OLIVIER SALVI, FRANÇOIS FONTAINE, BRUNO DEBRAY contact : olivier.salvi@ineris.fr

1. SRA-Europe, 15th Annual Conference, Ljubljana (SI) ADAPTATION OF THE ARAMIS METHODOLOGY TO INTEGRATE THE SECURITY OF HAZARDOUS INSTALLATIONS AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES OLIVIER SALVI, FRANÇOIS FONTAINE, BRUNO DEBRAYcontact : olivier.salvi@ineris.fr

2. Emergence of new risks: Malevolent on chemical sites E.g: Cellatex - Givet – France, July 2000 • After the selling off of the CELLATEX plant, 153 laid off employees stop the production and demonstrate in the plant on 5 July 2000... • During the night, 4 fires started in the buildings. In the plant, 4 tons of carbon sulphide, 90 tons of soda, and 50000 L of sulphuric acid.On 10 July, the employees threatened to destroy the plant if their claims are not satisfied...500 neighbours are evacuated...

3. Malevolent on chemical sites E.g: Socatrem - Reims – France, March 2001 • …« Les 147 salariés d’une cartonnerie, en liquidation depuis le 6 mars, sans proposition concrète de repreneur, tentent de se faire entendre par le biais de manifestations ponctuelles. Hier, ils sont passés à la vitesse supérieure et ont menacé de faire sauter leur usine...  • ...En ligne de mire, 2 barils de 200 litres de méthyléthylcétone. Il s’agit d’un liquide particulièrement dangereux. Explosif, incendiaire et asphyxiant...Un feu est allumé à proximité des deux barils... » (l’Union du 12 avril 2001)

4. Malevolent on chemical sites Daewoo - Mont Saint Martin - France, January 2003 • Difficult social climate (Company liquidation) • 2 January, 2003 - threat on chemical storage • 23 January, 2003 - fire on site caused by malevolent Report – All establishments were covered by the Seveso Directive or by specific environmental regulations

5. Emergence of new risks: Attacks on chemical sites or on transportation of dangerous goods • USS Cole – Yemen - 2000 • Limburg – Yemen - 2002 • Baqiq Oil Refinery - Saudi Arabia - February 24, 2006  Necessity to develop adapted methodologies and tools

6. And now ? • New French regulation (Decree n° 2006-212 of February 23, 2006 related to the security of Critical Infrastructures (« secteurs d’activités d’importance vitale »)  • Necessity to carry out a risk analysis by activities sector (e.g. chemical sites, marshalling yards etc.) • Operators must establish an “Operator Security Plan” • Public Authorities have to establish an “External Security Plan” • How to integrate security aspects ? Information on risk assessment already exists for most of these critical infrastructure.

7. Experience feedback Hazard Identification Risk Assessment Lessons learned from past accidents Risk Analysis Investigations Consequences Assessment Recovery Intervention Prevention Measures Preparedness (exercises) Response Prevention Mitigation Measures Emergency Planning 1st layer of risk knowledge: the Major Hazards Control Approach(accidental risks)

8. Threat Assessment Knowledge Management Experience feedback Better Hazard Identification Risk Assessment Lessons learned from past events Threat Analysis (modus operandi) Investigations Consequences Assessment Recovery Intervention Prevention Measures Preparedness (exercises) Countermeasures Prevention Prevention CBRN Response Response Mitigation Measures Emergency Planning 2nd layer of risk knowledge (security) to develop a global approach including risks and threats

9. New Dedicated methodologies for Security: • American Chemistry Council, ACC (2001). Site security guidelines for the US chemical industry • CCPS, (2002) Guidelines for Analysing and Managing the security vulnerabilities of fixed chemical sites • American Petroleum Institute, API (2003). Security guidelines for the petroleum industry • European Initiatives (Germany, Austria, The Netherlands) • … or • Adaptation of the ARAMIS methodology

