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Religious Experience in Analytic Philosophy FFD Zagreb, 15-19 April 2013

Analytic Philosophy today “Religious experience” and its uses in argument Richard Swinburne: RE in the cumulative case argument Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” William P. Alston: RE as social doxastic practice Comparisons

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Religious Experience in Analytic Philosophy FFD Zagreb, 15-19 April 2013

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  1. Analytic Philosophy today “Religious experience” and its uses in argument Richard Swinburne: RE in the cumulative case argument Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” William P. Alston: RE as social doxastic practice Comparisons The framework and rationality criteria of RE Summary & discussion Religious Experience in Analytic PhilosophyFFD Zagreb, 15-19 April 2013 Prof.Dr.Dr. Winfried Löffler University of Innsbruck Department of Christian Philosophy Karl-Rahner-Platz 1 A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria winfried.loeffler@uibk.ac.at www.uibk.ac.at/philtheol/loeffler

  2. 1. Analytic Philosophy today • Analytic Philosophy: not a bundle of positions, rather a style of philosophizing: clarity, analysis of language, application of logic, structures of argument (Löffler 1994 & 2007) • 1930-1960’s: Strong anti-metaphysical, irreligious stream in Analytic Philosophy. Examples: • Russell: irrational, since not enough empirical evidence • Carnap & Vienna Circle: cognitively meaningless, since unverifiable • Popper & falsificationism: unfalsifiable, hence (at least) un-scientific • Reaction of many philosophers & theologians: religious claims are not cognitive, but rather expressions of feelings of life, moral commitments and/or ideals. Non-cognitivism, theological anti-realism • 1970’s till today: Return of analytic metaphysics & philosophy of religion. Cognitivism & theological realism • “New Atheism” (my lecture 2012) is (partly) a reaction to it…

  3. 2. “Religious experience” [RE] and its uses in argument • For many people, a central argument. For them, the rationality of belief stands & falls with RE (= their own RE or reports of others) • “I know that simply from my RE” sometimes used as “killer-argument”, end of debates (opposition seems neither possible nor decent!) • On the other hand: common objections of “projection”, “wishful thinking”, “self-suggestion”, “product of group-dynamics” • Even religious groups are suspicious against too-bold RE; potentially destructive. (See letters of St. Paul (unordered speaking in tongues & prophecies), Martin Luther against fanatics, multiple checks of “miracles” in Catholic church) • Neglected topic in philosophy for decades. Swinburne, Plantinga, Alston contributed to revive it. They treat RE similar to perception

  4. 2. “Religious experience” [RE] and its uses in argument (cont.’d) • In what follows, purely phenomenological observations & distinctions. The question of veridicality or justification is bracketed for the moment. 2.1 RE, ordinary and extraordinary • Ordinary RE: - events within the usual course of things, - repeatable and in principle explainable, - yet with religious significance: Examples: nature, encounter & love, birth and death, danger & rescue, sickness & recovery, suffering and its integration … • Extraordinary RE: - beyond the usual course of things, - not repeatableExamples: visions, miracles, extremely improbable healings & weather changes • [Various descriptions of extraordinary RE: “unexplainable”? “breaking the laws of nature”? “extremely improbable, yet naturally explainable”?  Not our topic here]

  5. 2. “Religious experience” [RE] and its uses in argument (cont.’d) 2.2 RE, publicly and privately accessible • Publicly accessible RE: - people in the same situation make the same RE - (e.g. public miracles) • Privately accessible RE: - accessible to one person / little group only - others may only conclude from reports or behavior • Presumption: Ordinary RE seems (typically) to be privately accessible only; e.g. two persons are exposed to the same grand mountain panorama, only one experiences it as religiously significant.

