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Topic 6 Community Fisheries Management Part 1

Coastal Fisheries Policy and Planning Course, 28/01/08 – 8/02/08, Apia, Samoa. Topic 6 Community Fisheries Management Part 1. Notes By Ragnar Arnason. Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Organization. Background Community Fishing Rights Co-management and community management

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Topic 6 Community Fisheries Management Part 1

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  1. Coastal Fisheries Policy and Planning Course, 28/01/08 – 8/02/08, Apia, Samoa Topic 6Community Fisheries ManagementPart 1 Notes By RagnarArnason Secretariat of the Pacific Community

  2. Organization • Background • Community Fishing Rights • Co-management and community management • What are community fishing rights and why might they work? • Community fishing rights around the world • Community Fisheries management as a bargaining game • Community Fishing Rights: Design Principles • Assumptions • Propositions: Design principles • Community Fishing Rights: Practical implementation

  3. I. Background

  4. The Fisheries Problem • Fisheries are subject to well known problems of economic inefficiency • The common property problem excessive fishing effort, fleets and no net benefits • Fisheries management is needed ! • Research has determined two classes of management methods that can work • (i) Property rights regimes (widely applied) • (ii) Taxes (apparently not been applied)

  5. Key Property Rights Systems • Sole ownership • TURFs • IQs and ITQs • Community rights Note: First three are individual rights but the fourth is a collective right

  6. So, basically, individual property rights work! Experience • Sole ownership is extremely rare – but works! • TURFs more common - work! • IQs fairly common - work to a degree • ITQs becoming increasingly common (over 10% of the global catch is taken under ITQs) - work!

  7. Unfortunately:Individual property rights cannot be applied to all fisheries • Sole ownership • Socio-political problems • TURFs • Technical problems (exclusivity) • ITQs • Technical problems (enforcement) • Socio-political problems

  8. Therefore attention has been drawn tocollective property rights in particular..... Community fishing rights

  9. II. Community Fishing Rights

  10. What arecommunity fishing rights? • Fishing rights granted collectively to a group of agents • These rights constitute a property right • It gives the group the authority to • Defend these rights against outsiders • Conduct internal fisheries management Note 1: Limited community rights imply co-management Note 2: Community fishing rights do not constitute a fisheries management system

  11. Co-management Government 100% 100% Community Self- management Government/community power sharing

  12. Forms of co-management • Information flow • Communication (two way exhanges) • Consultation (listen to advice) • Cooperation (joint effort) • Partnership (formalized joint effort)

  13. Another common diagram

  14. Community Fishing rights: Rationale • Enhances economic efficiency in fishing • Fisheries management • Enforcement • Socio-politically more appropriate • More in accordance with tradition - natural • More fair - communities can control their own destiny • Politically expedient • Relieves the government of a difficult problem

  15. Why should community fishing rights promote efficiency? • In fisheries management • Better information • More appropriate incentives • In fisheries enforcement • Better information • More appropriate incentives • More powerful sanctions

  16. Community fishing rights in the world(Based i.a. on Willmann 2000 & Wilen et al 2007) • Widely found around the world • Both in large scale and small scale fisheries • More common in small scale, inshore fisheries • More common in inland than ocean fisheries • Global importance in marine fisheries not great • Important in Japan, Chile & some Pacific islands • Usually based on TURFS (in some form) • Area, bays, lagoons, fish aggregating devices, artificial reefs... • Sometimes based on community catch quotas • Collective quota rights

  17. Community fishing rights in the world (….cont.) • Turf-based community rights: • Japan inshore fisheries, Pacific island lagoon/reef fisheries • Community rights based on catch quotas: • Europe’s POs (including Shetland’s), Alaska’s community development quotas • Community rights based on both catch quotas and TURFs • Chilean inshore fisheries

  18. Community fishing rights in the world (….cont.) • Usually the community property rights are not very high quality • Not long lasting, not very exclusive, not very secure • Usually a degree of co-management with government (rather than pure self-management) • Power sharing, consultation, information etc. • Why not more common? • National governments have usurped power • Communities are undermined by technological progress • Transaction costs (difficult to organize and run) • Have not been very successful?

