Summary

1. Summary • Main inquiries: • Explaining Lack of sustained socio-economic development • Explaining Lack of political stability • Different theoretical approaches • Case Studies • The paradox of Argentina and Brazil: rich in natural resources but economically and politically unstable, why? • The paradox of Chile. Almost two centuries of political stability but it faced a backlash during the 1970s, why? • Today, the paradox of Colombia

2. Colombia’s Paradox • Two Paradox (Contradictions) • (a) The most violent country in Latin America but it has had a continuous democratic rule since 1958. • (b) The more money has been invested to eliminate drug-traffic, the more production of drugs we observe.

3. OverviewColombia, the usual path • (a) Concentration of land in few hands • (b) Economically depend on exporting raw material (Coffee, crude-oil, coal) • ( c) Racially divided: white (European descendent, less than 10%), mestizo (85%), indigenous (5%) • 1948/58 --> Civil war after attempt to introduce land reform. La violencia period, 200,000 deaths • 1958-2001 --> Government controlled by two parties (Conservative and Liberal). Both pro-status quo; alternation in power. • 1960s --> Emergence of Guerrilla movement, FARC and ENL (Marxist orientation. Social transformation agenda. • Based on rural areas. ENL (North), FARC (South) • 1960s --> Landowner responded organizing paramilitary groups. • 1980s --> Emergence of Narco-dealers

4. OverviewColombia: Armed Actors • The Government: low control over the military • The Armed Forces and Security Forces: 50,000-60,000 • The Paramilitary: 7,000-10,000 (linked to the Armed Forces, landowners, narco-dealers). Responsible of 80% of the deaths in Colombia • Since 1996, they act as a United Self-defense forces of Colombia • They tax illegal drug industry to obtain resources • They are involved in drug trafficking • Strategy: Massacre of small villages to attack suspects • The Guerrilla: 15,000-20,000 (Today, linked to narco-dealers). Responsible of 15% of politically-motivated deaths. • Control of 42,000 km2, • kidnapping for profit • tax coca cultivation and production for profit

5. OverviewThe results • Guerrilla war since 1960s and Narco-traffic war since 1980s. • Some Results 1960s-2001 • 1.8 million forcibly displaced • More than 120,000 deaths as a direct result of these conflicts • Average of 3,000 kidnapping a year. (1/2 guerrilla, 1/2 criminals) • Recent Statistics. • 1960s-1990s 3,000 deaths average per year • 1999--22,957 deaths • 2000 • 134,000 people displaced • Press estimate: 68 murders per day (7,000 deaths)

6. First Paradox:Violence and democratic rule • High level of conflicts -- but elected governments since 1948. Why? • Structure of the economy • Political factors: • Coalition politics • Exclusion of certain actors • Key: the military

7. Second Paradox:The more you invest in counter-narcotics aidThe more traffic you observe • Higher investment: • Since 1980 the U.S. Has spent over $ 25 billion on international anti-drug programs • Between 1996-2000 the U.S. invested $ 1 billion in counter-narcotics aid, increasing 68% in relation to the 1990-1996 period. • But bad results, • Coca cultivation double in Colombia between 1996-2000 • More illicit drugs are available in the US and at cheaper prices

8. Coca CultivationThousand of Hectares

9. The paradox:More investment in anti-narcotics warbut no results • Why do you think this has been the case?

10. The Coca problem • High incentives to grow coca and not alternative products • Weather • Characteristics of the plant • Peasants do not profit from coca cultivation. • Intermediary receive main profit (drug-dealers) • Geographical conditions make hard to detect laboratories • Profits from drug-traffic are incredible, given the demand! • Estimate 5 billion a year • Drugs dealers still profit paying guerrilla, paramilitary, politicians • Dealers could lose 90% of the profit and still be profitable • Another incentive: International arm traffic

11. The U.S. And the Drug Problem • Why does the US care about drug-traffic? • Total local cost is estimate in $110 billion a year (military aid, accidents, health care, lost productivity) 1 million hard-core drug users; 52,000 annual deaths for drug-abuse. • Thus, drug-traffic is a national security problem for the US • Colombia, the second most important recipient of US aid. • 90% of cocaine consumed in the US came from Colombia • How the U.S. Is dealing with this problem? • (a) Controlling Demand. Law enforcement and drug treatment programs. Only 57% of hard-core users have access to programs. • (b) Controlling traffic. Law enforcement, border control. • ( c) Controlling supply. Cutting coca production.

12. Plan Colombia: A new attempt to reduce supply • Colombia’s government plan. September 1999 • Objectives: • Peace negotiation with armed groups • Alternative economic development for affected regions • Promoting institutional reform to guarantee rule of law • Training Colombian military forces • Eliminating drug supply (Spraying coca cultivation, confronting groups) • Amount required: 7 billion dollars • Amount received: 3 billion dollars (US - 1.3 billion; Europe-300 million) • U.S. Aid: 1.3 billion (plus new $400 million this year) • 80% military aid. From this 80%, 70% will remain in the US • 20% economic development

13. Discussion question • What are the consequences of the Plan Colombia? (see readings--Vargas, Human Rights Watch) • Think critically: do you agree with the following statement: • “Assisting the Colombian government with training and equipment will enable to reduce illegal drug production”