney War (though naval engagements ...) Churchill became PM on May 10. End of phoney war: German invasion of Low Countries and France. With the evacuation of Dunkirk in May 1940 and the unexpected collapse of France in June (surrender 17 June), Britain found itself standing alone. http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=393

  7. WW2 & US / UK Britain needed resources fast and, facing a very real threat of invasion, spared no effort to mobilise energies behind defence.

  8. WW2 & US / UK Keynes threw fiscal rectitude to the winds. Churchill realized US essential. Bases for destroyers. Criticised.

  9. WW2 & US / UK The Secretary of State (Hull) to the British Ambassador (Lothian), Department of State, Washington, September 2, 1940. " ... I have received your note of September 2, 1940, of which the text is as follows: I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that in view of the friendly and sympathetic interest of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the national security of the United States and their desire to strengthen the ability of the United States to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defence of the Western Hemisphere, His Majesty's Government will secure the grant to the Government of the United States, freely and without consideration, of the lease for immediate Establishment and use of naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the Avalon Peninsula and on the southern coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast and on the Great Bay of Bermuda.

  10. WW2 & US / UK Furthermore, in view of the above and in view of the desire of the United States to acquire additional air and naval bases in the Caribbean and in British Guiana, and without endeavouring to place a monetary or commercial value upon the many tangible and intangible rights and properties involved, His Majesty's Government will make available to the United States for immediate establishment and use naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the eastern side of the Bahamas, the southern coast of Jamaica, the western coast of St. Lucia, the west coast of Trinidad in the Gulf of Paria, in the island of Antigua and in British Guiana within fifty miles of Georgetown, in exchange for naval and military equipment and material which the United States Government will transfer to His Majesty's Government.

  11. WW2 & US / UK All the bases and facilities referred to in the preceding paragraphs will be leased to the United States for a period of ninety- nine years, free from all rent and charges other than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States in order to compensate the owners of private property for loss by expropriation or damage arising out of the establishment of the bases and facilities in question. His Majesty's Government, in the leases to be agreed upon, will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power, and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity of such bases, necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases, and appropriate provisions for their control.

  12. WW2 & US / UK Without prejudice to the above-mentioned rights of the United States authorities and their jurisdiction within the leased areas, the adjustment and reconciliation between the jurisdiction of the authorities of the United States within these areas and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the territories in which these areas are situated, shall be determined by common agreement. The exact location and bounds of the aforesaid bases, the necessary seaward, coast and anti-aircraft defences, the location of sufficient military garrisons, stores and other necessary auxiliary facilities shall be determined by common agreement. His Majesty's Government are prepared to designate immediately experts to meet with experts of the United States for these purposes. Should these experts be unable to agree in any particular situation, except in the case of Newfoundland and Bermuda, the matter shall be settled by the Secretary of State of the United States and His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

  13. WW2 & US / UK I am directed by the President to reply to your note as follows: The Government of the United States appreciates the declarations and the generous action of His Majesty's Government as contained in your communication which are destined to enhance the national security of the United States and greatly to strengthen its ability to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defense of the Western Hemisphere. It therefore gladly accepts the proposals. The Government of the United States will immediately designate experts to meet with experts designated by His Majesty's Government to determine upon the exact location of the naval and air bases mentioned in your communication under acknowledgment. In consideration of the declarations above quoted, the Government of the United States will immediately transfer to His Majesty's Government fifty United States Navy' destroyers generally referred to as the twelve hundred-ton type. ..."

  14. WW2 & US / UK Give us the tools http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/images/wc0113s.jpg Lend-lease: the "most unsordid act in history"? Lend Lease Act 11 March 1941 http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq59-23.htm but in return for US aid, a number of conditions. Master lend-lease agreement Feb 23 1942 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade04.htm

  15. WW2 & US / UK 22 June 1941 - Hitler orders attack on the Soviet Union. Atlantic Charter, 14 August 1941. intensive talks on board the American cruiser, USS Augusta, and the British battleship, HMS Prince of Wales, anchored in Placentia Bay in Newfoundland.

