PS 142 War and Peace

1. PS 142War and Peace Lecture 10 Nuclear Proliferation and Weapons of Mass Destruction

2. Theories of Proliferation and Conflict We will examine 4 theories of the impact of nuclear proliferation First theory argues that proliferation is a good think for international peace The latter three theories argue it can be dangerous Differ in the reasons and conditions under which it is dangerous

3. Universal Deterrence Strongest advocate of proliferation is Kenneth Waltz Accepts arguments about the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons No nuclear war is worth fighting Nuclear weapons have some bad consequences Stability-Instability paradox Solution: Give nukes to everyone

4. Waltz Anticipates His Critics Unstable states with nuclear weapons might use them Who would they target? Why use nukes on your own nation? Irrational leaders will use nuclear weapons Many �crazy� leaders have been deterred Stalin, Mao, Saddam

5. Waltz�s Key Assumptions Leaders are rational Can prevent accidental use Leaders seek survival of their society as primary goal Secure second strike is easy to get Small chance of nuclear use is sufficient Small numbers of weapons are sufficient �Existential Deterrence�

6. The Difficulties of aSecure Second Strike First critique focuses on assumption of easy second strike Several reasons this may not be true Proliferation will be UNEVEN Many pairs of rival states First rival to get nuclear weapons has a strong PREVENTIVE INCENTIVE Examples: Israel & Arab countries, India & Pakistan, Iran & Iraq

7. The Difficulties of aSecure Second Strike SECURE BASING is problematic Hiding the weapons is difficult Can be found and hit If NO evidence to locate them, are they deterrents? Need large arsenal for security against major powers Secure basing is EXPENSIVE New proliferators cannot afford it

8. The Difficulties of aSecure Second Strike Cannot obtain a secure second strike against NON-STATE ACTORS Proliferation raises the risk of transfer to non-state actors Security lapses Selling the technology Both especially true in poor states Non-state actors cannot be deterred with secure second strike

9. Limit Proliferation to Ensure Secure Second Strikes This argument says we must place LIMITS on proliferation Must be EVEN to conflictual areas Must be done with secure basing and secure control over weapons and nuclear technology Proliferation to wealthy nations not a problem Japan, Germany, S. Korea

10. The Difficulties of Controlling Nuclear Weapons 3rd and 4th arguments criticize Waltz�s assumption of rationality First argument focuses on behavior of ORGANIZATIONS Even if leaders make rational decisions, they cannot control implementation

11. Normal Accident Theory World is complex and unpredictable We build organizations to deal with complex problems Organizations build routines to deal with these problems Routines can NEVER anticipate all possible circumstances When routines do not match the situation accidents become inevitable

12. Normal Accident Theory Usual response to the possibility of accidents is to create MORE routines and MORE levels of organization We cannot anticipate how these levels of routines will interact with each other and with the world Accidents may become MORE common as we make routines more complex

13. Normal Accident Theory Key advocate: Scott Sagan Evidence for this view is the large number of near accidents during Cold War Canada geese generating nuclear alerts Problems will be amplified by poor inexperienced organizations ALL proliferation is dangerous

14. The Psychology of Deterrence Final argument questions assumption of rationality from a psychological perspective Not ALL leaders may be rational ALL the time Hitler at end of WWII, Stalin after Barbarossa It only takes ONE collapse into irrationality to create disaster

15. The Psychology of Deterrence Even if leaders are �rational� in the strict sense, what are their preferences? Could leaders prefer some goals to their survival? Fundamentalist regimes? If so, then deterrence collapses

16. Empirical Evidence onNuclear Proliferation There is some reasonably strong evidence in support of the RADICAL WALTZ view of proliferation As nuclear weapons have spread to various countries, all of the scenarios raised by critics have occurred NONE of those circumstances have led to war

17. Empirical Evidence onNuclear Proliferation Spread of nuclear weapons HAS been uneven Many rivalries have seen one party get nukes first Israel, India, US, N. Korea NONE of these states (or their rivals) have engaged in preventive first strike Nuclear weapons have dampened rivalries and conflicts Arab-Israeli, India-Pakistan, US-Soviet, N-S Korea

18. Empirical Evidence onNuclear Proliferation Many apparently �crazy� leaders have been deterred by nuclear weapons Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemical weapons in 1st Gulf War Mao was coerced in Korea Khrushchev was deterred in Cuba � despite apparently erratic behavior

19. Empirical Evidence onNuclear Proliferation This does NOT imply that Waltz is definitely right It only takes ONE mistake to lead to a disaster But we should not immediately assume that proliferation is always a problem for international peace May still be a problem for US policy

20. Nuclear Proliferation and other �Weapons of Mass Destruction� Categories of WMD Chemical Biological Nuclear Are these all really comparable? Are other �WMD� really useful weapons? What are they useful for?