1 / 34

MH-20: The Korean War

MH-20: The Korean War. Korean War-Overview. North Korea invaded the South 0430 25 June 1950: Advanced rapidly down SK Peninsula=> Pusan NK showed Maneuver warfare was alive & well At least for the first year of the war North Korea’s invasion caught US unprepared

Thomas
Download Presentation

MH-20: The Korean War

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. MH-20: The Korean War

  2. Korean War-Overview • North Korea invaded the South 0430 25 June 1950: • Advanced rapidly down SK Peninsula=> Pusan • NK showed Maneuver warfare was alive & well • At least for the first year of the war • North Korea’s invasion caught US unprepared • SECDEF Johnsonhad gutted military readiness • He had cut all but Air Force’s strategic budget • US resolve waswatched closely by entire world • Failure of the US to act would discourage allies & encourage foes (to threaten Europe) • Gen MacArthur would turn things around: • Established Pusan Perimeter & InchonLanding • But Truman, tempted fate by expanding US/UN war aimsto unify Korea under So. Korea • Result: US threat to Yalu prompted China to act • MacArthur’s attempt to expand war prompted Truman to replace him with General Ridgeway • Ridgeway’s counter-offensive pushed NK back • Armistice talks drew War out for 2 more years • NTL direct military & nuclear escalation avoided

  3. Military Strategy serving Political Goals • Military strategy then became aligned w/political negotiations • Small limited engagements made for small advantage • Used as bargaining chips for truce talks at Panmunjom • As result:Korean War’s strategic aim limited => • Attain political goals primarily at bargaining table • Instead of tactical or operational advances on the Battle Field • Military strategy & tactics limited to serve political goalsonly • This different approach was a major change from that of WWII • The reason had much to do with the state of US military readiness following WWII

  4. Post-WWII Demobilization & Military Readiness • US Readiness to deal with limited conflict quickly • US post-War focus in Pacific: • Occupation duty in Japan • Unit training & combat cohesion virtually nonexistent • Combat readiness woefully inadequate • Political & diplomatic status of Korea given lower status: • Korea was outside US stated defense perimeter in Pacific • US focus in Pacific: Japan (for Asia) • US 1st priority globally? • Meanwhile:NK (Kim Il Sung) establish well trained Army • 135K capable & trained Army • Prepared for invasion & (eventual) unification of Korea • Soviets concurred with North Korea’s invasion plan: • Also both surprised by US reaction & response: • Misled by Dean Rusk’s ill advised public policy statement on Asia • Both US & South Korea totally unprepared for NK invasion Germany

  5. North Korean Invasion (25 June 1950) • North Korea crosses 38th parallel and invades on broad front: • 3rd & 4th NK Divisions attack South Korean west coast • Operational & tactical Objectives: • Take Seoul& rout South Korean Army => push them to the south • 2nd/7th Divisions drive south Yoju & Wonju to East • 5th Division attacks to take Samch’ok • Secondechelon regiments follow initial invasion forces: • Prepare for deep penetration through lead elements • Objective:South Korean rear areas • Result:ringing tactical success: • Quickly rout ROK defenders

  6. U.S. Response • US & ROK forces fall back in disarray • Outgunned by North Korea • Attempt to delay NK advance • US political response: • Surprise, embarrassment, anger, & resolve: • Trumandetermined US (w/UN) will defend South Korea • Problem? (with what & when– how soon?) • UN designates US as executive agent • Who does Truman assign as his commander?

  7. Mission & Operational Strategy • CINCUNC’s mission? • Halt North Korea’s advance & eject its forces from South Korea • What is CINCUNC’s Operational Strategy for this mission? • Slow NK advance to provide time • (time for what?) • Re-enforcement from Japan to build up on Pusan Peninsula • Then counterattack on NK’srear & flanks

  8. Concept of Operations & Execution • Operational Concept: • DelayNK‘s advance at Suwon-Taijon Axis – How- with what? • Task Force ?___________ • (1/2 Battalion!) to defend line: • Make stand 5km North of Osan • Against tanks? Level of (over) confidence? • Execution: • 5 July: NK attacks w/2nd wave follow-on frontal attacks • high casualties all around • TF Smithforced to withdraw (surrounded – flee – many MIAs) • Later TF Smith’s sacrifice became symbol of what? • Initial ?______ ___________ • Lack of adequate support & ?___________

  9. Establishing Pusan Perimeter • NK forces advances while US & ROK forces resist: • Sacrifice of TF Smith buys time to organize delay • LTG Walker’s 8th Army • 24th, then 25th Divisions delay NK advance • Fighting withdrawal to form perimeter around Pusan • Pusan becomes vital port for re-enforcements & re-supply • Rushed in a race against time

