The Vice President and Foreign Policy: From “the most insignificant office” to Gore as Russia Czar

1. The Vice President and Foreign Policy:From “the most insignificant office” to Gore as Russia Czar • Aaron Mannes • Researcher - University of Maryland’s Institute for Advanced Computer Studies • Ph.D. student - University of Maryland School of Public Policy • www.aaronmannes.com • amannes@umd.edu

2. Introduction: Two Themes • Vice President’s role in national security • Is a Vice Presidential role needed? • What should it be? • Challenges of stabilizing and encouraging reform abroad • These two themes meet in analyzing Gore’s role in the Clinton administration’s Russia policy

3. Paul Light, Vice Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White House Paul Kengor, Wreath Layer or Policy Player? The Vice President’s Role in Foreign Policy Marie Natoli, American Prince, American Pauper: The Contemporary Vice Presidency in Perspective Senate Historical Office, Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul: Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War Strobe Talbott’s The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy Key Sources

4. Overview of the Vice Presidency:The First 150 Years • Minimal Constitutional authority • Marginalized by the Senate • Often perceived by Presidents as rivals

5. FDR & The Vice Presidency • Henry A. Wallace, 1941-45 • Ran the Bureau of Economic Warfare (BEW), a 3000 person agency charged with stockpiling crucial war supplies • Got into turf wars with the Commerce and State • FDR dissolved BEW in 1943 and dropped Wallace from the ticket in 1944 • Harry S. Truman, 1945 • On taking office after FDR’s death was unaware of the atomic bomb project or the status of talks with Stalin on post-war Europe • To ensure this never happened again the VP was included as a statutory member of the National Security Council

6. Nixon & The Vice Presidency • Established the role of the political vice president under Eisenhower • Active at NSC, but denied line authority • Although Nixon did not include his VP in the policy process there were enormous changes to the office • VP’s office received its own budget line item in 1969 • Watergate, Agnew’s resignation, and the unelected Ford Presidency placed the VP in a new light

7. Short Unhappy Vice Presidency of Nelson Rockefeller • Selected to strengthen the unelected Ford presidency • Hoped to run domestic policy by chairing Domestic Policy Council • Frozen out of policy-making when Ford moved in other directions • Demonstrated two principles of VP influence • Without the President’s support the VP has no influence • Line assignments can enmesh VPs in turf wars and make them lightning rods for opposition

8. Mondale: VP as Senior Advisor • Carter was the first true outsider VP and he selected an insider VP • Carter agreed to give Mondale all the tools he needed for the position • Mondale rejected line authority, preferring a role as Senior Advisor • Mondale had key allies on the President’s staff • Adopted a low-key, non-public role in the policy process

9. George H. W. Bush:Low Profile Continuity • Adopted Mondale’s model • Took on some line assignments, chaired the crisis management unit of the NSC • Bush’s restrained response when Reagan was shot won praise • As President, Bush did not rely heavily on his VP - changes to the VP’s status are not permanent

10. Clinton-Gore:The Vice President as Partner • Experience in Washington and internationally complemented Clinton • Personal compatibility • National security process innovations reflected this relationship • Gore’s National Security Advisor had seats on the Principals and Deputies Committees at the NSC • NSC deputies had an arrangement ensuring that Gore was in the loop and did not derail the process

11. Russia Policy: From Stability to Transformation • Post-Soviet Russia risked, in the words of Clinton’s top Russia advisor Strobe Talbott, becoming “a nuclear Yugoslavia” • Bush 41 focused on “what we do not want to happen there” • Talbott sought to “nurture the best that might happen in the former Soviet Union” • Three tracked process: • Security • Economic Liberalization • Political Liberalization

12. Establishing the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) • Proposed by Russian FM Kozyrev to Talbott in March 1993 • Intended to be an extended working group that would help build Russian governance capabilities with a focus on Russia’s inter-agency process • Mechanism for institutionalizing bi-national partnerships

13. Growth of the GCC • GCC met 10 times, first meeting on September 1-2, 1993 • After Chernomyrdin was fired in March 1998, meetings were held with several Chernomyrdin successors • GCC included hundreds of officials from Energy, Defense, Commerce, HHS, Agriculture, NASA and others • Signed over 200 agreements from major energy and space deals to nuts and bolts technical exchanges

15. Early Mandate: Space & Energy • Focus on preventing proliferation of missile & nuclear technologies • Implemented Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar) • First meeting dealt with Russian rocket sales that could have triggered US sanctions under MCTR • Sought to establish a broad space and energy partnership worth billions making smaller deals from proliferation unappealing

16. Security Track Assessment • Worst case scenarios were avoided while NATO expanded eastward • Political and technical levels reinforced one another Iranian exception • Despite a 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement arms sales to Iran did not stop • Russia continued to sell nuclear technology to Iran • July 1998 administration sanctioned seven Russian entities that were transferring technology to Iran - forestalling more severe congressional sanctions • The administration was concerned that congressional sanctions would have damaged overall relations

17. Transformation Track:OVP & State vs. Treasury • US sought to foster economic and political reform • 1993 rise of ultra-nationalists raised concerns about Russia’s stability • Gore criticized ultra-nationalists, but also IMF conditions • Talbott called for “less shock and more therapy” • Treasury officials felt their efforts undermined • 1996 flawed Russian privatization led to the rise of the oligarchs • Chernomyrdin, former Gazprom chief, a suspected beneficiary • US government did not criticize for fear of undermining Yeltsin • 1998 Russian economy collapses, Russians assume US linked to oligarchs

18. Committed to Yeltsin • Transformation agenda focused on supporting Yeltsin • Skeptics did not develop alternatives • Gore and Talbott’s combined influence dominated policy process

19. Micro-Issues • Some agencies resisted GCC initiatives while others were pre-empted by GCC activity • VP staff may have been too small to manage the process • Accusations that GCC was a PR exercise that distracted from real work and the established inter-agency process

20. Transformation Track Assessment • Efforts to build civil society, rule of law, and democracy were not successful • Russian economic growth has been driven by resources, not economic liberalization • Demographic and public health trends are abysmal • Engagement fostered suspicion of US motives among Russian • Transformation efforts may have been essential to the security track

21. Analyzing the VP’s Role • VP’s engagement brings prestige • Preparation for the Presidency • VP may not have necessary staff • VP may not have time • Can burnish a VP’s reputation, but can also harm it