  6. 2. “Religious experience” [RE] and its uses in argument (cont.’d) 2.3 A typology of RE (C. Franks Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (1989))Again: a mere phenomenological description; beyond the question of truth/justif.And across religions, not only Christian religious experience. • Interpretative RE: - crucial situations of life, interpreted religiously - (e.g. important decisions seen as “lead by God”; sickness seen as “compassion with Christ”, …) • Quasi-sensual RE: - visions, auditions, dreams, touches, levitations - rich or poor content: gods with communication, images (“fire”, “last judgment”), pure sensual content (“light”) • Revelation experiences: - impression of a directly acquired, certain conviction - typically: quick, unannounced, “coming from outside”

  7. 2. “Religious experience” [RE] and its uses in argument (cont.’d) 2.3 A typology of RE (cont.’d) • Renovation / Regeneration experiences - refresh earlier religious orientations crucial situations of life, - may come silently, gradually or in a storm • “Numinous” RE: - experience of a “holy” reality as it is in itself, - i.e. no special relation to the man (“loving”, “guiding”…) - content often ineffable, indescribable; expression in art • “Mystical” RE: - experience of a happyfying uniting with some ultimate reality - typically: freedom from space, time, individual ego

  8. 2. “Religious experience” [RE] and its uses in argument (cont.’d) 2.4 “Inferential” and “evidential” arguments from RE Question: If there is RE, what might follow from it? How could RE function as an argument-basis? Two patterns: • “Inferential argument” from RE: - RE is seen as a phenomenon in need of (causal) explanation - the existence of God and his action is proposed as best causal explanation - i.e., an argument primarily from metaphysics / philosophy of science. • “Evidential argument” from RE: - RE seen as a special form of experience, analogous to perception/memory - defense of the reliability of such experience (under certain conditions) - analogy: my perception-that-q is an argument for q. The same with RE? - i.e., an argument from epistemology.

  9. 3. Richard Swinburne: RE in the cumulative case argument 3.1 The idea of a cumulative case argument • The Existence of God (1979, revised 1991, 2nd ed. 2004) • General characteristics: • Traditional deductive theistic arguments (St.Thomas, Leibniz,…) not viable • Reason: dubious status of synthetic-apriori principles (like the metaphysical principle of causality); a world as it is without God is a logically consistent idea • Treating God’s existence similar to large-scope scientific hypotheses (which also don’t underlie immediate “empirical control”) • Cumulative case argument: Reformulation of traditional arguments as (weak) inductive arguments (C-inductive); bundled in a cumulative case, they might provide a P-inductive argument for God’s existence (probability > 0.5). The rest is room for personal faith • Technical passages, but the core argument can be explained non-technically • The idea of cumulative case goes back to J.H. Newman

  10. 3.2 A non-technical summary of Swinburne’s argument • Experiences and reports of experience are trustworthy if their content is not highly improbable for other reasons. [Principle of Credulity / Testimony] • Some religious believers make and/or report religious experiences which, if veridical, would imply the existence of God. • Hence, (reports of) religious experiences are trustworthy if God’s existence is not highly improbable for other reasons. [from (1), (2)] • Six general features of the world are most easily explained by the exist-ence of God, hence they are (weak) evidence for the existence of God: (a) the existence of a complex physical universe; (b) order in the univer-se; (c) the existence of conscious beings; (d) the matching between human and animal needs and the features of environment; (e) (perhaps) the occurrence of miracles; (f) the fine-tuning of basic natural constants. • God’s existence is not inconsistent, i.e. its probability is not zero. • The existence and amount of evil is no significant evidence against God’s existence (and there is no other significant counter-evidence). • Hence, God’s existence is not highly improbable, but has an (although small) probability. [from (4), (5), (6)] • Hence, (reports of) religious experience are trustworthy, i.e. God’s existence is more probable than his non-existence. [from (3), (7)] • This means that its probability is somewhere between 0.5 and 1; filling the gap to 1 is a matter of personal faith.