10. Risk severity Consequence Safety culture Number of vulnerable targets Characteristics of the Critical event = Substances involved, amount, rate F(initiating event) Efficiency of the SMS Efficiency of the safety barriers Frequency  Severity  Vulnerability Principles of the ARAMIS methodology Risk = Frequency  Intensity  Vulnerability

11. Principles of the methodology – 6 major steps • Identification of major accident hazards • Identification of the safety barriers and assessment of their performances • Evaluation of safety management efficiency to barrier reliability • Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios • Assessment and mapping of the risk severity of reference scenarios • Evaluation and mapping of the vulnerability of the plant’s surroundings

12. Identify all hazardous equipments MIMAH MIRAS Collect data about frequencies Select pertinent hazardous equipments Associate CE to each equipment Estimate frequencies of CE from generic data Calculate frequencies of CE from the fault trees Build fault trees Build event trees Calculate frequencies of Dangerous phenomena Estimate the class of consequences of the DP Build bow ties Use risk matrix to define the RAS Identify safety barriers Propose new barriers Define the level of confidence of safety barriers Vulnerability Severity Set a risk reduction goal Estimate the risk reduction Define the study area Classify the barriers Calculate the consequences of the RAS Divide the study area into meshes Select the barriers for audit Calculate severity for each CE and each DP for each mesh Identify the targets Audit delivery systems Audit safety culture Quantify the targets Aggregate all the severities into a global severity index for each mesh Calculate operational LC Calculate the vulnerability for each mesh Management Safety Culture Estimate risk reduction Draw the severity map Draw the vulnerability map Establish the complete set of scenarios Initial ARAMIS methodology

13. UE ME DDC and DP CuE ME SCE TCE DC or UE DP ME DDC or UE NSC TCE DP ME UE SCE DDC or ME UE TCE DP DC or ME UE DDC and UE ARAMIS : a bow-tie approach CE Critical Event Event Tree Fault Tree

14. UE ME DDC and DP UE ME SCE TCE DC or UE DP ME DDC or UE NSC TCE DP ME UE SCE DDC or ME UE TCE DP DC or ME UE DDC and UE ARAMIS : a bow-tie approach CE Safety barriers

15. Threat analysisUse analysis of past events Selection of malovelentscenarios

16. Specific security measures Verify if safety measures can benefit security

17. Not used : security is deterministic

18. Use the severity calculation methodology to rank the security scenarios

19. Vulnerability of the environment of the critical infrastructure is the same

20. Conclusion • Safety and security : Using the same approach improves consistency and efficiency of the analysis, and it saves resources • Benefits from ARAMIS • threat assessment : use MIMAH results to determine the hazard potential and the most sensitive installations • prevention and countermeasures : verify if countermeasures for safety can benefit for security • response : use the severity calculation • Complete ARAMIS with • scenarios of malevolent actions • specific security countermeasures • analysis of past events

21. Bibliography • User Guide to be downloaded : http://aramis.jrc.it • Special Issue of Journal of Hazardous Material • Outcomes of the ARAMIS project (Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for IndustrieS in the framework of SEVESO II directive), New stakes and opportunities in the control of major accident hazards. Vol. 130. • Salvi O., Debray B., 2006, A global view on ARAMIS, a risk assessment methodology for industries in the framework of the SEVESO II directive. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 2006, vol. 130, n° 3, pp. 187-199.

22. Acknowledgement • The work presented in this paper has been elaborated in the frame of the EU project ARAMIS “Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for IndustrieS”, co-ordinated by INERIS (F) and including EC-JRC-IPSC-MAHB (I), Faculté Polytechnique de Mons (B), Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (E), ARMINES (F), Risø National Laboratory (D), Universita di Roma (I), Central Mining Institute (PL), Delft University of Technology (NL), European Process Safety Centre (UK), École des Mines de Paris (F), École des Mines de Saint Etienne (F), École des Mines d’Alès (F), Technical University of Ostrava (CZ) and Jozef Stefan Institute (Si). • The project is co-funded under the Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development Programme in the 5th Framework Programme for Science Research and Technological Development of the European Commission.

23. Thank You for your attentionhttp://aramis.jrc.it