  10. Inchon Landing • MacArthur’s high risk Inchon invasion w/10th Corps: • USMC 1stDivision w/untrained 7thdivision in reserve • Attitude of JCS, Navyamphibious experts & Landing force Commander? • Difficulties surrounding attempted landing? • Timing of 30 foot ?_____ ______ • Wolmi-do island also posed potential threat to invading forces flank

  11. Inchon Landing Execution • For the most part- as planned: • Benefit of high risk operations: • Strategic & tactical surprise • NKcaught totally by surprise & now out gunned & cut off • Offer stiff resistance – but soon forced to retreat back to 38th ll

  12. Inchon Landing: Results • Results: Total success- • NK LOCscompletely cut off • Strategic situation completely reversed • Strategic initiativenow shifts to US

  13. Changing War Aims • Initial War Aims? • Eject NK from South Korea • Force them back over • When changed & how? 38th parallel • Following Inchon & radically changed strategic situation • NSC council’s advice to Truman • DOD (JCS & MacArthur) position & advice? • ?___ ___ _____! • Mission Creep? • Expanded aim: unify Korean Peninsula under South Korea • Strategy: Drive north & attack & destroy NK Army

  14. The China Card • China’s response & unheeded warnings & intelligence • CICUNC intelligence (J-2)breakdown • Selective perception • Discounts Korean recon teamreports of Chinese build-up • “Chinese volunteers at the Yalu” • MacArthur’s assurances to Truman at Wake • Chinese won’t attack • When Chinese attack => who’s surprised now?

  15. Strategic Situation Reversed • Nov’50- Jan’51: strategic situation reversed (again) • Americans & SK forces fall back in retreat (8th Army in West ) • 10th Corps (1st USMC & 7thin East (retreat:Chosin Reservoir) • Only US CASallow 8th Army & 10th corps to barely escape • Col Chesty Puller, USMC, would lead with distinction

  16. Chosin Reservoir- The Retreat

  17. US Global Strategic Priorities • MacArthur’s reaction & desired response? • Expand and ?___________ the War=> bomb ?___________ • US (Truman/JCS) strategic priorities: • Europe! • View NK invasion as diversion sanctioned by USSR • Confine conflict to Korean Peninsula (at least Asia): • Truman determined not to allow war to spread or escalate • (Avoid spread to China & especially Europe • As Operational situation in Korea grows grim: • Truman hints: potential A-bomb use • NATO (Britain) allies become seriously concerned • British PM Attleevisits Truman to gain assurances • Questions US direction of the War

  18. War Aims & Strategy “Adjustments” • Result:War aims & strategy changed again: • PM Attlee & Truman reach compromise agreement: • Europe first! => Asia (Korea) distant second • Adjusted aims & grand strategy: • Both confirm commitment to fight along side South Korea • 1. Operational Aim: establish strong defense line & hold it • 2. Negotiate settlement from position of strength • 3. Finally – throughout conflict: keep the war limited • Both in intensityandgeographic region • Impact on MacArthur’s desired Operational Strategy? • Mac’s operational objectives in direct conflict w/this compromise • And therefore with US (Truman) & UN political & strategic aims • Truman ordered Mac to change his Op strategy to what?

  19. Strategic Defense • From Strategic OffensetoStrategic Defense: • Korean unification shelved • Political negotiated settlement now pursued • MacArthur’s reaction & response: • Goes head to head with the Commander in Chief • (Not recommended) • Undermines President’s political aims for (MacArthur’s) military objectives • Criticized Truman’s “defensive” strategy in letter to GOP Congressman • “There is no substitute for victory” • He would soon be relieved and sent back home- into retirement

  20. Ridgeway & Operation Killer • LTG Ridgeway takes 8th Armyfollowing Walker’s death • Reinvigorates troops • Waits for opportunity to strike • Seizes opening & launches counter-attack • Pushes NK back & digs in to await another opening • Launches several follow-on operations • Pushes North Korean back over 38th parallel • Meanwhile Truman seeks to take advantage of Ridgeway’s success • Plans speech to offer negotiated settlement w/China • Mac had undermined presidential prerogative & paid the price • Command changed result: • Ridgeway replaced Mac & Gen Van Fleettakes 8th

  21. Mobile WarfareEnds • Chinese & NK counterattacks April 1951: • Drive X-corps & 2 ROK Corps south of 38th Parallel • Van Fleetseizes opportunity & counterattacks in West into right flank of advancing enemy • 8th Army attacks along entire line • Chinesesurprised & withdraws into NK north of 38th Parallel • Mobile warfare ends (May’51) at established front Battle line

