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Topic 3 Fisheries Management Part 1 Theory

Coastal Fisheries Policy and Planning Course, 28/01/08 – 8/02/08, Apia, Samoa. Topic 3 Fisheries Management Part 1 Theory. Lecture Notes By Ragnar Arnason. Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Orientation. Have completed: Policy: What is it and how to formulate it

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Topic 3 Fisheries Management Part 1 Theory

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  1. Coastal Fisheries Policy and Planning Course, 28/01/08 – 8/02/08, Apia, Samoa Topic 3Fisheries Management Part 1 Theory Lecture Notes By Ragnar Arnason Secretariat of the Pacific Community

  2. Orientation • Have completed: • Policy: What is it and how to formulate it • Legal framework: Constraints and obligations • Fundamental elements of fisheries economics • Today (and for the rest of the course): • Fisheries management and its application to the South Pacific fisheries • Begin by basic fisheries management theory

  3. Lecture 1Fisheries Management: Introduction • The institutional framework under which the fishing activity operates • This may be set by (a) Social custom and tradition (b) The government (the fisheries authority) (c) The association of fishermen (d) Other means • It may be explicit or implicit

  4. An appropriate FMR • Without an appropriate FMS, no long term profits • With an approirpirate FMS realtively high profits $ Poor management Effort Good management

  5. Fisheries management system, FMS Monitoring, control & surveillance, MCS Fisheries judicial system, FJS FMR: Main components • All links in the same chain • Interdependent • Each must be designed w.r.t. the others

  6. Methods for Fisheries Management:Fisheries Management Systems Biological fisheries management Economic fisheries management Direct Indirect Taxes Property rights

  7. Equations • Sustainable fisheries model G(x)-y = y = Y(e,x) = ex c = C(e) = c e2 • Dynamic fisheries model

  8. Lecture 2.ABiological Fisheries Management • Purpose: Increase the biological yield of the resource • Methods: Protect young fish, spawners and habitat • Common measures • TAC • Area closures • Seasonal closures • Gear restrictions • Pollution restrictions

  9. Biological Fisheries Management: Effects The Sustainable Fisheries Model The Dynamic Fisheries Model Loss Profits Value, $ Effort, e OSY OSY CSY CSY Effort, e Biomass, x • So, little or no long term gains • Gains along adjustment path • Note also the cost of management

  10. Lecture 2.BDirect Economic Restrictions • Purpose: Enhance the economic yield from the resource • Method: Constrain fishing effort and capital • Common measures: • Limited fishing effort (days at sea, fishing etc.) • Capital restrictions (vessel size, power, shape, type, equipment) • Investment restrictions • Gear restrictions (number, size, type)

  11. Direct Economic Restrictions: Effects The Sustainable Fisheries Model The Dynamic Fisheries Model Loss Profits Value, $ Effort, e OSY OSY CSY Effort, e =CSY Biomass, x • So, little or no long term gains • Losses along adjustment path • Note distortive effect • Note also the cost of management

  12. Lecture 3Taxation • Purpose: Obtain economic rents • Method: Induce industry to reduce effort (in a wide sense) by making it less profitable • Variants: • Tax on the volume of landings • Tax on the value of landings • Tax on inputs [Not recommended because of substitution effects] Note: Nowhere used as a fisheries management method

  13. Effects of Taxes (on landings) The Sustainable Fisheries Model The Dynamic Fisheries Model Loss Profits Value, $ Effort, e Tax OSY = CSY CSY Effort, e Biomass, x • So, Long term gains equal to taxation revenue • Private losses along adjustment path • Remember the cost of management

  14. Lecture 4Property Rights • Purpose: Obtain economic rents • Method: reduce or eliminate the common property externality => private incentives coincide with public objectives • Variants: • Licences • Sole ownership • Turfs • IQs/ITQs • Communal property rights

  15. The Sustainable Fisheries Model The Dynamic Fisheries Model . e=0 Effort, e Competitive Property right value Optimal . x= 0 OSY CSY Effort, e Biomass, x Property Rights Regimes: Effects Value, $ • So, long term gains equal to property right value • Private gains along adjustment path • Remember the cost of management

