names, sense and reference ‘ Nick Clegg ’ (A) suppose the meaning of the name is the object

1. names, sense and reference ‘Nick Clegg’ (A) suppose the meaning of the name is the object knowing the meaning is knowing the object! Ep and met consequences of (A): • ‘Nick Clegg’ is not a name • what is a name? • what is involved in ‘knowing an object’? Russell’s answers to (i) – (iii)

2. Russell (i) ‘Nick Clegg’ not a name, it’s a description form: the so-and-so, e.g. ‘leader of Lib Dems’ = there is an F and there is only one F = x[Fx & y(Fy  y=x)] descriptions are disguised sentences! they are not referring expressions. (ii) real names: ‘this’ and ‘that’ (iii) knowing an object = acquaintance with it, names/pointing what makes an expression a name is the name users relation of acquaintance to the object Russell’s Cartesian epistemology meant he thought you couldn’t be acquainted with Nick Clegg. one further consequence of Russell’s view….

3. a small point about logic…. if naming requires acquaintance with sense-data, how do you argue? answer: ‘quickly’! Or, what sort of thing counts as a name in the schema: a is F a is G a is F and G we know that’s a schema for valid arguments, but what sorts of things go in the place marked ‘a’? answer: words used under continuing acquaintance. so what is said with ‘a is F’ (what is said by deploying the name ‘a’) turns on the continuance of the utterer’s relation of acquaintance with the object that is the bearer of the name. what you say with the name, depends on how you are related to things that’s a version of externalism

4. ‘Nick Clegg’ (B) suppose knowing the meaning is ‘having an idea’ Frege’s distinction between sense and reference: ‘George Orwell’ and ‘Eric Blair’ it’s rationally possible to assent to George Orwell wrote 1984 and dissent to Eric Blair wrote 1984 these two names have same reference, different sense sense = what you know that constitutes understanding the name - mode of presentation so • ‘Nick Clegg’ is a name • What’s the sense of ‘Nick Clegg’? • Is reference indirect?

5. sense – intuitive criterion of difference: ‘sentences S1 and S2 express different thoughts if it is rationally possible for someone to understand both and take different attitudes to them’ (Evans 1982, pp.18-19) sense is component of thought (sense of sentence) thought is what is said ‘George Orwell wrote 1984’ and ‘Eric Blair wrote 1984’ expresses different thoughts why? ‘cos thought (what is said) is required to make sense of behaviour. we explain behaviour in light of actor’s beliefs and desire, the content/thought of their beliefs and desires.

6. what’s the sense of ‘Nick Clegg’? what you know that enables you to understand what is said with ‘Nick Clegg is F’ but what is this knowledge? suppose you think: thoughts are characterisable independently of what they are about that’s a form of internalism sense = some knowledge that you can have whether or not the object exists what? Descriptive knowledge? but if Russell is right, how do you refer with a descriptive sense?!? there’s no ‘pointing’ back to where we started……

7. suppose for ‘Nick Clegg’ what you know is, ‘Nick Clegg’ refers to Nick Clegg that is not Russell’s idea that the meaning is the object, but it is Russellian, for it is a form of externalism but now, if what you know is sense and, if sense is thought then, the individuation of thought is externalist there are thoughts you cannot have without the existence of the object, for the very individuation of the component of thought that makes your thought of the object requires the object’s existence. thinking about Nick Clegg is relational!!!!!! compare, under what conditions does ‘Nick Clegg’ substitute for ‘a’ to make a valid argument in a is F a is G a is F & G when your use of ‘Nick Clegg’ involves an ongoing sustained relation to Nick Clegg. and how do we achieve that?.......