PS 142 War and Peace

1. PS 142War and Peace Lecture 18 The Cuban Missile Crisis

2. The Onset of the CubanMissile Crisis US discovers missiles being built in Cuba U2 photo surveillance President Kennedy keeps discovery secret Creates EXCOMM to plan response Ad hoc committee of advisors EXCOMM meets for a week and debates options

3. The Escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis EXCOMM debates several options Diplomacy in UN Blockade Air strike Invasion Kennedy settles on blockade and announces crisis and response on national TV Backs off initial desire for air strike

4. Slipping Toward the Nuclear Brink? Khrushchev objects vehemently to US actions: calls it �banditry� Soviet ships steam toward blockade Khrushchev blinks: two telegrams 1st a rambling telegram offers to remove missiles for �no invasion� pledge 2nd a stiffer demand for trading missiles in Turkey

5. Sealing the Deal US ignores 2nd telegram and accepts the first RFK rejects explicit trade & threatens war Soviets accept deal and crisis abates Negotiations continue over surveillance of missile removal and understanding on acceptable weaponry

6. Explaining American Success in Cuba Graham Allison has most famous explanation of Cuban Missile Crisis Three competing models of behavior The Rational Actor Model The Organizational Process Model The Bureaucratic Politics Model Allison compares all three as explanations of the Cuban Missile Crisis

7. The Rational Actor Model Leaders review all possible policy options Evaluate costs and benefits of each Choose �best� available option Seems to fit behavior of EXCOMM Systematically evaluated many options Presented �cost-benefit� calculation to the president

8. The Organizational Process Model Bureaucracies develop standard operating procedures to implement policies SOPs may not match needs of specific situation US nearly discovers missiles too late because of U2 schedule US avoids early air strike because of mistaken definition of �mobile� missile Navy wants blockade 500 miles off Cuba, not 50 miles as JFK wants

9. The Bureaucratic Politics Model Policy is a result of �tug-of-war� among bureaucratic partisans Advisors with closest ties to President �win� the policy fight Problem if bureaucratic interests do not match with national interests Model expects Pentagon to lobby for using force, etc.

10. Explaining US Behavior in the Cuban Missile Crisis CMC is situation where rational model should work well Small ad hoc group, high stakes Rational model appears to explain US behavior well EXCOMM searches for options and evaluates costs and benefits Arguments are transmitted to the President who evaluates and chooses

11. Explanatory Power of the Organizational Process Model SOP model predicts nothing about US response Not clear model can make predictions Simple routines can be combined in complex ways Sheds post hoc light on pieces of the crisis But when SOPs do not fit with situation or clash with desired policies, the SOPs are changed Blockade moved to 50 miles and �moblile� vs. �moveable� missile definition is sorted out

12. Explanatory Power of the Bureaucratic Politics Model Cannot always make predictions of �bureaucratic� preference What is RFK�s bureaucratic bias? Bureaucratic politics predictions are generally not confirmed Sec. Def is a dove, Sec. State is a hawk EXCOMM process is deliberative, not tug-of-war RFK as �gatekeeper� prevents lobbying

13. Explaining US Behavior in the Cuban Missile Crisis Rational model fits better than the other two Does not imply that other models are never good explanations CMC is hard case for these models Policy makers very attentive in crisis Crisis disrupts usual policy channels High stakes: national interests trump bureaucratic interests

14. Explaining Soviet Behavior During the Cuban Missile Crisis Allison explains US policy choice What explains Soviet choice to capitulate? Understanding USSR�s choice is critical to crisis bargaining theory CMC is viewed as ideal crisis bargaining success for US Why did it work?? Find out next time!