  11. 3.2 A non-technical summary of Swinburne’s argument • Experiences and reports of experience are trustworthy if their content is not highly improbable for other reasons. [Principle of Credulity / Testimony] • Some religious believers make and/or report religious experiences which, if veridical, would imply the existence of God. • Hence, (reports of) religious experiences are trustworthy if God’s existence is not highly improbable for other reasons.[from (1), (2)] • Six general features of the world are most easily explained by the exist-ence of God, hence they are (weak) evidence for the existence of God: (a) the existence of a complex physical universe; (b) order in the univer-se; (c) the existence of conscious beings; (d) the matching between human and animal needs and the features of environment; (e) (perhaps) the occurrence of miracles; (f) the fine-tuning of basic natural constants. • God’s existence is not inconsistent, i.e. its probability is not zero. • The existence and amount of evil is no significant evidence against God’s existence (and there is no other significant counter-evidence). • Hence, God’s existence is not highly improbable, but has an (although small) probability. [from (4), (5), (6)] • Hence, (reports of) religious experience are trustworthy, i.e. God’s existence is more probable than his non-existence.[from (3), (7)] • This means that its probability is somewhere between 0.5 and 1; filling the gap to 1 is a matter of personal faith.

  12. 3.3 The key role of RE in the argument • Notice that RE is not a seventh piece of C-inductive evidence! • The six cumulated C-inductive arguments have only the role to show that God’s existence is not highly improbable, i.e. that his probability is not close to 0. -- See step 9! • At closer look, RE bears the burden of proof! -- See step 3! (RE is trustworthy if God’s existence is not highly improbable). The principles of credulity / testimony can also be applied to RE. • RE shifts the burden of proof: from the outset, RE is credible, as long as God’s existence is not improbable • Swinburne seems to think of extraordinary RE, and experiences which are semantically rich enough to be told to others • The justification of all believers hangs on the RE of some believers • i.e., Swinburne’s argument could (at least in principle) be interesting for non-members, perhaps even non-believers. Similarity to classical apologetics.

  13. 3.4 Where Swinburne’s probabilistic reasoning comes in • Six general features of the world are most easily explained by the existence of God, hence they are (weak) evidence for the existence of God: (a) the existence of a complex physical universe; (b) order in the universe; (c) the existence of conscious beings; (d) the matching between human and animal needs and the features of environment; (e) (perhaps) the occurrence of miracles; (f) the fine-tuning of basic natural constants. Why … ? • God as a radically simple object, considerable probability • The pieces of evidence are comparatively complicated, their intrinsic probability of existence is very low • God has reasons to bring about these pieces of evidence, i.e. the hypothesis of a God has a considerable explanatory power • Bayesian modelling of this reasoning (simplified):(h… God exists, e… the evidence occurs, k… background knowledge) P(h/e & k) = “the probability of h, given e and k” quite high considerable extremely low

  14. 4. Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” 4.1 “Reformed Epistemology” • Reformed (=Calvinist) Christians, but also • Aimed at reform of epistemology (importance of “basic beliefs”, we don’t conclude so much) and religious epistemology (it’s not the believer who must justify his faith in terms of non-belief!) • = Shift in the burden of proof: the null-hypothesis is the rationality (!) of a theistic world-view; as long as its impossibility is not proven. • “religious belief can be properly basic” • Contrary to critics of religion, but also phil. theology! Alvin Plantinga (*1932) • Reason and Belief in God (1983) • Warranted Christian Belief (2000) • Where the Conflict Really Lies. Science, Religion, & Naturalism (2011)

  15. 4. Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” 4.2 Basic beliefs • Belief system = huge network of beliefs, logical relations between them • Where does the system ultimately hang? “Basic/foundational beliefs” – neither further justifiable nor in need of justification. = “foundationalism” • Basic/foundational and inferential beliefs • Plantinga’s “soft” foundationalism: there are basic beliefs, they are even the vast majority of our beliefs, but they are not immune to error (examples) • One and the same belief can be basic or inferential (examples)