  19. The experience • Empirical: • Lots of evidence – But poorly organized and analysed • Primarily anthropological and social evidence (not very hard data) • Mixed outcomes – some fairly good, some worse (Note: Tend not to observe the really bad ones) • Experimental (in the laboratory): • Mixed outcomes

  20. So: Outcomes of community fisheries management seem to depend very much on the particular situation Why?

  21. III. Community Fisheries Management as a Bargaining Game

  22. Analytic Framework:Assumptions A-1 The community consists of a finite number of members, I. (May vary over time) A-2 Community members differ w.r.t. (i) Utility functions (preferences) (ii) Opportunity sets (abilities) A-3 Each member is only concerned with his own utility

  23. Assumptions (cont.) A-4 The fisheries policy consists of allocating harvesting rights and/or benefits to members A-5 The community decides and enforces fisheries policy

  24. Proposition Members of the fishing community will generally disagree about the optimal fisheries policy. • They are not identical (different fishers (benefit functions) and other types of community members) •  They will generally want different fisheries policies Implications: Members find themselves playing a game. This game is a positive sumbargaining game How the game is played depends on the rules

  25. So: Crucial to adopt the appropriate community design ! ….to facilitate a good outcome

  26. IV. Design Principles Conditions that contribute to efficient community fisheries management

  27. High quality property right • Security • Exclusivity • Permanence • Transferability Property rights attributes [0,1] High quality  Each attribute close to 1

  28. Exclusivity Security Permanence Actual property right Perfect property right Transferability Perfect and actual property rights

  29. Efficiency 1 1 Quality of property right Theorem The lower the value of the property right the less efficient is the associated economic activity Community property rights should be as high quality as possible!

  30. Closed Shop The community must be able to restrict new entry .....otherwise, the common property problem simply re-emerges Note 1. Necessary but not sufficient Note 2. Does not exclude new membership

  31. Closed Shop Theorem If new members can join the community, they will do so whenever the community income exceeds the alternative Community must be able to control new entry

  32. Inclusive membership This means: • No outsiders at the beginning • No-one can leave to become an independent operator in the fishery (I.e. no-one can operate outside the community rules)

  33. Theorem If community management is successful, individual fishers will benefit from opting-out of the group rule - provided they can do so with impunity Fisheries communities should be inclusive

  34. Homogeneous membership Theorem If fishing community members are not identical, bargaining will not lead to the most efficient fishery - unless (perhaps) benefits are transferable

  35. This implies: • The composition of the fisheries community should be as homogeneous as possible • I should only include fishermen – not other professions or interests • It should preferably only include owners of fishing capital – not fishing labour

  36. Pay-offs as shares • Theorem • If fishing community members receive benefits that are increasing in aggregate benefits • (1) The bargaining solution is efficient! (2) The competitive solution is efficient!

  37. This suggests If at all possible, the fishing community should be set up so that each member’s benefits are an increasing function of aggregate benefits Note (1) Limited companies have this property (2) Within-community ITQs have this propety

  38. Fishing CommunityPractical design guidance- Summary - • The community rights should be as high quality as possible • The community must be able to restrict entry • The community should be inclusive – i.e. include all fishers in the area • The community should have as homogeneous membership as possible • Each member’s pay-off should be increasing in the aggregate pay-off

  39. V.Practical Implementation

  40. Build political support Legislation Negotiation Information Technical guidance Decision making framework Right of veto Access to expertise Access to temporary funding (GFRF?) Evolution of relationship (turn back?) Certain key items

  41. Basic Flowchart(Community management unit from scratch) Political support Legislation Rights and obli-gations of parties Negotiation Implementation plan Contract

  42. Basic Flowchart(Community management in the South Pacific) Political support Very high Legislation Sometimes Rights and obli-gations of parties Negotiation Considerable Implementation plan Contract Some

  43. Step 1Build Political Support • Form proposal • Consultation • Government (by levels), community leaders, fishers, fisheries authorities etc.) • Key decision makers • Revise proposal • Reach agreement (Plan of Action)

  44. Step 2Legislation(or equivalent) • Legal framework for community fishing rights • Important to do it well • Basis for everything that follows • Content • Government grants certain rights to communities on certain conditions

  45. Step 3Negotiation(or equivalent) • Negotiation with “interested” communities • May have to generate interest • This leads to a contract containing the following • Rights and obligations of the community • Rights and obligations of the government (fishery authority) • Development of an implementation plan • Financing plan

  46. Rights and obligations of community • TURFS / Quotas • Quality of these rights • Rules for membership • Rules for decision-making • Consultation obligations

  47. Rights and obligations of government • Many possibilities • Rights of consultation • Rights to veto certain plans • Obligation to provide expertise • Obligation to provide finance • Obligation to provide training • Obligation to provide other assistance

  48. Implementation plan • Essentially just another plan • Can be very complicated • Normally developed in close cooperation between the community, authorities and experts • A few general rules apply • Information needs to be provided • Training needs to be supplied • The financing aspects need to be dealt with

  49. Evolution and dynamics • The contract and the management structure may need to be adjusted over time. • Provisions to meet this eventuality should be built into the contract • Be careful not to diminish the property right in this way.

  50. End

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