GREETINGS TO PARTICIPANTS AT THE MOZAMBIQUE TRAINING WORKSHOP ON COMPETITION NAMIBIA

1. GREETINGS TO PARTICIPANTS AT THE MOZAMBIQUE TRAINING WORKSHOP ON COMPETITION NAMIBIA 31 JULY-02 AUGUST 2007 Dr. S Chakravarthy

2. COMPETITION – RESTRICTING PRACTICES PRESENTATION BY Dr. S. CHAKRAVARTHY (Profession : Civil Servant) Formerly, Member, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Member, High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law And Member of Committee for Drafting the Law. Presently, Adviser/ConsultantCompetition Policy and Law HYDERABAD INDIA Dr. S Chakravarthy

3. C O M P E T I T I O N……. • IS A DYNAMIC CONCEPT • IS AN AMALGAM OF FACTORS THAT • STIMULATE ECONOMIC RIVALRY • IS A TOOL TO MOUNT MARKET PRESSURE • TO PENALISE LAGGARDS AND TO REWARD • THE ENTERPRISING Dr. S Chakravarthy

4. COMPETITION POLICY - GOALS PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS EFFICIENCY IN PRODUCTION AND ALLOCATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES INNOVATION AND ADJUSTMENT TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH Dr. S Chakravarthy

5. RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES • REFUSAL TO DEAL • TIE-UP SALES • FULL LINE FORCING • EXCLUSIVE DEALINGS • CONCERT OR COLLUSION -- CARTELS • PRICE DISCRIMINATION • RE-SALE PRICE MAINTENANCE • AREA RESTRICTION • PREDATORY PRICING Dr. S Chakravarthy

6. AGREEMENTSOUTLAWED • AGREEMENTS THAT CAUSE AN APPRECIABLE ADVERSE EFFECT ON COMPETITION ARE GENERALLY OUTLAWED • THIS APPLIES TO WRITTEN AGREEMENTS, ORAL AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS AND CONCERTED PRACTICES Dr. S Chakravarthy

7. AGREEMENT – A DEFINITION • AGREEMENT INCLUDES ANY ARRANGEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING OR ACTION IN CONCERT • AGREEMENT NEED NOT BE FORMAL OR IN WRITING • AGREEMENT NEED NOT BE ENFORCEABLE BY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Dr. S Chakravarthy

8. UNDERSTANDING – AN ILLUSTRATION • SIEM REAP IN CAMBODIA - POPULAR TOURIST TOWN, HOUSING THE FAMOUS ANGKOR VAT TEMPLES. • THERE ARE THREE MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION FROM PHNOM PENH, CAPITAL OF CAMBODIA TO SIEM REAP – BOAT, ROAD AND AIR. • 8 BOAT COMPANIES - THE PRICE FOR ONE-WAY TRAVEL IS 40,000 RIELS (ABOUT US $ 10). BECAUSE OF COMPETITION PRICES PLUMMETTED TO AS LOW AS 20,000 RIELS, A LEVEL BELOW PROFITABLE LEVEL. • THE BOATERS ENTERED INTO AN UNDERSTANDING TO FIX PRICES AT 40,000 RIELS. THEY FURTHER AGREED THAT THEY WOULD NOT COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER AND WOULD SHARE THEIR DEPARTURE SCHEDULES. • THERE WAS NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT BUT ONLY AN UNDERSTANDING. • THE UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTES A CARTEL AGREEMENT. Dr. S Chakravarthy

9. TWO TYPES AGREEMENTS ARE OF TWO TYPES 1. HORIZONTAL • AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ENTERPRISES COMPETING IN THE SAME MARKET (OFTEN PER SE) 2. VERTICAL • AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ENTERPRISES AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF PRODUCTION/ DISTRIBUTION PROCESS (RULE OF REASON) Dr. S Chakravarthy

10. ANTI - COMPETITION AGREEMENTS • HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS : • CARTELS {FIXING PURCHASE OR SALE PRICES (EXPORT CARTELS EXEMPTED) } • BID-RIGGING (COLLUSIVE TENDERING) • SHARING MARKETS BY TERRITORY, TYPE ETC. • LIMITING PRODUCTION, SUPPLY, TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT THE ABOVE ARE “PER SE” ILLEGAL. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS : • TIE-IN ARRANGEMENTS • EXCLUSIVE SUPPLIES • EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION • REFUSAL TO DEAL • RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE ADJUDICATION BY RULE OF REASON Dr. S Chakravarthy

11. CARTEL : DEFINED • A CARTEL IS SAID TO EXIST WHEN TWO OR MORE FIRMS, THAT ARE NOT DE FACTO OR DE JURE CONTROLLED BY GOVERNMENT, ENTER INTO AN EXPLICIT AGREEMENT • TO FIX PRICES • TO ALLOCATE MARKET SHARE OR SALES QUOTAS, OR • TO ENGAGE IN BID-RIGGING IN ONE OR MORE MARKETS. Dr. S Chakravarthy