  16. 4. Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” 4.3 Religious basic beliefs? • Not like “God exists” or “God is a trinity”! • But: “Manifestation beliefs” in certain appropriate situations:“God has created all that”; “God dislikes what I’m just doing”; “God shall be praised”; “God speaks to me now” • These beliefs, if veridical, imply “God exists” (as inferential belief): (BASIC) MANIFESTATION BELIEF INFERENTIAL BELIEF God has created all that God exists God dislikes what I´m just doing God existsGod shall be praised God existsGod speaks to me now God exists • These beliefs are basic, i.e. not out of inference. Like “Here comes Ivan” or “I had breakfast at 7” – i.e. analogous to perception & memory • They can be properly basic, i.e. not every religious belief is irrational!

  17. 4. Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” 4.4 The arguments for Plantinga’s “Reformed” position • Two strategies, a destructive one and a constructive one • Destructive strategy: Refutation of the “classical foundationalism” (CF)which is behind critics of religion (and behind classical phil. theology!) • Constructive strategy: proposal of a model how religious PBBs are possible

  18. 4. Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” 4.4 The arguments for Plantinga’s “Reformed” position • The Destructive strategy: Refutation of “classical foundationalism” (CF1) Rational beliefs are either inferential or properly basic. (CF2) Properly basic beliefs are either evident to the senses (“I see white”) incorrigible inner perceptions (“I feel pain”) or conceptually self-evident (“parts are not bigger than wholes”). (Clearly, religious beliefs are hard to justify within CF…) • But: two arguments against CF! • (1) CF is self-undermining: (CF2) must be basic or inferential. Is it basic? It is neither evident to the senses, nor incorrigible, nor conceptually self-evident. Is it inferential? No idea how…

  19. 4. Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” 4.4 The arguments for Plantinga’s “Reformed” position • The Destructive strategy: (1) CF is self-undermining … • (2) CF is unduly narrow. Makes a lot of beliefs completely irrational: Emma is angry. I had breakfast at 7. There are material objects. Objects keep on existing when no one looks at them. There are other minds beyond my own. The world has existed for more than 5 minutes. etc. But… Such beliefs are neither CF-basic nor inferable. But they are rational! Hence, CF must be wrong.

  20. 4. Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” 4.4 The arguments for Plantinga’s “Reformed” position • The Destructive strategy: A better notion for “o.k.” beliefs (instead of CF-justification): WARRANTed beliefs! A belief is warranted if and only if …. … the relevant segments of my cognitive faculties work properly, & … the cognitive environment is appropriate, & … my belief-forming is interested in truth (not something else), & … my cognitive faculties produced mostly true beliefs so far. Warrant is a quality label for basic as well as inferential beliefs. (Inferring is a cognitive faculty!)

  21. 4. Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” 4.4 The arguments for Plantinga’s “Reformed” position • The Constructive strategy: The two “Aquinas/Calvin models”= models how warranted religious experience could be possible from a Christian standpoint (assumption: we are God’s creation, created in God’s image) • (1) The A/C modelGod has implemented in us a “Sensus Divinitatis”, i.e. a special ability to make religious experiences, i.e. to form theistic manifestation beliefs in appropriate situations. These beliefs can fulfil the warrant definition: • … my cognitive faculties (including Sensus Div.!) work properly… there are appropriate environments/situations for religious beliefs… my belief-forming is interested in truth… my cognitive faculties produced mostly true beliefs so far.

  22. 4. Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” 4.4 The arguments for Plantinga’s “Reformed” position • The Constructive strategy: …(1) The A/C model … • (2) The extended A/C modelProblem: The original sin (istočni grijeh)has damaged the Sensus Divinitatis, the sense for God is confused, few people succeed in it • Solution: the assistance of the Holy Spirit … • … repairs the Sensus Divinitatis … gives specific Christian (not only: theistic) beliefs their warrant… brings firmness and joy of faith

