How East Asians View Democracy

1. How East Asians View Democracy

2. East Asia BarometerA Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change, 2001-2003 • First systematic comparative survey of attitudes and values toward politics, governance, democracy and reform, and citizens’ political actions in East Asia • Standardized survey instruments designed around a common research framework • Federated country-team structure, coordinated by Yun-han Chu, National Taiwan University, with international steering committee • Funded by Taiwan Ministry of Education, Henry Luce Foundation, World Bank, foundations in some of the countries, and other sources • Allows for nested comparisons: three Chinese societies, five “Confucian” societies, developed/developing, democratic/non-democratic; within-society educational, gender, occupational, ethnic, religious, and other groups • Later changed its name to Asian Barometer Surveys. Web address: www.asianbarometer.org

3. Table 1.2a Survey Schedules and Sample Sizes of First Wave EAB

4. Data release form

5. Table 1.2b Survey Schedules and Sample Sizes of Second Wave AB

6. Regime Support and Democratic Support in Asia (% of total sample expressing support) Notes:   Source: 2006 Asian Barometer Surveys, preliminary 7-nation dataset as of July 2007 "Rejects authoritarian alternatives"=respondent rejects at least half of the authoritarian alternatives on which s/he expresses an opinion, out of a possible total of three; "Commitment to democracy"=combined measure of five positive attitudes toward democracy; "Trusts government institutions"=summed trust scores for five government institutions is more positive than negative. Bold (red) numbers are at or above the average for that row, nonbold (green) numbers below the average

7. Table 1.3 Meaning of Democracy (% of total sample mentioning this meaning)

8. Table 1.13 Commitment to Rule of Law(% of respondents)

9. Table 1.8 Support for Democracy(% of respondents)

10. Table 1.9 Authoritarian Detachment(% of respondents)

11. Democratic Values in East Asia (% giving pro-democratic answer)

12. Table 1.7 Perceived Change from Past to Present Regime (% of valid sample mentioning this meaning)

13. Difference in Perceived Performance of Current and PastRegimes (% perceiving improvement minus percent perceiving worsening)

14. Table 10.3 Impact of Regime Policy Performance on Support for Democracy(Standardized regression coefficient)

15. Traditional Values in East Asia (% agree or strongly agree)

17. First and Second Wave Comparison

18. Satisfaction with the way democracy works (% satisfied)

19. Democracy is always preferable(% Agree)

20. We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things(% Strongly or somewhat disagree)

21. Authoritarian detachment(% Oppose all three non-democratic alternatives except expert rule)

22. Democracy can solve the problem(% Positive response)

23. Whatever its faults may be, our form of government is still the best for us(% Agree)

24. Second Wave

25. Q103. People have the power to change a government they don’t like

26. Q113. How often do national governments abide by the law?

27. Q43. On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?

28. Q110. People are free to speak what they think without fear

29. Q111. People can join any organization they like

30. Q116. How well do you think the government responds to what people want?

31. Q45-47. Access to Public Services Easy Difficult Easy Difficult Easy Difficult Easy Difficult Easy Difficult Easy Difficult Easy Difficult Easy Difficult

32. Policy implications • Don’t walk away after democratic transition, but invest in the consolidation of new democracies at risk. • Consolidation is not only about elections and civil society, but even more about rule of law, accountability, and governance – the “quality of democracy.” • Promoting the “d” word is less valuable than promoting deeper democratic values. • Longterm modernization promotes democratic values, but slowly and unevenly. • The modernization process that most changes values is education. • Take authoritarian governments at their word in their democratic claims, and work with the public’s rising expectations for democracy.

33. Institutionalizing African Democracy:Formal or Informal?Michael Bratton, Michigan State University

34. Research Questions What are the trends over time in popular support for democracy? Is nostalgia for authoritarian rule growing or shrinking? Over time, are Africans becoming more or less satisfied with the quality of democracy delivered by their leaders? How much democracy do they think they have? How do they arrive at their attitudes to democracy? With reference to formal or informal institutions? Which is more important? If informal institutions remain important to African politics, do they help or harm democracy?