  16. Property Rights (cont.) • The above theory applies to all property rights regimes • Sole owner rights • Territorial use rights (TURFS) • Individual Quotas • Community rights • However, the efficiency of the regime depends on the quality of the rights • The higher the quality of the property right the more efficient the fishery

  17. Quality of Property Rights • Many important attributes • The following are often quoted • Quality of Title (security) • Exclusivity • Permanence (durability) • Transferability

  18. Property Rights Attributes:A Representation Exclusivity Security Permanence Transferability

  19. Actual property right Perfect property right Exclusivity Security Permanence Transferability

  20. Exclusivity 1 Norway 1 Security Permanence 1 Iceland New Zealand 1 Transferability Some ITQ property rights

  21. Q-measures of property rights Q

  22. Results of three ITQ systems

  23. Lecture 5ITQ-systems • Shares in TAC(much superior to quantity quotas) • Annual quota for firm i: q(i)=a(i)TAC • The q(i), being a property right, will be fished in the most efficient manner • If the a(i) is a permanent asset the firm can plan and will adjust its capital structure to fit. • Nota Bene: The ITQ is not a property right in what really counts; the fish stocks themselves. • Unlike e.g. a farm property right • No stock enhancement, genetic improvements, feeding, spawning assistance etc. will be undertaken by individual ITQ holders

  24. ITQ markets and prices • There will arise a market and a price for both q(i) and a(i). (Why?) • These prices will faithfully reflect the marginal benefits of using (and holding) these quotas. (Why?) • Price of q(i) will be approximately marginal variable costs of using these annual quotas. (Why?) • Price of a(i) will approximately equal the expected present value of using the expected quotas for fishing. (Just as the value of any productive asset) • It follows that the price of a(i) will provide a measure of the appropriateness of the TAC-policy.

  25. Fisheries management under ITQs • The fisheries authority just has to • Set the TAC • Enforce the property rights • But setting the TAC correctly requires immense biological and economic information. (Basically everything about the fishery)

  26. Quota values, resource rents Total allowable catch, TAC Minimum information management, MIMS

  27. Total Quota, TAC Negative (i.e., stock enhancement) Quota price Positive (i.e., fishery) Unprofitable stock enhancement (subsidized releases) Unprofitable fishery (subsidized removal of predators/competitors) Negative Profitable stock enhancement (ocean ranching) Profitable fishery (Commercial fishery) Positive MIMS in the multispecies Context

  28. Lecture 6Community fishing rights Setting: A group of people (N1) with property rights => they have a degree of common interest.

  29. Can they manage themselves well? • N=1, easy • N>1, more difficult => need to bargain, negotiate etc. • Fundamentally a bargaining game • Nature of problem: • Must agree on procedures (voting, majority etc.) • Must talk • Must reach a conclusion • Some formal framework (legal) may help

  30. Available theorems • If each group member’s benefits increase with total benefits he will support the common good. • That happens e.g. in limited companies (i.e. in principle)

  31. Advantages of self-management • Vested interest in good management => (a) Good decisions (b) Minimum cost management • Have much of the best information • The government does not have to be involved

  32. Fisheries management systems:Summary • Only indirect economic methods work • The most promising are: • Property rights • Sole ownership • Turfs (where applicable) • ITQs (where applicable) • Communal rights • Taxes • Taxes on landings • Taxes on the value of landings

  33. Lecture 7Monitoring, Control and Surveillance • Data monitoring (monitoring and surveillance) • Gather data on the fishery and fishery operations for the purpose of management (landings, days at sea, fishing costs etc.) • Enforcement monitoring (monitoring and control) • Detect violations of fishery rules • Induce correct behaviour • Reporting violations (citing)

  34. Data gathering monitoring 1. Biological monitoring (for biological research, stock assessment etc.) • Examination of landed catch • Records of fishing behaviour (location, timing, gear, log-books, observers) • Field trips on research vessels, • Oceanographic research • Climate research • Modelling and prediction • These activities are usually shared between the marine research agency and the enforcement agency

