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Follow-up eLTC

Follow-up eLTC. Selection of slides presented at the eLTC. Daily Operation with Beam The Ideal World. The MPS hardware is working under nominal configuration : Beam dump request is only given when it is required No ‘false’ hardware interlocks via BIS No ‘false’ software interlocks via SIS

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Follow-up eLTC

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  1. Follow-up eLTC • Selection of slides presented at the eLTC MPS Comm. WG, 23 April 2008

  2. Daily Operation with BeamThe Ideal World • The MPS hardware is working under nominal configuration: • Beam dump request is only given when it is required • No ‘false’ hardware interlocks via BIS • No ‘false’ software interlocks via SIS • Systems are brought into operation according to MPS commissioning plans • Depends on beam intensity and beam energy = commissioning phase • Machine model is nominal, fitting to the corresponding phase : • Optics functions within tolerance (orbit, tunes etc.) properly corrected and within tolerances, beam intensity and energy within the pre-defined limits • Try to stick to ‘stable optics’ – avoid verification of MPS for new conditions • Operational procedures related to Machine Protection ok: • Beam quality checks ok • Post Mortem following beam dump fully understood • Post Operational Checks (injection, beam dump) always ok Be sure not to work outside the agreed upon conditions: • A system is required to restrict the operation within the well defined window: • Clear procedures / limits known at all times: central place to keep this info! • Software interlock on energy / intensity / optics? (e.g. limit operation at 2 TeV) MPS Comm. WG, 23 April 2008

  3. Beam Dump, or no ‘green light’ to inject: operation Stopped Safe, but degradation of the machine up-time: action desired Is this sufficient (I, E) Y Mask Y Follow-up N Possible to mask? Can it be fixed within an acceptable delay Y Fix it N N RBAC MCS, … Possible to adjust the interlock level or the settings to continue Acceptable? Adjust Y Y Follow-up N N RBAC MCS, … Acceptable? Useful? which? Continue with Different beam conditions ? (I , E, Optics) Adjust (SIS) Y Y Follow-up N N RBAC MCS, … Acceptable? Y Disable the interlock Adjust Y N Follow-up N Stop the LHC,Restart after Repair MPS Comm. WG, 23 April 2008

  4. Protection andBookkeeping RBAC MCS, … • When Settings or Interlock Levels ’can be changed’, protection against ‘anybody’ doing this and errors in transmission. Talk V.Kain on Friday: • Role Based Access Control (RBAC) • Management of Critical Settings (MCS) • Coherent list of equipment where this is required • Coherent list of people for the specific equipment • Need to do the bookkeeping of all changes Change of Settings, Interlocks Disabled Change of Settings, Interlocks Disabled TOOL MPS Comm. WG, 23 April 2008

  5. Responsibilities Engineer In Charge Equipment Experts Machine Coordinator Commissioner in Charge LHC Protection Panel Concerning Machine Protection System Magnet Performance Panel In place for ‘magnet protection’, Already used during Hardw. Comm. A.Siemko, MPP meeting 21/09/2006 J. Uythoven, ‘Chamonix’ 2006 MPS Comm. WG, 23 April 2008

  6. LHC Protection Panel • Group of experts who have an overview of • The nominal MPS • MPS  MPSi • The actual state of the MPS • The bookkeeping • Can’t foresee all permutations, can’t write procedures in case of failures beforehand, need experience with the actual systems and flexibility to adjust • See ‘Chamonix’ 2006 • New: LPP members  MPS Comm WGThis group of experts exists! JET is operating since many years with a Machine Protection System Panel MPS Comm. WG, 23 April 2008

  7. Conclusions • The aim is to have a fully operational MPS, functioning under nominal conditions, all the time. • In all circumstances the state of the MPS should be known • Inventory of ‘hardware’ which is not standard • Settings • Interlock Levels • Masking • Disabling • In all circumstances the operational limits and conditions of the machine should be clear • For the standard conditions, depending on the commissioning phase • If one is allowed to only run under special conditions: • An LHC Protection Panel should be used to advise the EIC when significant changes to MPS systems and their settings need to be made to continue or optimise operation • This is at least the case when RBAC is required to make the change • Once agreed upon to make a change to MPS (settings): procedures for doing this • Clear definitions of applying RBAC and MCS – coherent approach • Who can make hardware changes? Obvious? • Do we need a kind of RBAC on the Software Interlock System? • Maskable interlocks with Safe Beam on SIS? Tool(s) required for keeping track of MPS conditions Tool(s) required for keeping track of allowed machine conditions MPS Comm. WG, 23 April 2008

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