  16. WW2 & US / UK

  17. WW2 & US / UK The Atlantic Charter "The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world."

  18. WW2 & US / UK First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

  19. WW2 & US / UK Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

  20. WW2 & US / UK Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want; Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

  21. WW2 & US / UK Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. Franklin D. Roosevelt Winston S. Churchill

  22. WW2 & US / UK Pearl Harbor (7 Dec 1941) - US joins war, after surprise Japanese attack. WW2 becomes truly world war.

  23. WW2 & US / UK Joint Chiefs of Staff (regular meetings to organise running of the war). Friction over strategy. British presence in Indian Ocean gravely compromised. "Three-ocean war" impossible. Singapore (Feb 14 1942)

  24. WW2 & US / UK At last success in North Africa: El Alamein November 1942.

  25. WW2 & US / UK Tube Alloys and the Manhattan Project In the 1930s Britain led the field in research into nuclear physics. On the suggestion of nuclear scientists a letter was sent to Roosevelt to indicate potential for a super bomb. In 1942 US suggested research be carried out in US: the Manhattan project. The British called it Tube Alloys.

  26. WW2 & US / UK Quebec agreement 19 August 1943* and aide-mémoire 19 Sept 1944 after discussions at Roosevelt's apartment at Hyde Park, New York "Full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing tube alloys for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement" DBPO I, vol. 2, London: HMSO, p. 516 * www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/quebec/q002.htm

  27. WW2 & US / UK Intelligence: The British had (with the help notably of a Polish contingent, decoded ENIGMA. In 1943 (British and United States Agreement) was signed. Principle of JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) system adopted by American intelligence services. Bletchley Park http://www.gchq.gov.uk/about/bletchley.html (Echelon) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/503224.stm and EU report http://www.fas.org/irp/program/process/rapport_echelon_en.pdf

  28. WW2 & US / UK The beginning of the end? Conferences. Big Three or Big Two and a half?

  29. US / UK First use of the expression Special Relationship: Letter from R.M.K. Slater, Foreign Office, to Rt. Hon. Arthur Henderson, MP, 5 May 1965, PRO FO 371/179574 "You asked for a brief note on the origin of the term ‘Special Relationship’. As far as we can discover the phrase was first used by the late Sir Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on 7 November, 1945. In the course of his speech, in which he outlined some suggested principles for British foreign policy, he said :

  30. US / UK ‘May I in conclusion submit to the House a few simple points which, it seems to me, should gain its approval ? First, we should fortify in every way our special and friendly connections with the United States, aiming always at a fraternal association for the purpose of common protection and world peace. Secondly this association should in no way have a point against any other country, great or small, in the world, but should, on the country, be used to draw the leading victorious Powers ever more closely together on equal terms and in all good faith and good will. Thirdly, we should not abandon our special relationship with the United States and Canada about the atomic bomb, and we should aid the United States to guard this weapon as a sacred trust for the maintenance of peace.’

  31. US / UK As you will see the connotation of this term has changed during the past 20 years and has been misconstrued to imply that there is some kind of preferential relationship between this country and the U.S.A. This is certainly not our view. The ‘special relationship’ is a fact, e.g. we speak the same language and have the same cultural antecedents ; a ‘preferential relationship’ is part of popular mythology and is frequently put up as a cock-shy to enable its detractors to knock it down."

  32. US / UK Post-war friction: Cessation of lend-lease and "financial Dunkirk" "American loan" McMahon Act

  33. US / UK Official announcement end of lend-lease 21 August 1945. British sent a team of negotiators to Washington: "Our delegation originally went to Washington in the hope that they would be able to secure from the United States a broad and generous settlement which would take account of our financial sacrifices during the war and permit us to join freely with them in promoting a world-wide commercial expansion. We had hoped at best for a grant in aid of $5,000,000,000 and at the worst an interest-free loan for this amount. » DBPO, I, vol IV, p. 23

  34. US / UK "American loan" Difficult negotiations: agreement only signed 7 Dec 1945. Loan $3.75 billion dollars, at 2%, to be repaid over 50 years and on condition Britain agree to converttibility one year after final signature, i.e. July 1947. US also liquidated lend-lease debt for $650 million. The Economist felt that it was galling after having sacrificed a quarter of the country's wealth to fight the war to have to give money to a country which had proposered a sa result of the war. Vote in Commons only 343 to 200, with 169 absentions. Conservative MP talked of an "economic Munich".

  35. US / UK US, UK and the bomb Oct 1945 Truman declared US would share atomic secrets with no-one, but would keep the bomb in trust for humanity. Aug 1946 McMahon Act forbade any sharing of atomic secrets. 26 Oct 1946 Bevin is quoted a having said " … we’ve got to have this … We’ve got to have the bloody Union Jack flying on it." Attlee felt that there were so many areas of tension between US and UK that Britain had to have its own bomb or find itself entirely in US hands. Britain made its own A-bomb.

  36. US / UK Military cooperation: Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to continue even though there was reluctance politically to do so publicly: "Joint Staff Mission (Washington) to Cabinet Office Immediate. Top Secret Washington, 9 February 1946, 10.33 p.m. We had lunch with the United States Chiefs of Staff yesterday and a very good informal discussion afterwards.

