Logical Atomism

1. Logical Atomism

2. Absolute Idealism

3. Idealism Idealism (ordinary): the unrealistic belief in or pursuit of perfection. [IDEAL + ISM] Idealism (philosophy): any of various systems of thought in which the objects of knowledge are held to be in some way dependent on the activity of mind. [IDEA + LISM]

4. Idealism = Kinda Like the Matrix The world of appearance is entirely in your mind (there may be another much more inaccessible world behind it).

5. F.H. Bradley • Oxford philosopher • Absolute idealist • Extremely famous, respected, and honored in his day • Pro-imperialism

6. Absolute Idealism Idealism: The world is mind-dependent Absolute Idealism: There is only one thing, multiplicity is an illusion.

7. The Unity Problems Unity of the fact: how does the pen go together with redness to make a red pen? Unity of the proposition: how does the pen go together with redness IN THOUGHT to make a red pen?

8. Bradley’s Regress Argument One possibility: the pen and redness “go together” by a relation of instantiation.

9. Bradley’s Regress Argument Second possibility: the pen and redness “go together” with a third thing, a substance.

10. Bradley’s Regress Argument Third possibility (Lewis Carroll): the pen and redness “go together” by a relation of identity. =

11. Analytic Philosophy

12. G. E. Moore (1873-1958) • Chair Professor at Cambridge • Former editor of Mind • Former president of the Aristotelian Society • Wrote Principia Ethica, “The Refutation of Idealism,” “A Defence of Common Sense,” and “A Proof of the External World”

13. A Proof of the External World Moore recognized that a (good) argument of the form: P1, P2, P3,… therefore C Is just the claim that P1, P2, P3,… and not-C, taken together, are inconsistent.

14. A Proof of the External World So all of these arguments are the same: P1, P2, P3,… therefore C Not-C, P2, P3,… therefore not-P1 P1, not-C, P3,… therefore not-P2 P1, P2, not-C,… therefore not-P3 ….

15. A Proof of the External World P1, P2, P3,… therefore C Not-C, P2, P3,… therefore not-P1 P1, not-C, P3,… therefore not-P2 P1, P2, not-C,… therefore not-P3 …. Moore argued we should accept the argument with the most common-sensical conclusion. (Reject the least convincing P.)

16. A Proof of the External World So consider the (good) argument: I do not know that I am not a brain-in-a-vat therefore I do not know that I have hands.

17. A Proof of the External World This just means that P1 and not-C are inconsistent: P1: I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. Not-C: I know that I have hands. So we need to reject one of them.

18. A Proof of the External World But obviously the most common sense thing to say is: Accept not-C: I know that I have hands. Reject P1: I know that I am not a brain in a vat. External world proved!

19. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) • 3rd Earl Russell • Part of a prominent aristocratic family • Grandfather had twice been Prime Minister • Parents died when he was young, was raised by his domineering grandmother, Countess Russell

20. Bertrand Russell • With A.N. Whitehead, wrote one of the most important works in mathematics, Principia Mathematica • With G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein, led the revolt in philosophy against Idealism

21. Bertrand Russell • Agnostic • Pacifist (went to prison) • Social critic • Winner of the Nobel Prize in literature

22. Logical Atomism

23. “[T]he point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it.”

24. Atomism and Physics Atomism (ordinary): There are simple (no parts) physical components of the universe.

25. Logical Atomism There are simple (non-complex) aspects of reality. Russell takes these to be particulars, universals, and relations.

26. Particulars Particulars are also called individuals, objects, or things. They are that which can be properly named. Russell thinks the complex things we “name” aren’t particulars, and aren’t properly named.

27. Universals and Relations Universals are characteristics, features, or properties that multiple particulars can have, instantiate, or participate in. Debate between Russell and Wittgenstein: whether logically atomic universals could have logical relations with one another.

28. The Concept Horse Problem Frege thought that you couldn’t name universals (he called them ‘concepts’). So he had to say that the description (for him, a name) “the concept horse” didn’t name a concept.

29. Acquaintance Russell’s fundamental psychological relation was acquaintance. Things that are ‘directly presented’ to you are the objects of acquaintance: your self, your ideas, your sense data, and the universals & relations.

30. Facts A fact is a “going together” of a particular with a universal, or of several particulars in a relation. The idealists thought “this is red” is a distortion of reality (this = red). Russell thought it expressed a fact which could be written: Fa

31. Propositions For Russell, a proposition is just a sentence. Q: What might be problematic here? Q: What happens to the unity of the proposition problem?

32. Logically Perfect Languages “In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact, with the exception of such words as “or”, “not”, “if ”, “then”, which have a different function…”

33. Logically Perfect Languages “In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for the simple things that enter in, one word for each simple component. A language of that sort will be completely analytic, and will show at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied.”

34. Definitions The process of analysis reveals definitions. Example: A hexagon is [by definition] a plane figure with six straight sides. Understanding the definition lets you recognize a hexagon, even if you’ve never seen one before.

35. Analyses Not all definitions work in the same way. If you defined ‘red’ as ‘electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of 625-740nm’ this would be correct, but wouldn’t allow someone to recognize red who hadn’t seen it. This definition is not an analysis.

36. Logical Atoms If the only way to understand a word is to be acquainted with what it designates, then the thing designated is a logical atom. For Russell, (every particular shade of) red was thus a logical atom.

37. Moore’s Open Question Argument Moore argued that ‘good’ had to be a logical atom because for any possible analysis of good as X, it always made sense to ask: “Is X good?”

38. The New Empiricism Hume was also a British empiricist engaged in a project of analysis. For Hume, the objects of analysis were complex ideas which were analyzed into simple ideas. In his empiricism, Russell replaces ideas with propositions. The project becomes logical rather than psychological.

39. Russell’s Private Language According to Russell, you are not acquainted with ordinary objects like tables and chairs, rather you know them “by description.” That is a particular table will not be given a proper name in the theory, but a definition in terms of other logical atoms.

40. The Demise of Analysis “A tiger is a large carnivorous quadrupedal feline, tawny yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and white belly.”

41. Naming the New Philosophy • Analytic • Anglo-Austrian • Anglophone • ???