12. BENEVOLENCE AND MALEVOLENCE • CARTELS ARE MALEVOLENT BUT CAN BE • BENEVOLENT • HARDCORE CARTELS ARE MALEVOLENT • Eg: R&D CARTELS MAY BRING ABOUT • SYNERGIES AND DYNAMIC • EFFICIENCIES - ARE BENEVOLENT Dr. S Chakravarthy

13. HARDCORE CARTELS DEVASTATE CONSUMERS • AVERAGE ILLEGAL GAIN FROM PRICE FIXING IS ABOUT 10% OF THE SELLING PRICE • HARDCORE CARTELS IMPACT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MORE • GENERALLY HARDCORE CARTEL ACTIVITY EMANATES FROM DEVELOPED COUNTRIES • MOST STUDIES POINT TO A 20 TO 40% FALL • IN PRICES AFTER COLLAPSE OF THE CARTEL Dr. S Chakravarthy

14. IMPORTS OF 12 CARTELISED PRODUCTS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1990-2000 US $ billion YEAR Dr. S Chakravarthy

15. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE BAR CHART • CUMULATIVELY IMPORTS EXCEEDED US$ 80 BILLION SINCE 1990 • PRICE OVERCHARGE ASSUMED AT 20 - 40% • DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PAID US$ 12.5 • TO 25 BILLION MORE THAN THEY SHOULD HAVE FOR THE 12 PRODUCTS • EVEN THIS IS AN UNDER ESTIMATE Dr. S Chakravarthy

16. VITAMIN CARTEL - IMPACT • WORLD MARKET DIVIDED BY THE CARTEL DURING 90s • PRICE OVERCHARGE RESULTED • 90 COUNTRIES IMPORTED VITAMINS DURING 90s • DAMAGES • 10 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SUFFERED OVERCHARGE OF US $ 660 MILLION • INDIA SUFFERED US $ 25 MILLION • ALL 90 IMPORTING COUNTRIES IN THE AGGREGATE SUFFERED OVERCHARGE OF US $ 2700 MILLION Dr. S Chakravarthy

17. DAMAGES INFLICTED BY CARTELS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES • CARTELS IN HEAVY ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, STEEL AND ALUMINUM • DAMAGES • ZIMBABWE - US $ 44 MILLION • KENYA - US $ 34 MILLION • SOUTH AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION - US $ 270 MILLION Dr. S Chakravarthy

18. BID RIGGING BID RIGGING IS A HORIZONTAL AGREEMENT AND PER SE ILLEGAL. BID RIGGING MEANS ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN PERSONS OR ENTERPRISES, ENGAGED IN IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR PRODUCTION OR TRADING OF GOODS OR PROVISION OF SERVICES, WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING OR REDUCING COMPETITION FOR BIDS OR ADVERSELY AFFECTING OR MANIPULATING THE PROCESS FOR BIDDING. Dr. S Chakravarthy

19. MEDICAL OXYGEN SUPPLY – A BID - RIGGING CASE • FOUR FOREIGN COMPANIES, NAMELY, AIR LIQUIDE (FRANCE), PRAXAIR (US), AGA (GERMANY) AND INDURA (CHILE) WERE THE SUPPLIERS OF MEDICAL OXYGEN TO BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HOSPITALS IN ARGENTINA. • THESE COMPANIES FORMED A CARTEL AND ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT TO INDULGE IN BID RIGGING AND TO DISTRIBUTE AND DIVIDE CUSTOMERS AMONG THEMSELVES. • AS A RESULT OF BID RIGGING AND COLLUSION, HOSPITALS AND CONSUMERS WERE FORCED TO PAY HIGH PRICES. AND THE CARTEL MEMBERS ENJOYED ILLEGALLY HIGH PROFITS. • THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE FOUR COMPANIES PROSECUTED AND LEVIED WITH FINES AMOUNTING TO US $24 MILLION. Dr. S Chakravarthy

20. LIMITING PRODUCTION AND RESTRICTING TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW • SARABHAI M CHEMICALS PRIVATE LIMITED ENTERED INTO A TECHNOLOGICAL KNOW-HOW AGREEMENT WITH ITS OVERSEAS COLLABORATOR, E. MERCK A.G., PROVIDING FOR THE PROVISION OF KNOW-HOW BY MERCK TO SARABHAI. • THE KNOW-HOW WAS TO ENABLE SARABHAI TO MANUFACTURE PHARMACEUTICAL CHEMICALS, VITAMINS, INSECTICIDES ETC IN INDIA. • THE AGREEMENT STIPULATED THAT MERCK BY ITSELF OR ITS LICENSEES (LIKE SARABHAI) SHOULD NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY MANUFACTURE CERTAIN ITEMS (ABOUT 520 OUT OF 600 ITEMS) IN INDIA AND THAT MERCK WOULD BE FREE TO IMPORT INTO INDIA SUCH ITEMS AND SELL THE SAME. • SARABHAI’S REQUEST FOR TECHNOLOGICAL KNOW-HOW FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF CERTAIN PHARMACEUTICALS AND VITAMINS WAS TURNED DOWN BY MERCK. • THE MRTP COMMISSION HELD THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON COMPETITION BECAUSE OF THE DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE TECHNOLOGICAL KNOW–HOW AND WAS ALSO A BARRIER TO ENTRY TO OTHER INTENDING MANUFACTURERS. Dr. S Chakravarthy

