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School of Public Health. Outline. What is a consumer directed health plan?General introduction and preliminary research findingsTheory of consumer behaviorCDHP cost-sharing design creates a budget constraint with 2 kinks Contrast with ?standard' health insurance that uses coinsurance or deducti
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1. School of Public Health Comparing the Effectiveness of a Consumer Directed Health Plan with Traditional Cost Sharing in Controlling Medical Care Use and Cost Roger Feldman/Steve Parente
University of Zurich, Switzerland
June 21, 2006
2. School of Public Health Outline What is a consumer directed health plan?
General introduction and preliminary research findings
Theory of consumer behavior
CDHP cost-sharing design creates a budget constraint with 2 kinks
Contrast with standard health insurance that uses coinsurance or deductible
Determine expected effects on enrollee behavior
Empirical model and results
3. School of Public Health Classic CDHP Model Definity Health in Minneapolis
4. School of Public Health The Health Savings Account (HSA)
5. School of Public Health Who Chooses a CDHP? Strongest and most consistent conclusion: CDHPs are preferred by highly-paid employees (Parente, Feldman, and Christianson, 2004)
A large employer that offered a PPO and POS plan introduced Definity Health 2001:
38% of employees choosing Definity had income above the firms 75% percentile
19% of POS and 29% of PPO enrollees were above the 75th percentile of income
6. School of Public Health Do CDHPs ExperienceFavorable Selection? When the University of Minnesota offered a CDHP in 2002, there was no evidence of favorable selection (PFC, 2004)
In the large employer previously mentioned, CDHP enrollees had lower baseline illness burden than the PPO but about equal to the POS plan
In our largest sample of 80,000 covered lives in 3 employers, there is evidence of mild unfavorable selection against the CDHP
7. School of Public Health Potential HSA Take-up Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 lets individuals and employers contribute to tax-free health savings accounts up to the lesser of the deductible (at least $1,050 for an individual or $2,100 for a family) or a maximum set by law ($2,700 for a single person or $5,450 for a family)
2006 State of the Union (SOTU) proposes to eliminate all taxes on out-of-pocket spending through HSAs
Low-income families would be offered refundable tax credits to purchase health insurance policies with HSAs
We project that tax credits would increase HSA enrollment from 3 million to 7 million (Feldman, et al., 2005) with much of the increase coming from previously uninsured
8. School of Public Health Price-elasticity* of uninsured take-up with respect to HSA premium subsidy
9. School of Public Health CDHP Effects on Cost and Use Evidence is very preliminary, but it suggests that CDHPs with small gap between HRA and deductible do not control cost & use (PFC, 2004)
CDHP disadvantage is most striking for hospital cost versus POS cohort
CDHP pharmacy cost trend is most favorable
10. School of Public Health Hospital Costs 2000-2002
11. School of Public Health Why is Todays Talk Different? Our prior work simply compared costs or use for all enrollees in each cohort, e.g. did the CDHP cohort spend more on average than the PPO cohort?
This research recognizes that the effects may differ within the CDHP cohort
Key insight: CDHP creates a budget constraint with 2 kinks
Kinked budget constraint has different incentives for low vs. high users of services
12. School of Public Health The Kinked CDHP Budget Constraint
13. School of Public Health If I Only Lived One Year
14. School of Public Health Key Difference Between FSA and CDHP HRA lasts more than one year if you stay with the employer and HSA is owned by enrollee
Both versions of CDHP provide insurance against cost of possible serious illness in the future
Risk-averse, far-sighted consumers in good health may conserve medical care in a CDHP
15. School of Public Health Model (1): Basics 2 periods and 2 states of the word: good health and serious illness:
Known probability p that healthy consumer will become seriously ill next period
Fixed money income Y and employer contribution of C in each period
C1 can only be spend on medical care; C2 can be spent on medical care or goods
Insurance policy has deductible D and no coinsurance
16. School of Public Health Model (2): CDHP Equilibrium Healthy consumers objective function:
Solution involves finding optimal M2 given good health, then recursively choosing how much to save in the first period:
17. School of Public Health CDHP Equilibrium
18. School of Public Health Model (3): Deductible Plan Deductible plan (D-plan) has same F.O.C. but different equilibrium value of M1 compared with CDHP
Suppose the D-plan enrollee had the same value of M1 as the CDHP enrollee
That would imply equal H1? but less saving
Less saving implies a higher value of E(W2? )
That contradicts the F.O.C.
The D-plan enrollee cuts back M1 until H1? = E(W2? )
19. School of Public Health Model (4): Coinsurance plan Assume the coinsurance plan (C-plan) has c % coinsurance up to a maximum limit on out-of-pocket expenditure
At c = 1, the C-plan is identical to D-plan
At c = 0, medical care in the C-plan is free so there is no reason to conserve
The demand function is continuous, so there must be 0 < c* < 1 at which M1 in the C-plan and the CDHP are equal
20. School of Public Health Predicted Spending by Budget Region
21. School of Public Health Data Large employer added a CDHP to previously-offered PPO and POS Plans in 2001
Quasi-experimental pre/post design
We selected 3 cohorts of workers continuously employed from 2000-2003:
Always in PPO
Always in POS
PPO or POS in 2000, switched to CDHP in 2001 and stayed in CDHP 2002 and 2003
22. School of Public Health Plan Characteristics
23. School of Public Health Empirical Model Step 1 Predict employees 2000 spending region on the basis of cohort, contract-level, and employee demographic data
Cohort stands in for unmeasured variables that affect spending
Control for health status using indicators for 34 adjusted diagnostic groups (Starfield and Weiner, 1991)
24. School of Public Health 2000 Cost Model
25. School of Public Health Predicted 2000 Spending Regions by Cohort
26. School of Public Health 2001-2003 Cost Models We estimated 2-part models for total $, physician $, Rx $, and proportion of Rx $ on brand-name drugs
1st part = probit analysis of any $
2nd part = ln($ ? $>0)
Models include predicted region x Cohort
Will present key results
27. School of Public Health Total Expenditure
28. School of Public Health Physician Expenditure
29. School of Public Health Rx Expenditure
30. School of Public Health Brand Name Rx Proportion
31. School of Public Health Summary of Empirical Findings (1) CDHP enrollees predicted to be low spenders consistently spent less in following years than a comparison group with conventional cost sharing
This difference was found in all probit equations and for cases with positive total expenditure and Rx expenditure
This finding is striking because CDHP enrollees had no cost-sharing in this region
HRA account provides insurance against future expenses
32. School of Public Health Summary (2) CDHP enrollees predicted to be in Region 2 or 3 spent more than the comparison POS group
This finding is similar to our previous cohort study in 2001 and 2002 (PFC, 2004)
CHDP enrollees in Region 3 have used their accounts and face no cost-sharing at the margin ? no incentive to conserve on medical care
The maximum out-of-pocket limit is too low
Problem could be addressed by raising the limit and introducing modest coinsurance above the limit
33. School of Public Health Summary (3) Tiered pricing steers POS enrollees away from brand name prescription drugs
More results will be forthcoming (Parente, Feldman, and Song, 2006)
34. School of Public Health Final Thoughts Both CDHP and deductible plans represent return to demand side cost-sharing in US health care
Is consumer directed health care just deductible-lite?
Our models suggest that CDHP is welfare-inferior to deductible plan because it imposes an additional constraint on enrollee
But we ignored the tax subsidy for HRA