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The Many Dilemmas of Corruption: Building Trust, Guiding Reform. Michael Johnston Colgate University Hamilton, New York mjohnston@colgate.edu 8 May 2013. Choosing targets, tracking reform. Are we making progress, or doing harm? Are we having any effect at all?
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The Many Dilemmas of Corruption:Building Trust, Guiding Reform Michael Johnston Colgate University Hamilton, New York mjohnston@colgate.edu 8 May 2013
Choosing targets, tracking reform • Are we making progress, or doing harm? • Are we having any effect at all? • What are the most critical targets? • Can we show citizens reform is real? • All pose problems of measurement and assessment…
Behind the index numbers… • What does “a high level of corruption” mean? • The one-number problem • Tracking change…? • Developing societies’ scores can suffer from corruption originating elsewhere • Low-corruption societies: sustaining factors are not what got them there • One-dimensional indices treat corruption as the same thing everywhere…
Contrasting syndromes of corruption? Influence Markets strong institutions, mature markets and democracy Elite Cartels moderately strong institutions, gradually liberalizing markets and politics Oligarchs and Clans very weak institutions, rapidly liberalizing markets and politics Official Moguls very weak institutions, political power personalized, liberalizing markets
Influence markets… • Private interests buy influence within well-institutionalized public agencies; parties and politicians often are intermediaries trading in access • Examples: USA, Japan, Germany…
Elite Cartels… • Networks of elites in collusion, staving off rising political, economic competition • Examples: Italy, Botswana, Korea…
Oligarchs and Clans… • In a setting of insecurity and weak institutions, oligarchs and followers feed on both the public and private sectors, using violence to protect their gains • Examples: Russia, The Philippines, and (recently) Mexico
Official Moguls… • Top figures, their power both personal and official, engage in corruption with impunity, channel benefits to selves and favorites • Examples: China, Indonesia, Kenya…
The evolving agenda of reform… Official moguls: increase pluralism, open up safe political, economic space Oligarchs and clans: open up safe space, supporting reform activism Elite cartels: supporting reform activism, open up safe space Influence markets: maintaining accountability, supporting reform activism
Ends versus means: Collective action problems are serious Instead of devising grand strategies and seeking citizen support Implement reforms helping citizens defend themselves by political means Close the loop: show citizens that reforms build fairness, better quality of life
Indicators and benchmarks… • How effectively does government perform basic tasks? • Build public support, allow effective leaders to take credit • Are easily understood, inexpensive to gather, and can be “actionable” • Are institution-building in their own right • Can squeeze out the scope for corruption • But open to opposition, misuse…
Broader issues to track: • Expectations and trust • Capital flight, levels of conflict/confidence • Depth and breadth of economic development • Depth and breadth of citizen participation • Efficiency, credibility of anti-corruption agencies • Citizen “report cards” on government • Civil society evaluates services, works with leaders, sees results • “Crowdsourcing” for data
Make haste slowly… • First, do no harm; then, build trust • Fight corruption indirectly, over long term • Build institutions as a foundation for liberalization; build trust through services • Consider kinds of corruption – not just more/less • Know what not to do • Halfway measures can be valuable • Reform systems, notjust cases, offenders