  23. 4. Alvin Plantinga: RE delivers “properly basic beliefs” 4.5 Reformed Epistemology as “Augustinian Christian Philosophy” • But are the A/C models TRUE? • Plantinga: “Here we pass beyond the competence of philosophy.” (!) • Only a partial answer (objections to 5 common attacks). – But this does not matter. “Augustinian Christian Philosophy”: • NOT: making the Christian world-view plausible for non-believers, by using only neutral premises (“Thomistic CP”), • BUT: developing a Christian world-view under the assumption that Christian doctrines are true (e.g.: given the doctrine of creation, what would follow for epistemology?) = “Augustinian CP”“It is also perfectly proper to start from what we know as Christians.” (Plantinga, Advice to Christian Philosophers (1983)) • Make a Christian proposal, wait for objections, defeat them (find “defeater defeaters”!). Here: a proposal how religious experience could work and why it could be reliable.(Main worry (see Friday): a philosophical or theological project?)

  24. 5. William P. Alston: RE as social doxastic practice 5.1 Well-established social doxastic practices • doxa = belief, opinion, conviction, … - a component of knowledge • “Doxastic practices” = practices, techniques, habits of getting beliefs. • Examples for well-established social practices: perception, measuring, introspection, reasoning, interpreting utterances, … • Doxastic practices give beliefs a prima-facie-justification, • Justification can be lost by overriders (examples). • No ultimate justification for doxastic practices (would end in circularities) – but it is pragmatically rational to follow them. (And perhaps also to follow religious doxastic practices.)

  25. 5. William P. Alston: RE as social doxastic practice 5.1 Well-established social doxastic practices Alston’s overall Project: • there are also religious SDP’s, • they may be reliable, perhaps they even produce knowledge • Also other SDP’s cannot ultimately be justified without circles • Hence religious SDP’s are not worse off than non-religious ones • “Parity argument”

  26. 5. William P. Alston: RE as social doxastic practice 5.2 Characteristics of “mystical experience” • Concentration on perception-like religious experiences; Perceiving God (1991); summary in Mystical perception and perceptual awareness of God, in W.E. Mann (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion (2005) • Character of presence (not just thinking-of) • Directness (not like “feeling God in the rain”) • Not restricted to the standard 5 senses, quasi-sensual • Mostly “focal” experiences, i.e. attract all attention and blot out everything else • Spontaneously appearing or deliberately sought

  27. 5. William P. Alston: RE as social doxastic practice 5.3 Why mystical perception can lead to rational beliefs: a complex ‘parity argument’ • Of course: there is a lot of projection, inconsistent and insane religious experience. But can RE in principle yield rational beliefs? YES. 5.3.1 A plausible principle for general perception: (PF) The fact that a subject, S, has an experience that seems to be a case of x’s appearing to S as so-and-so renders a belief that x (exists and) is so-and-so prima facie justified. • Notice: the justification is prima facie only and can find overriders. • Important: (PF) cannot be proven, only defended: (1) any alternative to (PF) would be radical scepticism, implausible; (2) Any attempt to prove (PF) would lead into hopeless epistemic circularities. (Like the PNC!)

  28. 5. William P. Alston: RE as social doxastic practice 5.3 Why mystical perception can lead to rational beliefs: a complex ‘parity argument’ 5.3.2 Does the same hold for mystical perception? (PFG) The fact that a subject, S, has an experience that seems to be a case of God’s appearing to S as so-and-so renders a belief that God(exists and) is so-and-so prima facie justified. • (PFG) is of course not as strong as (PF). Rejecting (PFG) does not end in general scepticism. • Alston: But (PFG) is not so much worse than (PF). Mystical perception should not be measured with unfairly high standards. • In what follows: 3 Arguments for (PFG)…