  35. 2. Economic monitoring (economic research, costs and prices) • Study of fishing company accounts, • prices, • technology • fleet developments • fishing effort by gear and vessel type • harvesting functions, • cost functions • These activities are usually carried out by an economic or fisheries economics research agency

  36. The economic monitoring is a very important function. • Without it: (a) the TAC and other management measures cannot be set optimally. (b) Progress in fisheries management cannot be judged. • Nevertheless, this function is often underdeveloped compared to the biological research function. • Best carried out by a special office or institute Note: With fisheries self-management centralized data monitoring is no longer necessary

  37. Enforcement monitoring • Different fisheries management systems employ different controls. => Different enforcement monitoring is needed for different fishereis management systems

  38. 1. Biological fisheries management TAC: monitoring of landings (at landing sites) and catch (at sea) Area restrictions: monitoring of fishing locations (at sea, remote sensing, log books, black boxes) Seasonal closures: monitoring of vessels in ports, monitoring of vessels at sea (observation, remote, log books), monitoring of landings (off season species in the catch) etc. Gear restrictions: monitoring of gear (at sea and on land) Fish size restrictions: monitoring of landings and catch

  39. 2. Direct economic restrictions Effort restrictions: monitor effort (days at sea, fishing time, vessel size and power, gear size etc.) Investment restrictions: monitor investments (vessel registry, vessel inspection, shipyards, import level, equipment certification) Vessel size and power restrictions: (see investment restrictions) Gear restrictions: (see biological fisheries management) Other restrictions: monitoring depends on the type of restriction

  40. 3. Taxes Taxes on the volume of landings: monitor landings Taxes on the value of landings: monitor volume and price of landings Taxes on inputs: monitor the purchase and use of inputs. Tax on exports: Is it a good idea? May be in some cases.

  41. 4. Property rights Licences: monitor fleets, check for licences (mostly in port) Sole ownership: not much monitoring is needed. (The owner will do it himself) Turfs: usually not much monitoring is needed. (The adjacent owners will do it themselves) Individual quotas: monitor catches (as landings in ports or (better) as harvests at sea or as volume in processing and trades; impose periodic (daily) harvest reporting requirements) Community or group rights: monitor adherence to the rights (areas, quotas etc.)

  42. Note very well! • The effort to monitor the various restrictions varies a great deal and, consequently the cost as well. • Taxes on landings and some property rights systems (sole ownerships and turfs) are probably the easiest to monitor

  43. Lecture 8The cost of MCS • Very significant • Available estimates suggests between 3-25% of the gross value of landings (with a mean of some 8%). • The most important cost items are: (i) Biological research (ii) Enforcement • This high cost should affect: • The optimal fisheries policy • The choice of a fisheries management system

  44. MCS costs Ecomp Effort MCS costs(especially enforcement)

  45. Impact of MCS costs on the optimal fisheries policy Costs with MCS Costs without MCS E* E** Effort

  46. Costs with MCS Costs without MCS E* E** Effort Impact of MCS costs on the optimal fisheries policy-Very high management costs-

  47. Optimizing the MCS activity • High costs => important to do MCS correctly and efficiently • The problem is to minimize MCS costs subject to a desired level of MCS • Note that there is a trade of between MCS costs and management regime effectiveness (The more MCS => the higher MCS costs => the more effective the FMR)

  48. The optimal MCS level $ Marginal cost Marginal benefits MCS* MCS activity

  49. So to determine the optimal MCS we need: • An estimate of the MCS cost function (marginal costs) • An estimate of the benefits of MCS (marginal benefits) These may be difficult to obtain!

  50. Monitoring and enforcement technology • At land and on sea • Dockside monitoring • On-board observers • MCS vessels and airplanes • Remote sensing (satellite, radar, reporting) • Automatic recordings (black boxes) • The paper trail method • Optimal investment in MCS technology (cost-benefit studies)

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