35. The Afrobarometer A comparative series of public attitude surveys on democracy, markets and civil society. Run by Idasa (South Africa), CDD (Ghana) and MSU, plus national partners. Based on: * national probability samples (1200-3600) representing all adult citizens * margin of sampling error of +/- 3% at 95 % confidence * face-to-face interviews by trained interviewers in language of choice * response rates averaging above 80% * standard questionnaire with identical or functionally equivalent items Data Comparisons of observed values across countries, and over time, between: * Afrobarometer Round 1 (12 countries), 1999-2001 (21,000+ cases) * Afrobarometer Round 2 (15 countries), 2002-2003 (23,000+ cases) * Afrobarometer Round 3 (18 countries), 2005-2006 (25,000+ cases)

36. Figure 2: Coverage of Afrobarometer Surveys, 1999-2006 Back to Afrobarometer Countries

37. “Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? • Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; • In some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferable; • For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what form of government we have”

38. “There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternative: The army comes in to govern the country?”

39. “There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternative: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office?”

40. Percentage approving democracy or rejecting other political regimes

41. * Percentage saying that “democracy is preferable to any other form of government.” 2005 figure for Tanzania includes 59 percent “don’t know/don’t understand.”

42. Percentage approving democracy or rejecting other political regimes

43. Percentages (a) satisfied with “the way democracy works” (b) perceiving that country has “full” or “almost full” democracy and (c) thinking country will remain a democracy in the future

44. * Percentage “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with “the way democracy works in (this country).” * The estimate for Ghana in 2002 is based on 15 percent “don’t knows” (imputed from R1 and R3 distributions)

45. Figure 10: Satisfaction with Democracy: 18 African Countries, 2005 “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in (your country)?”

46. Percentages (a) satisfied with “the way democracy works” (b) perceiving that country has “full” or “almost full” democracy and (c) thinking country will remain a democracy in the future

48. Figure 13: Explaining Popular Demand for Democracy: Selected Social Influences a Multiple Regression (OLS) Unstandardized Standardized Coefficients Coefficients Model B Std. Error Beta Sig. 1 (Constant) 1.319 .027 .000 Gender (Female) -.093 .008 -.083 .000 Habitat (Rural) -.057 .009 -.049 .000 Age .002 .000 .045 .000 Religion (Muslim) .062 .011 .045 .000 Education .052 .002 .185 .000 Model Summary Adjusted Std. Error of R R Square R Square the Estimate .217 .047 .047 .54511 The dependent variable (demand for democracy) is an average index of support for democracy and rejection of three authoritarian alternatives (military, one-party and one-man rule). It measures the depth of popular commitments to a democratic regime.

49. Figure 14: Explaining the Perceived Extent of Democracy: Formal Institutions versus Informal Ties, 2005 Multiple Regression (OLS) Unstandardized Standardized Coefficients Coefficients Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 1.318 .021 63.233 .000 Free and Fair Elections .356 .007 .427 49.247 .000 Trust in the President .200 .007 .242 27.910 .000 Model Summary Adjusted Std. Error of Model R R Square R Square the Estimate a 1 .575 .330 .330 .767 a. Dependent Variable: EXTENT OF DEMOCRACY Source: Individual-level data, Afrobarometer Round 3 for original 12 Afrobarometer countries (n = 17,917 unweighted, 14,400 weighted) Adjusted R square for all 18 R3 countries = .287 (Beta = .396 for free and fair elections. Beta = .239 for trust in president)

50. Percentage share of explained variance in extent of democracy accounted for by each predictor 12 original Afrobarometer countries (Round 1, N = 21,531; Round 3, N = 17,917) “In your opinion, how much of a democracy is (your country) today?”