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CALEA: one university view

CALEA: one university view. Terry Gray University of Washington Agora Meeting 2 December 2005. Important Safety Tip #1. I'm just a techie. But… Here we are at the intersection of “IT” and “policy”. University Environment.

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CALEA: one university view

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  1. CALEA: one university view Terry Gray University of Washington Agora Meeting 2 December 2005

  2. Important Safety Tip #1 • I'm just a techie. But… • Here we are at the intersection of “IT” and “policy”

  3. University Environment • Like any $2B/yr enterprise, except we have hospitals, classified research, students… • Aggressively decentralized • Trickle-down technology • Extreme net/computing diversity • Approx 100K devices on net • Multiple high-speed research nets • Global initiatives, e.g. ResearchChannel

  4. Status Quo • Subpoenas received • Subpoenas complied with • Fairly rare • What’s the problem?

  5. CALEA Issues • Who will be affected? • What will be required? • Will it work? • Cost? • Impact on operations? • Impact on users? • Does it make sense?

  6. Worst Case Scenario • Real-time wiretap of any UW traffic • Even if it doesn’t go thru a router • Even if carried on >10Gbps link • Wiretap by user identity, not just IP address • HUGE impact on users • HUGE impact on network managers • Wiretrap trigger by application behavior • As per wireline rules, e.g. notify when “phone rings” • Immense performance and Ops issues

  7. Reality Check: will it work? • For dumb criminals, but not even all of them • 62% of outbound dorm traffic = Skype • All encrypted • Is it file sharing, voice, video, or ???

  8. Technical Limitations on Wiretapping • Encryption • Technology is always a 2-edged sword • Very high-speed networks • Consider SC05 scenario • VOIP • Lots of flavors; can be hard to identify • Wireless • Anonymous hot-spot access

  9. Cost • Depends totally on final rules! • Potentially huge… (millions of $$) • Replacement of all switches/routers • Network admission control SW/ops • 40G/s routers with dynamic port mirroring? • Significant non-economic costs • Inconvenience of additional network login • Impact on innovation e.g. ultra-high-speed comm

  10. Winners • Equipment vendors: Cisco, Juniper, ... • Common carriers: shift/share burden • LE: Easier to catch dumb criminals

  11. Losers • Users (NAC inconvenience and indirect costs) • Institutions (cost of unfunded mandate) • LE • less effective than hoped • risk of changing criminal behavior -badly • risk of backlash from public against LE

  12. Important Safety Tip #2 • Fear trumps reason • People don’t always make best decisions when they feel threatened • This goes doubly for policy makers • NB: this is not an official UW observation 

  13. Summary • We all want to be safe • LE has a really tough job • Balancing societal needs is hard, esp. post 9/11 • Cost-benefit of proposed rules is dubious • Impact unknowable until details decided

  14. Postscript: notes from the panel • NB: UW does support/cooperate with LE! • NB: CALEA doesn’t change when LE can tap • Distinguish CALEA from PATRIOT issues • At issue: reasonableness of implementation requirements --cost/benefit • “Timeliness” is a key factor in cost: • Do we need to pre-provision for instant response to any possible request? Or is on-demand provisioning satisfactory?

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