  22. End Game – Negotiations & Stalemate • Truman-Attlee agreement precluded conventional victory • Implicit war aim: cease-fire in place • June 1951: Negotiations start: • Bog down for awhile over protocol issues • July 1951: Agenda finally set: • Fix demarcation line (DMZ) • Set terms for Truce supervision • Protocols for POW return • Recommendations to warring parties • UN Forces attempt to take tactical advantage: • Establish strong defensive position • Capture key terrain point => • Objective:establish strong negotiating position • Then => conductactive defense& hold gains

  23. Communist Response • Communist take advantage of UN’s proposed 30 day deadline: • Dig in & establish strong in-depth defense line • Creates stalemate => static warfare (WW1) • Ensured static situation for rest of war • Therefore Chinese & NK outmaneuvered US politically • Result: ground action & mobility deteriorates • NTL Air & Naval interdiction continues to apply pressure on NK

  24. Small Units Actions • Both sides compete for small incremental gains in difficult terrain: • Purpose: gain small advantage at bargaining table • 1951-52: Series of night actions & patrol level firefights at fwd outposts: • Pork Chop Hill, T-Bone Hill, White House, etc

  25. OperationErie • OperationErie => • Violent Chinese assault on fwd US position • Typical example of tactics serving politics • (And troops paying the price as bargaining chips for political ends)

  26. Obstacles to Truce & POWs • Truce talks at Panmunjom: • Most all issues settled except? • ?____________ disposition: (issue?) • UN insists ?_________________ should decide where to go following truce • China & NK position? • Forced ?_________________ • Results of Red Cross poll: remain in SK • China & NK reaction=> incredulous (many former captured SKs) • Koje-do incident involving hardcore NK (inhibit defectors) • China & NK exploit aspropaganda against UN (embarrassed)

  27. Ike’s Election &Its Impact • Ike concurred with Truman’s strategic aim: • Agreed to negotiated settlement in principle • But with incentives to Chinese (?) • Strategic bombing of NK ?__________authorized • JCS directed to plan for mobile plans • Widen war geographically (into China) & in intensity • Signals his intent to use A-Bomb (B-29 Bombers deployed) • Stalin’s death changes focus & strategic priorities for Soviets • ALCON decide it is time to settle • Concentrate on next USSR leadership

  28. Assessing Limited War • Review of Policy, Doctrine, & Strategy: • Kennan’s Long Telegram & Truman Doctrine • Containment Policy & associated strategy • Marshall Plan, NATO, & NSC-68 • Korean War costs: • Casualties: • Chinese & NK estimated combined causalities:1.5-2M • 1 million civilian deaths • UN: 88K KIA (23,300 US) & 300K SK; • DMZ: remains tense potential battle ground- even today • NK raids & agent infiltrations continued throughout • Terrorism, sabotage, abduction,WMD development • War by Proxy: • Korean War intensified conflict between superpowers • Potential to escalate to Nuclear level conflict at hand • Threat of spreading to other theaters => Europe

  29. Rising Defense Spending • High costs for military unpreparedness: • NSC-68validated by North Korea’s invasion: • US caught by surprise & unprepared => decidednever again • DOD Budgetdramatically increased: • Permanent US standing armed forcesestablished: • Largest in US history • (No more Task Force Smiths type trip wires) • Combat Ready Forcetrained & ready to deploy • No mobilization time required • European forward deployment (& to South Korea) • Peacetime Draft until after Vietnam • Military scientific industrial complex expanded & nurtured • National & global economic impact ($$ for defense contracts)

  30. End Result • Korean War became a model for future wars: • Established major precedence: • Limited War (w/o A-Bomb) now considered possible • Conflict of limited scope & violence for limited aims • Communist exploitation of limited war: • Stressed a Politicalvice military strategy • Delay & propaganda used very effectively • Win at bargaining table what can’t be won in combat • Political aims of limited war must be a calculated priority • When confronting future conflicts- especially in Asia

  31. Back-up Slides

  32. Korean War (1950-1953) • North Korea invaded the South 0430 25 June 1953: • As they advanced rapidly down Korean Peninsula => • Demonstrated Maneuver warfare was alive & well • At least for the first year of the war • Both sides maneuvered back & forth for 1st year => • then entrenched stalemate like WW1 re-emerged • Overview of the course of the war… in a “nutshell:”

  33. Strategic Overview of Key Events

  34. Korean War • From a US perspective, the Soviets engaged the US indirectly through NK & China

More Related