Policing Paradigms

1. Policing Paradigms

2. Community policing

3. Development ofAmerican policing • “Watchman” style of the 19th. and early 20th. centuries • Officers on foot beats • Emphasis on order maintenance • Problems with corruption and nonfeasance • Professional model developed during the mid-20th. century • Motorized patrol & advances in communications • Emphasis on quick response to calls for service • Use statistics to track crime and evaluate response • Fight crime and violence by making arrests • Community model developed in the late 1970’s • Riots brought on concerns about community-police relations • Blamed police isolation from public • Emphasis on preventing rather than just reacting to crime and disorder • Partner with citizens and community institutions to identify problems and develop solutions

4. What’s so different aboutcommunity policing? • Supposedly more than crime-fighting • Community defines problems • Community participates in solutions • Success measured by citizen satisfaction • To do community policing need: • Decentralized authority • Changes in recruitment and training • Move away from incident-driven (response) policing • Different measures of output (results) • Major Federal funding • COPS office in Department of Justice funds community policing initiatives throughout the U.S. • 2009 Federal Recovery Act gives COPS $1 billion in grants to preserve police jobs and aid community policing efforts

5. How Community Policing advocates compare itagainst the Professional model Adapted from Peak, Policing America, table 6-1

6. In the middle of it all...“Broken Windows” • Landmark article by James Q. Wilson andGeorge Kelling in March 1982 Atlantic Monthly magazine • Proposed that taking care of neighborhood deterioration -- rowdiness, disrepair, drunkeness -- can prevent an area’s lapse into serious crime • Skepticism of policing innovations • Motorized patrol  distance from citizens • Uniform Crime Reports  policing becomes a numbers game • Decriminalizing minor transgressions may not be such a good idea • Laws provide police with leverage • Protecting communities just as important as protecting individuals • Gave impetus to community policing movement

7. Concerns about thecommunity model • Is it rhetoric or reality? • Are areas impacted by crime and violencereally “communities”? • Are citizens well informed about crime? • Is there a consensus about what’s needed? Can one even be formed? • How much can citizens really help? • Problem of witness intimidation -- it may mask crime • Is “community policing” potentially more intrusive? • Are there enough officers to do it? • Officer coverage (1997 data) • L.A.: 9500 officers (2.5/1,000 pop.) • Chicago: 13,671 officers (4.8/1,000) • New York: 35,404 officers (4.3/1000)

8. Resource issues • Community policing strategiesinevitably draw on the officer pool,making fewer available for motorized patrol and responding to calls • But prompt police response isn’t an option: it’s what citizens have come to expect • Who else can handle serious crimes and violence? • How else can police cover large areas? • Best opportunity to catch a criminal, identify witnesses and preserve evidence is in the moments after a crime occurs • Patrol, though, seems undervalued by promoters and even some detractors of community policing • Both Peak (Policing America) and Walker (“Broken Windows and Fractured History”) feel that its crime control role is greatly exaggeratedSee next slide 

9. COMPARISON BETWEEN - Demographically different WITHIN Demographically similar More patrol Less patrol Five groups of three beats each No change 1973 -- Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment

10. 1973 Kansas CityPreventive Patrol Experiment • Does routine patrol deter crime? • City divided into 15 beats • Created five groups, each with three demographically similar beats • For one beat, patrol was left as before; for the second, patrol was increased; For the third, patrol was removed • Compared results within groups of beats and between groups of beats • Conclusions • Crime did not change regardless of amount of patrol • Citizen fear of crime and attitudes about police did not change • Police ability to respond to calls did not change • Issues • General v. specific deterrence • Experiment kept secret from citizens and crooks • Officers did not respect boundaries when answering calls • Differences between actual patrol levels was slight

11. Four years later:1977 Kansas City patrol study • Response time • Findings: Faster police response does not help(reducing delay in crime reporting does help) • Issue: Was response time significantly decreased? • One versus two-officer cars • Finding: One-officer patrol cars just as safe • Issues • Are “solo” officers equally proactive? Can they be? • Is it really “solo” when multiple cars respond to a hot call? • On-view arrests during routine patrol • Finding: Officers seldom “stumble across” felonies in progressBut what about . . . 

12. Stumbling: Murder of husband and mother of Federal judge • On Feb. 28, 2005 the husband and mother ofFederal judge were found shot to death in theLefkow’s Chicago home • Suspicion was immediately placed on right-wingmilitants against whom Lefkow had ruled on a civillawsuit. A huge investigation got under way. • Three days later a West Allis, Wisconsin patrol officer pulled over Bart Ross for suspicious activities. • Ross, an unemployed electrician and cancer victim, shot himself as the officer walked up. The officer almost got hit. • Inside the car was a note in which Ross confessed to the shootings. He was angry at the judge for dismissing his suit against his doctors. • Ross’s DNA was matched against DNA left on a cigarette butt left behind in the Lefkow residence.

13. Stumbling: OklahomaCity bombing • On the morning of April 19, 1995,Timothy McVeigh parked a rentedtruck full of explosives in front of theFederal Building, got in a car andescaped. • At 9:02 a.m. a massive explosion occurred, killing 168 persons. • Two hours later McVeigh was stopped by a Oklahoma Highway Patrol officer because his vehicle lacked a license plate. The officer noticed a bulge in McVeigh’s jacket and arrested him for carrying a loaded .45. • Suspicions about McVey and his resemblance to sketches of the person who rented the truck led police to call the Feds.

