Feminism and Science

1. Feminism and Science

2. The politics of science • The enlightenment view science is framed in terms of universal values, epistemic objectivity and challenges to entrenched (and unjustified) authority. • In the mid-twentieth century, science came to be identified with threats as well as promises– the atom bomb, chemical pesticides, corporate dominance of the economy and politics and unjustified authority. • Now progressive political groups have a more conflicted and even sometimes an outright negative view of science. • In particular, feminist critiques of science have emerged.

3. 18th Century rhetoric • Sexist views and sexist rhetoric are extremely easy to find in 17th and 18th century scientific writings. • They are also pretty easy to find more recently. • The structures of authority (institutions, journals and associations) that have developed in science have, for obvious reasons, been dominated by men. • The concerns about institutionalized science that we’ve just raised added fuel to the fire here: if science is a male-dominated enterprise serving military and corporate and privileged interests, there are plenty of reasons to be concerned and critical of it.

4. Examples of feminist work on science • Lloyd, The Man of Reason: Francis Bacon’s view of knowledge as (male) power/control. Such metaphors are still around, though just how influential they are is not entirely clear. (Keller: the image of a scientist modeled on patriarchal husband imposes inauthenticity on women who identify with it.) • Hrdy, The Woman that Never Evolved: Primatology and sexual behaviour. Did female primatologists correct an imbalance in the field? (Leakey’s ‘angels’: Goodal, Galdikas and Fossey…)

5. A question • In what areas, or regarding what sorts of questions, do you think the differences between male and female scientists are most likely to be important or influential? • This seems to me to be an important question to keep in mind here. Physics and chemistry don’t (or don’t obviously) engage social issues in ways that make these differences important– biology and especially primatology, on the other hand, do. • See also Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, on such concerns.

6. Feminist epistemology 1 • This field covers a very wide range of positions– • At one extreme, we find pretty traditional empiricism, leavened with the modest claim that some issues or topics can be dealt with better when womens’ perspectives are included as correctives against certain fairly concrete and specific biases. (Harding) • In the middle we find more ambitious efforts to modify and improve empiricism (broadly, by removing deeper, more general and subtle biases in epistemic thinking). (Longino) • The challenge here is to show that there are systematic differences between women and men that really matter to the science that gets done...

7. Feminist epistemology 2 • At the other extreme we find radical feminist epistemology (which is generally postmodern and relativist in outlook) and standpoint epistemology, which holds that certain facts are only ‘visible’ from the point of view of people who occupy disadvantaged or marginalized positions in society– this can include women, the poor, disadvantaged races or cultures. • Longino’s response to standpoint epistemology pushes back in the direction of Mill– the ideal here is that all points of view have a voice in the debate. (Contextual empiricism)

8. The Science Wars • Sokal’s paper: http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/transgress_v2/transgress_v2_singlefile.html • This is a real hoot (whether it was constructive or not as a contribution to the debate). • For example: • Just as liberal feminists are frequently content with a minimal agenda of legal and social equality for women and ``pro-choice'', so liberal (and even some socialist) mathematicians are often content to work within the hegemonic Zermelo-Fraenkel framework (which, reflecting its nineteenth-century liberal origins, already incorporates the axiom of equality) supplemented only by the axiom of choice. But this framework is grossly insufficient for a liberatory mathematics, as was proven long ago by Cohen (1966). • Cohen (1966): Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis.