Informational models of consciousness and systematic descriptions of linguistic processes

1. Pavel N. Baryshnikov Pyatigorsk State Linguistic University 9 Kalinin Avenue, Pyatigorsk, 357500, Stavropol Region, Russia pnbaryshnikov@pglu.ru Informational models of consciousness and systematic descriptions of linguistic processes

2. Brief survey of key items • “Intellect” and non-formalizable human concepts; • Mathematics and brain activity; • Computability of Self-entity; • Problem of metalinguistic description; • “Too human” cognition in environment complexity (summary)

3. “Intellect” and non-formalizable human concepts • The theory of AI provokes some particular anthropological models of cognitive processes; The process of defining becomes quite problematic, as the word "intellect" has an anthropological "conceptual trail " in everyday language. According to this definition, only a human being may possess an "intellect" along with all the variety of non-formalized axiological and ethical contents. The idea of AI, which is capable of reproducing of the main functions of human consciousness on the basis of information processes. And we interpret the human cognition as informational procedure.

4. “Intellect” and non-formalizable human concepts The conclusion seems to be quite a paradox: our consciousness is able to take a metaposition towards its processes of logical, linguistic and behavioral acting, the artificial intellectual systems, in return, do not need it. Why? Because the machines don’t know about its own existence.

5. Mathematics and brain activity

6. Mathematics and brain activity • Human brain is not only a calculating processor working with the evolution programs, but also an open developing system connected to the source of these programs themselves.

7. Mathematics and brain activity At the same time, the result of consciousness activity is utterly unstable and is quite difficult to work with using formal analytical methods. Brain is a material carrier of countable physical processes and it is possible to study it through down to the limits of “fissility” of substance.

8. Mathematics and brain activity • In other words, within informational models of consciousness it is easier to study the influence of a wave of a certain length upon the photo-receptors with the further information transfer to the visual zone of a cerebral cortex than to take out of consciousness a subjective mental image or a “branching” linguistic concepts using complex metaphors.

9. Mathematics and brain activity • From the point of view of logical and mathematical methods there is a problem of non-recursiveness of the natural semantics, except the restrictions tied up to computability of the mental processes.

10. Mathematics and brain activity Computable structures were described and formalized long ago, but the laws which generate the given structures (according to the mentioned theorem of Gödel) are out of the limits of structures.

11. Mathematics and brain activity • There are some synthetic approaches (V. Nalimov) which propose to enter spontaneous filter (p(y/μ) in the Bayes' rule: • p(μ/y)= kp(μ) p(y/μ) • It contradicts the information nature itself because information transmits the strong ordered meaning.

12. Computability of Self-entity

13. Computability of Self-entity • The human capacity to self-consciousness isn’t model-based as the process of natural language because the semantic base of natural language is the unique system of token computation which mounts the Gödel’s ontological proof.

14. Computability of Self-entity • What does “self-entity” mean? “To experience the absolute is to experience the absence of self, person, entity, soul, essence, substance, presence. We realize very distinctly that the sense of the entity of the self is actually a result of holding different things together with some sort of glue. The glue is the concept of entity, giving the illusion of entityhood” The most striking property of natural language is the creating of infinite senses with limited syntax code plus possibility of description of proper referential procedures. What is this glue?

15. Computability of Self-entity • If there is a level of behavioral or communicative intention in the proposition system (saying the preposition meaning “x” I keep in mind “y”) it means that there is a metasubject of proposition. In the natural language the recipient interprets as a rule “senses” the true speaker’s intention with nonverbal code, cultural presupposition and enigmatic inference rules (semantic deduction).

16. Computability of Self-entity • Here we have a paradox: the referent of pronoun “I” has nothing in common with the person pronouncing it. Because saying “I” we intend something quite different than what we perceive as our “self”. But it is something that we feel our “self”, “encodes” the linguistic embodiment of pronominal referent. • And here the mathematical identity law is broken!

17. Problem of metalinguistic description There are technological possibilities of modeling of a natural signal and of its limited scope of meanings as well.

18. Problem of metalinguistic description • Bee-robot Linguistic behavior Polysemantics, interpretative communicative basis, opportunity of metadescription. Basis of a decoded bee dance, with signal formal models.

19. Problem of metalinguistic description • Theoretical and informational approach may decode the quantitative component of the signal system or levels of complexity of the system, but not the sense-creating procedures of consciousness capable of generating endless number of senses using a limited number of signs.

20. Problem of metalinguistic description

21. Summary and conclusions Complex non-formalizable functions of consciousness were reflected within linguistic sign and symbolical systems: • Introspection and self-entity; • Free sense-creating; • “Flinkering” sensesand “branched” concepts; • Forms of metadescription;

22. Summary and conclusions • Whether it is worth trying to reproduce these “too human” forms of cognition within artificial models?

23. Summary and conclusions Thank you for your attention!