Realism II: Modern Approaches

Realism II: Modern Approaches Lecture 3 – Tuesday, 15 February 2011J A Morrison Kenneth Waltz John Mearsheimer Robert Jervis

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Lec 3: Modern Realism • Realism Old & New • The Waltzian Paradigm • Major System-Level Causes in IP • Do Unit-Level Characteristics Matter After All?

Last Thursday, we found that classical realism hit upon three major themes…

Major Themes of Realism • Relationship between Power & Morality • Role of Anarchy in Shaping IP • Mutual Exclusivity of States’ Interests

You’ll see that many of these issues persist in our discussions of international politics today.

So, as we work through these “modern” approaches, ask yourselves:Do we ask different questions today? Or do we consider the same issues but merely offer different answers?

What, if anything, serves to distinguish our “classic” approaches from the “modern” approaches we take today?

Lec 3: Modern Realism • Realism Old & New • The Waltzian Paradigm • Major System-Level Causes in IP • Do Unit-Level Characteristics Matter After All?

Much of the study of IP in the last 30 years has pivoted around Kenneth Waltz.Most studies have either been written in the Waltzian paradigmor self-consciously in response to that paradigm.

II. The Waltzian Paradigm Domestic Versus International Politics in Waltz Hallmarks of the Waltzian Paradigm

In 1979, Kenneth Waltz argued that international politics (IP) was qualitatively different from domestic politics (DP)...

“The difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it…A national system is not one of self-help. The international system is.” -- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979), pp 103-104.

Waltz’s Logics of Order • Hierarchy: logic of order in domestic politics • Sovereign monopolizes use of violence • Stability and cooperation follow • Anarchy: logic of order in international politics • There is no sovereign to protect weak states, enforce agreements, ensure stability • Self-help: states must help themselves • Results: predation, violent dispute resolution, instability

You should recognize these conclusions from Hobbes & Bull…Politics works very differently in domestic politics (under a sovereign) than in international politics (in anarchy).

Waltz argued that these differences between domestic and international politics require us to think about each realm of politics separately.

The Waltzian paradigm specifies how we should theorize aboutinternational politics.It assumes that theories of DP aren’t useful for understanding IP.Instead, we need to develop entirely new theories of IP appropriate to this distinct realm of politics.

Waltz developed his own specific theory of international politics; and we’ll consider those specifics shortly.But Waltz’s manner of theorizing gave rise to a paradigm in which many other theories were formed.

III. The Waltzian Paradigm Domestic Versus International Politics in Waltz Hallmarks of the Waltzian Paradigm

Theories of IP in the Waltzian Paradigm generally share several traits…

First, they incorporate anarchy as a key starting point. In these theories, states’ capacities to maximize their interests depends on their ability to help themselves.With no superintending sovereign, states can do what they will.

Second, they focus on systemic-level influences on state-behavior. Here, the characteristics of individual units (regime type, ideological orientation, &c.) matter less than the pressures exerted by the system.

(We’ll consider several specific system-level variables in Part III of this lecture. Stay tuned!)

Third, they assume convergent evolution follows. In biology, isomorphism is the tendency of organisms with different ancestries to evolve similar responses to similar environmental pressures.For instance, both bats and insects evolved wings for similar reasons.

“The close juxtaposition of states promotes their sameness through the disadvantages that arise from a failure to conform to successful practices. It is this ‘sameness,’ an effect of the system, that is so often attributed to the acceptance of so-called rules of state behavior. Chiliastic rulers occasionally come to power. In power, most of them quickly change their ways.” -- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979), pp 128.

Hallmarks of Theories in Waltzian Paradigm • Incorporate anarchy as key starting point • System-level variables are most significant determinants of state behavior • Systemic pressures  convergent evolution & isomorphism

Now we’ll look at some of the most significant system-level variables…

Lec 3: Modern Realism • Realism Old & New • The Waltzian Paradigm • Major System-Level Causes in IP • Do Unit-Level Characteristics Matter After All? • Conclusion

III. MAJOR SYSTEM-LEVEL CAUSES IN IP The Distribution of Power Offense-Defense Balance Additional System-Level Causes

What is the “distribution of power”?

We usually consider both military and economic power.Obviously, the two can be related, but they don’t need to be. (Consider Japan today or China in 1990.)

Distributions of Power • Unipolar/Hegemonic: single state controls disproportionate amount of power • E.g. Britain was political (military) hegemon in 1815 • E.g. Postwar US was economic hegemon • Bipolar: two largest states share roughly equal amounts of power • E.g. US & USSR in Cold War • Multipolar: several large states share roughly equal amounts of power • E.g. Britain, Germany, France, & Russia in 1914

The distribution of power is frequently suggested to be the most important systemic cause.Why? How would this matter?

The distribution of power shapes the incentives states face in ordering their foreign policies!Small states don’t resist hegemons. And hegemons have an incentive to preserve stability in the current order.

 Empirically, unipolar orders tend to be more cooperative and peaceful than do multipolar orders.

Going back to Hobbes, this makes sense.After all, hegemonic distributions of power most closely mimic domestic political orders ruled by a sovereign!

III. MAJOR SYSTEM-LEVEL CAUSES IN IP The Distribution of Power Offense-Defense Balance Additional System-Level Causes

Unfortunately, there is a security dilemma in IP.What is the security dilemma?

The security dilemma is the condition in which a state cannot increase its security without decreasing other states’ security.

The security dilemma follows from the fact that the pursuit of security is largely a zero-sum game.I can increase my security by arming myself, but doing so decreases your security. After all, my arms can be used to harm you.

But this is not the end of the story.For one thing, the different ways in which I can increase my security decrease your security to varying extents.For example, putting on a helmet decreases your security less than does loading a gun.

Here is the implication: The extent to which states find themselves in a security dilemma varies across contexts.

Robert Jervis suggests that the extent of the security dilemma depends on the offense-defense balance.What is the offense-defense balance?

Offense-Defense Balance • Is it easier to take territory or to defend it? • Determinants of Balance • State of military technology: relative potency of offensive & defensive arms • Geography & terrain • State of military tactics

The extent of the security dilemma was different here… Battle of Gallipoli (1915)

Than it was here. North Africa Campaign (c. 1941)

Comparison of O-D Balances

Realism II: Modern Approaches