  37. US / UK We explained how anxious you were that collaboration in all fields of service interest should continue and the United States Chiefs of Staff spoke emphatically in the same vein. They said they wanted collaboration to continue in peace on exactly the same scale as it had in war and in all the same fields (i.e. exchange of views on policy, together with collaboration in the technical, scientific, tactical doctrine, intelligence and training fields).

  38. US / UK After much deliberation, however, they said that they had come to the conclusion that it will be impossible for them to obtain permission to continue this collaboration openly for an indefinite period. They were all emphatically of the opinion that while they wished to extend to us the privilege of a ‘most favoured nation’ and hoped that we would do the same for them, it would be impossible for the United States administration to recognise officially a special degree of United States/British collaboration.

  39. US / UK So much now has been said about UNO and the need for collaboration with everyone on an equal footing, that the American people simply would not understand discrimination in our favour. The Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery as a formal expression of this collaboration would therefore have to go underground when peace conditions are resumed in the United States and our war commitments are liquidated … Leahy, Eisenhower and Nimitz (Spaatz was not present) were all firmly of this opinion. They were equally of strong opinion, however, that ways and means should be found for continuing full collaboration under cover of other activities …" DBPO I vol IV, p. 93-94

  40. US / UK Fulton Missouri: the Sinews of Peace, the Iron Curtain and the Special Relationship. 5 March 1946 Truman had invited Churchill to give speech. Theme: US - UK alliance necessary to secure world peace against background of risk of Societ expansionism. Cool, if not downright hostile, response from US press.

  41. US / UK Palestine Britain had mandate from UN, following League of Nations mandate before the war. Commitment to respect Arab interests. Balfour declaration Jewish homeland. Incompatible? Post war Jewish / Zionist pressure for Jewish state. Terrorism in Palestine (Irgun). British limited Jewish entry, Arabs feared they would become a minority.

  42. US / UK Palestine US keen to help Jewish settlement in Palestine. Tension. Creation Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine, report published July 1946. Truman insisted 100,000 a year and was quick to show US support for this and creation state of Israel.

  43. US / UK Attlee was furious. "I have received with great regret your letter refusing even a few hours grace to the Prime Minister of the country which has the actual responsibility for the government of Palestine in order that he might acquaint you with the actual situation and the probable results of your action. These may well include frustration of the patient efforts to achieve a settlement and the loss of still more lives in Palestine." FRUS 1946, vol 7, 704-5, cité dans Alan Bullock, op. cit., p.305

  44. US / UK Greece, Turkey and the Truman doctrine Britain had commitments to defend Greece and Turkey ("Southern Tier") which it was finding increasingly difficult to sustain. Arranged for US to take over. Astonishingly smooth. Truman doctrine. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm

  45. US / UK

  46. US / UK Cold War. Increasing polarisation. But Attlee still had doubts. On 1 Dec 1946 he wrote to Bevin: "Of course it is difficult to tell how far Russian policy is dictated by expansionism and how far by fear of attack by the U.S. and ourselves. Fantastic as this is, it may well be the real grounds for Russian policy … " Attlee to Bevin, 1 December 1946, PRO FO 800/475/ME/46/22, quoted in Alan Bullock, p.340

  47. US / UK Meanwhile in 1947 Britain, probably overestimating the extent of its immediate recovery from the war, honoured its promise to make sterling convertible. However this led to a fast drain on Britain's reserves and convertibility was suspended later in 1947.

  48. US / UK Marshall Plan Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson spoke of poverty and distress in Europe: seeds of discontent. 8 May 1947. Secretary of State General George Marshall 5 June 1947 at Harvard. Acheson had tipped off British journalists about importance of speech, summed up in BBC report on the radio, which Bevin listened to. Bevin saw importance of "  … the initiative, I think, must come from Europe". http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1947marshallplan1.html

  49. US / UK Marshall Plan Bevin later told journalists: I assure you gentlemen … it was like a life-line to sinking men. It seemed to bring hope where there was none. The generosity of it was beyond belief. It expressed a mutual thing. It was ‘Try and help yourselves and we will try to see what we can do. Try and do the thing collectively and we will see what we can put into the pool.’ I think you understand why, therefore, we responded with such alacrity and why we grabbed the life-line with both hands. » Alan Bullock, p.405

  50. US / UK Prague coup, 25 February 1948 Seen in the West as an example of Soviet opportunist expansionism. In the reading The Soviet Union had taken advantage of political instability, exacerbated by economic weakness, to seize control in Czechoslovakia.

More Related