14. Stumbling:Lakewood shooter • About 12:45 am, 12/1/09 a Seattlepolice officer on routine patrolspotted a parked car with the hoodopen and the engine running. He ran the plate and determined the vehicle was stolen. • While in his car doing paperwork he noticed a man approaching the driver’s side of the police car. The officer exited the car and ordered the man to stop and show his hands. The man walked away and reached into his waistband. The officer fired, striking the man twice. He died at the scene. • The man was identified as Maurice Clemmons, the suspect in the killing of four Lakewood (Wash.) officers two days earlier. He was armed with one of the dead officer’s handguns.

15. Problem-oriented Policing

16. What is problem-oriented policing? • Crime incidents may only be symptoms • To extinguish need to deal with the“real”, underlying problems • This is supposedly different from “community-oriented policing” • Acceptance that traditional crime-fighting methods may be ineffective • BUT -- no value judgments as to police role (fact-based rather than ideological) • To respond to problems police must be flexible and willing to experiment • Emphasis on crime prevention, not responding “after the fact” • Like in community policing, external relationships are important • Collaborate with other agencies, politicians, community groups, private service providers, local businesses • Environmental design important (“target hardening”) • Not necessarily a “kinder and gentler” approach • May call for more intrusion, not less

17. SARA • Scan to identify problems • Personal observations • Citizens and businesses • Other officers • Available data • Analyze problems • Collect information from various sources • Break down problem into constituent parts • Look for patterns among incidents • Crime analysis & mapping • Detailed analysis of incidents and calls for service • Modus operandi, location, persons, times, events

18. Response -- develop and implement solutions • Example: street drug sales • Soft responses: No incoming pay phone calls;cleaning up junk and graffiti; urging landlords toscreen and evict drug-dealing tenants • Hard responses: Gang injunctions; concentrated enforcement; surveillance and undercover work • Assessment -- evaluate effectiveness of response with traditional and non-traditional measures • Crime trends, clearance rates • Citizen complaints • Truancy • Fear • Business profits • Property values

19. Combining community policing &problem oriented policing:The best of both worlds? • It’s now assumed that “community policing”incorporates problem-solving • How to implement • Provide leadership: convince the troops thatprevention better than after-the-fact response • Train officers in addressing problems • Provide incentives to get on board • Broader role for street cop: think about problems and develop solutions • Supposedly more job satisfaction • Evaluation criteria must change -- not just making arrests • Need commitment from managers and executives • Reduce barriers to implementation • Allocate necessary time, resources, manpower • Overcome resistance • Give officers leeway in innovation • Emphasize centrality of patrol

20. Selective/concentratedenforcement techniques • Selective enforcement / gang suppression • Uniformed officers look for gangstersin high-crime areas • Use stop-and-frisk to find guns and contraband • Hot-spot policing (Police Issues posting) • Flood problem areas with cops (“hot spot” policing) • Police presence as a deterrent • Lessen response time to violent incidents • No free lunch • Diverting patrol officers to these techniques means less patrol and increased response time in non-selected neighborhoods • Citizens may feel harassed in selected areas • Aggressive enforcement can create legal issues

21. Evaluating police strategies

22. Problem-oriented policing • Many studies found improvements after POP was implemented • Scholars often attribute these improvements to “soft” and innovative strategies rather than to the traditional “hard” strategies (coercive police presence) of the professional model • But since every POP implementation inevitably infuses an area with more attention from the police and other official agencies, it’s impossible to apportion success to a specific tacticGo to Police Issues Strategy and Tactics -- Slapping Lipstick I & II

23. Slapping Lipstick I • Ceasefire -- a mixed approach • Law enforcement campaign to curb guntrafficking, plus a softer “pulling levers”approach to reduce the demand for guns • Hard: Feds and police arrested gun sellers andpossessors • Soft: Gang members called in and warned • SACSI implemented Ceasefire in ten cities • Project Exile -- a hard approach • Federal career criminal laws used to imprison armed felons • PSN -- Project Safe Neighborhoods -- a blend of the above • U.S. Attorneys worked with police chiefs, probation and parole • Participants urged to incorporate Ceasefire’s “pulling levers” approach • Difficulty in getting non-police agencies to participate • At the end, level of Federal prosecution seemed most important

24. SlappingLipstick II • Article in Criminology & PublicPolicy evaluated Ceasefire inBoston, Project Exile inRichmond and Compstat in NYC • Ceasefire • Youth homicide dropped 30 percent compared to 16 percent in non-Ceasefire cities • But actual numerical gains were very small, thus statistically non-significant (pre-Ceasefire mean of 3.5 deaths a month, post-Ceasefire mean of 1.3 a month) • Can’t tell if improvement was due to more policing or “pulling levers” • Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia • Twenty-two percent yearly decline in gun homicide, considered a success • Compstat in New York City • No demonstrable effect

25. Evaluation of community & problemoriented policing in Chicago • Ten-year evaluation of largest project of its kind inthe U.S. • Split-force concept for entire city • Officer teams in each police beat spend their time on community projects and problem-solving efforts • “Rapid response” units respond to calls for service • Compstat used to plan police deployment • “Final grades” • Public involvement: B • Agency partnerships: A • Reorganization: A • Problem-solving: C

26. RHETORIC –v- REALITY:What helped Compton?“Community policing”?“Problem oriented policing”?The “professional” model? • L.A. Times reports great drop in homicides: • 1/1/05 - 3/22/05 = 22 • Same period 2006 = 3 • Why? • Many say it’s more police • Some say it’s more citizen reporting, involvement • Some say it’s gang outreach • Can it be kept up? • Compton, a contract city, is not paying for more officers • Most expect coverage will have to be reduced • Compton had 65 homicides in 2005, a record • In response, LASD doubled manpower • Doubled patrol deputies • Instituted night detectives • Citizens report greatly improved security • Much greater police visibility • More citizens report being stopped What happened?

27. Crime in Compton, 2002-2007 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Crime data from FBI UCR More on this at PoliceIssues