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The problem of evil. Philosophy of Religion 2008 Lecture 5 . Procedural work. Draft exam answers: complete in an hour! Handwritten is fine, but do give references … Does the ‘soul-making’ theodicy provide an satisfactory answer to the problem of evil?
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The problem of evil Philosophy of Religion 2008 Lecture 5
Procedural work • Draft exam answers: complete in an hour! • Handwritten is fine, but do give references … • Does the ‘soul-making’ theodicy provide an satisfactory answer to the problem of evil? • Is divine hiddenness essential to human freedom? • Is there a logical problem of evil for the theist? • If the universe shows evidence of design, does this prove the existence of God? • Hand in by 4pm Friday Week 8.
Today • A forgotten proof? Franklin’s ‘beer proof’ (!) • Two problems of evil: • The logical problem • The evidential problem • …the coherence of theism and the existence of God • Selected theistic responses • Opposition to theodicy
Problems of evil: 1 • The logical problem: a problem of consistency: • If God is good; and omnipotent; and omniscient • There shouldn’t be human and animal suffering • But there is – inconsistency? • Which premise will the theist give up … ? • (See Hume DCNR Part X)
The logical problem • Mackie (‘Evil and omnipotence’): ‘God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, yet evil exists … the theologian it seems at once must adhere, and yet cannot consistently adhere to all three’ • Strictly, to produce inconsistency, need added premise(s). E.g.: • An omnipotent God can do anything • Good must always seek to eliminate evil
Pause for clarification • Suffering as evil, or as the result of evil … so evils/suffering interchangeable • Evils: • Moral: resulting from human action/inaction • Natural: resulting from other causes • God as good or God as loving? • These last two may affect the sort of defence the theist can mount
The logical problem • Possible defences for the theist? • The theist may simply deny one of the premises (unattractive) … • More likely to point out that: • These premises need to be understood in a certain way, or • The hidden premises (omnipotence all powerful, goodness must oppose evil) are wrong
Possible defences • So: perhaps • God is not good in our sense of morally good • Evil does not exist … • Or: • God has reasons for allowing evil (goodness will not always seek to overcome evil) • God has created the world in such a way that he cannot intervene …
God not good? • Does calling God ‘good’ mean morally good … • Goodness is not always a moral property • It may be a expression of gratitude..? • Can God be subject to moral judgment? • ‘God can no more be part of a moral community [with his creatures] than he can be part of a political community with them …’ (Kenny, What is Faith?) • Does the same apply to ‘loving’ …?
Evil doesn’t exist? • Aquinas: evil is not a positive quality • It is ‘a certain absence of a good’ (Summa Theologiae - cf. discussion of omnipotence) • So God cannot cause evil … but does he therefore permit this absence to occur? • Augustine: evil as ‘the name for nothing but the want of good’ (City of God Bk XI) • And this want arises from the fall, original sin …
The free will defence • And note, the fall arises from human choice … • Allowing choice seems to limit God’s power • Challenges the hidden assumptions: • An omnipotent God can do anything • Good must always seek to eliminate evil • ‘Greater good’ defences – goods which cannot be achieved without allowing (possibility of) evil
The free will defence • It is good to have free agents, and so it is good to allow agents freedom • God cannot let us be free and ensure we chose good (incompatibilism) • And so God must allow us to do evil … • Plantinga: ‘thus is the power of an omnipotent God limited by the freedom he confers upon his creatures’
The free will defence • But what relationship between God and freedom? • Is God still responsible for the actions of free agents? • Since he created them, and sustains them • (Aquinas) God is not a worldly cause, so he can bring human actions without limiting freedom (compatibilism) • But is this plausible?
The free will defence • General problem: is the good worth the evil? • Maybe if the free creatures do more good than evil? • Can our free will account for natural evils? • As they affect both us and other creatures… • Should they be laid at God’s door? • Or the fall/original sin (Augustine, van Inwagen)
Free will and natural evils • Maybe being able to enjoy free will depends on the existence of natural laws, that will not always work in our interests … • We cannot all get what we want: what decides the matter will be certain natural facts (Mawson) • But what can this say about other creatures’ suffering – the fawn in the forest fire (Rowe) • Do all creatures have free will?
Overcoming evils • ‘The worst evils demand to be defeated by the best goods. Horrendous evils can be overcome only by the goodness of God’ (Marilyn Adams). • We may not fathom the reasons for evil … • … but God’s ensures that each person’s life is a good to them, by ‘engulfing’ evils. • God is still good, despite evils … • Transcendent goods: relations with God; God’s gratitude; identification with Christ …
Problems of evil: 2 • Or an evidential problem (Mackie MoT, Rowe): • If there were an omni – God … • There would not be evil/suffering • But there is … • So there cannot be such a God (modus tollens) • Suffering as evidence for atheism - not proof, but supports a ‘strong presumption’ (Mackie)
The evidential problem • A Bayesian approach (e.g Draper in Copan and Meister) • This evidence may increase the balance of probability of God’s non-existence • By increasing the ‘antecedent probability’ of atheism, prior to our considering any further arguments
Some responses • We know that God exists for some other reason • … so while this presents a problem, it cannot count as evidence against His existence • We don’t see the whole picture • Not having God’s omniscience, all the evidence is not available to us • Relies on first point? Otherwise we can judge only on evidence we have … • Combines with ‘greater good’ theodicies?
Defences and theodicies • Defences: challenging one of the premises of the argument • Theodicy (after Leibniz): explaining why God might act in a certain way • Not always an easy distinction to draw … • And defences may work against both forms of argument, or only against one: careful!
Greater good arguments • Is the existence of evil necessary to bring about a greater good (cf free-will)? No ‘gratuitous evil? • Hick: soul-making/Iranean theodicy: • God intends to bring us to moral/spiritual maturity • This must be a free choice: epistemic distance • ‘A world without problems … would be morally static’ • So to grow, we must live in a world with evil • But … could we not learn virtues in a good world?
Greater good arguments • Swinburne: if we are to become morally mature • … we must act freely, and have knowledge of the consequences of actions, both good and evil • Again, we cannot be force-fed this: we must work it out inductively • … and this means both bringing about moral evil and having experience of natural evils
Against theodicy • Are greater good arguments too anthropocentric • Or not respectful of suffering humans, animals? • Responses: • Acknowledge our lack of understanding: ‘if [God] is there, he is surely something bigger and more mysterious than a corrupt or stupid official’ (Midgley; see also DZ Phillips) • God as human love and effort (Soelle) • Are theodicies besides the point …?
References/additional reading • Seminar readings • Davies Introduction Ch3 (2nd edn) or 10 (3rd edn) • Davies Guide Part V • Mackie: ‘Evil and omnipotence’ (Mind 64, Peterson) • Mackie: Miracle of Theism Ch.9 • Rowe: ‘The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism’ (Taliaferro & Griffiths) • Augustine: City of God Bk XI (or passages in Peterson, Davies, Hick Ch.2)
References/additional reading • Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part X • Swinburne: Existence of God Ch.11, or Stump & Murray Ch.25 • Hick: ‘An Iranean theodicy’ (in Hick, Peterson) • Adams: ‘Horrendous evils and the goodness of God’ (in Stump & Murray, Taliaferro & Griffiths) • Midgley: Wickedness (extracts in Taliaferro & Griffiths) • Against theodicy: see Clack and Clack Chapter 3.
Questions • Can you distinguish the various defences and theodicies? • Which do you think are the strongest? • Can we combine approaches to give a complete defence of God’s existence in the face of both moral and natural evils?