21. MANUFACTURING CARTEL DIVIDING THE MARKET • THREE TIMKEN CORPORATIONS (AMERICAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH) MANUFACTURE ANTI-FRICTION BEARINGS. • THEY ALLOCATED TRADE TERRITORIES AMONG THEMSELVES AND COOPERATED WITH EACH OTHER IN FIXING PRICES, IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE OUTSIDE COMPETITION. • THE SUPREME COURT OBSERVED THAT THE DOMINANT PURPOSE OF THEIR ACTION IN CONCERT WAS TO AVOID ALL COMPETITION EITHER AMONG THEMSELVES OR WITH OTHERS. • THE COURT FURTHER RULED THAT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN LEGALLY SEPARATE PERSONS AND COMPANIES TO SUPPRESS COMPETITION AMONG THEMSELVES CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED AND THAT COLLUSIVE CONTROL OF THE TRADING OPERATION (ALLOCATIONS) WOULD ATTRACT COMPETITION LAW. Dr. S Chakravarthy

22. BOYCOTT TRENCHES COMPETITION LAW • KARNATAKA CHEMISTS AND DRUGGISTS ASSOCIATION (KCDA) IS A PHARMA TRADE ASSOCIATION IN BANGALORE. • THE ASSOCIATION ISSUED A CIRCULAR THAT NO DRUG MANUFACTURER COULD APPOINT A PERSON AS ITS STOCKIST/WHOLESALER WITHOUT OBTAINING A NO OBJECTION CERTIFICATE (NOC) FROM IT. KCDA PUBLISHED IN ITS CIRCULAR, A LIST OF AGENTS AFFILIATED TO IT AND REQUESTED ALL MANUFACTURERS TO APPOINT ONLY THOSE AS AGENTS. • FURTHERMORE, KCDA WAS MAKING FREQUENT AND RECURRENT BOYCOTT CALLS OF VARIOUS MANUFACTURERS CITING TRADE ISSUES WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION. • THE MATTER WAS TAKEN UP WITH THE MRTP COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION OBSERVED THAT BECAUSE OF THE INSISTENCE ON THE NOC BY KCDA, THE MANUFACTURERS WERE DEPRIVED OF THE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE THEIR DISTRIBUTION PARTNERS. THE CALL OF BOYCOTT BY KCDA OF ANY DEALER, IN ANY MANNER, WRITTEN OR ORAL, RESTRICTED COMPETITION AND THE PRACTICE WAS STOPPED BY KCDA. Dr. S Chakravarthy

23. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE – Dr. MILES’ CASE • DR. MILES MEDICAL COMPANY WAS A MANUFACTURER OF PROPRIETARY MEDICINES. • IT ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH ITS DISTRIBUTION AGENTS THAT THE MEDICINES SHOULD BE SOLD AT NOT LESS THAN THE PRICES INDICATED BY IT. LIKEWISE, IT ENTERED INTO AGREEMENTS WITH THE RETAILERS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT SELL AT PRICES LESS THAN THE FULL RETAIL PRICES AS PRINTED ON THE PACKAGES. • THESE AGREEMENTS WENT UP TO THE US SUPREME COURT. • THE COURT OBSERVED THAT THE SYSTEM OF INTERLOCKING RESTRICTIONS BY WHICH DR. MILES SOUGHT TO CONTROL THE PRICES AT WHICH ITS DISTRIBUTORS AND RETAILERS MAY SELL ITS MEDICINES WAS ELIMINATING COMPETITION AND THAT THE AGREEMENTS WERE IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. Dr. S Chakravarthy

24. CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS • HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS CAN HAVE POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE EFFECTS • WEIGH PRO AND ANTI COMPETITIVE EFFECTS TO ARRIVE AT A JUST CONCLUSION • VERTICAL AGREEMENTS ARE NOT AS SERIOUS AS HORIZONTAL ONES • HERE TOO WEIGH PRO AND ANTI- COMPETITIVE EFFECTS TO ARRIVE AT A JUST CONCLUSION Dr. S Chakravarthy

25. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE “PARADOXICALLY, THE ENDURING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY LIE INCREASINGLY IN LOCAL THINGS – KNOWLEDGE, RELATIONSHIPS AND MOTIVATION THAT DISTANT RIVALS CANNOT MATCH.” MICHAEL E. PORTER Dr. S Chakravarthy

26. THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND ATTENTION Dr. S Chakravarthy