  29. 5. William P. Alston: RE as social doxastic practice 5.3 Why mystical perception can lead to rational beliefs: a complex ‘parity argument’ 5.3.3 Three arguments for (PFG) A. Theistic doctrines say that mystical perception is to be expected.Hence, opponents of MP must prove the falsity of theism.(Similar to Plantinga’s shift of the burden of proof to the atheist!) B.(parity argument): MP is not much worse off than sense perception:(i) “MP is only made by some, SP by all” – BUT: demographic rarity says nothing about veridicality, see piano tuners or high-end scientists!(ii) “SP is continuous, MP rare and rhapsodic” – BUT: similar to (i). (iii) “SP is rich in details, MP poor and obscure” – BUT: this may hold for seeing, not for smell and touch. They are also poor, but veridical.(iv) “SP yields an intersubjectively consistent picture, MP not” – BUT (weakest objection): the ultimate reality has many appearances. Hick! C.…

  30. 5. William P. Alston: RE as social doxastic practice 5.3 Why mystical perception can lead to rational beliefs: a complex ‘parity argument’ 5.3.3 Three arguments for (PFG) A. B. C.MP is a SDP and hence “adjustable” and (in a sense) “testable”: - spiritual practices e.g. in religious orders (Ignatian exercises, ‘deliberatio primorum patrum’, ‘deliberatio communitaria’, …) - criteria for God-experiences are conformity to doctrine; stable inner peace, openness for others, spiritual growth etc. (John Hick!) - Parity argument between RE and rational intuition, introspection etc.: not easily testable, yet they may deliver truths

  31. 5. William P. Alston: RE as social doxastic practice 5.3 Why mystical perception can lead to rational beliefs: a complex ‘parity argument’ Alston’s warning from “epistemic imperialism” of sense perception: Mystical perception should not meet unfairly high criteria. Sense perception, especially seeing, is not the benchmark for all other doxastic practice!

  32. 6. Comparisons 6.1 Three variants of an evidential argument • All three: Defenses of RE as source of truth. Evidential argument from RE. • Only Swinburne: Combination of the evidential argument (the “big bracket” in his argument) with an inferential argument (= the cumulative argument from the six other pieces of evidence, which makes God not highly improbable) • All three: Forms of a credibility principle are involved. Swinburne: Principles of Credulity/Testimony Plantinga: Basic beliefs are prima facie warranted, until defeat Alston: Principles (PF) and (PFG)

  33. 6. Comparisons 6.2 Internal and external argumentations • Swinburne: EXTERNAL argument, addressees are also non-believers. - Component of inferential argument- credulity principles do not require theological assumptions, just: - not in-principle-atheism and strong agnosticism - burden of proof at the beginning is with the theist - religious experience has strong external role in the argument • Plantinga: INTERNAL argument, directed to the Christian, why he may trust in his RE. Reason: Christian doctrine says also something about the explanation of RE. Burden of proof is at the beginning with the atheist, he has to prove falsity of theism/Christianity. • Alston: …

  34. 6. Comparisons 6.2 Internal and external argumentations • Alston: interesting intermediate position. - the parity argument B (between SP and MP): external - argument A resembles Plantinga: theism makes RE expectable; an internal argument - argument C (testability and criteria for authentic RE): the criteria seem to presuppose a background-theology: God fosters peace, solidarity… - internal argument ?

  35. 6. Comparisons 6.3 Atomistic, isolated religious beliefs? • A general worry: religious beliefs appear as single, atomistic, “context-free”, not-in-need-of-interpretation, clear in themselves • But: like other beliefs, religious beliefs rest on background beliefs, a context of interpretation; “Weltanschauung” / “world-view” / “metaphysical framework” / “conceptual framework” etc. • Examples of its content: What does “God” mean, what attributes & effects could such an object have, does it exist? What kinds of cause and effect are possible? etc…

  36. 6. Comparisons 6.3 Atomistic, isolated religious beliefs? • Alston: of all 3 authors, weakest atomism and isolationism. Most understanding for embedding into manifold of doxastic practices; they hang together, overriders may come from various doxastic practices. (Especially in last book, Beyond Justification 2005) • Of all three, Alston takes diversity of RE most seriously. RE is conceptually underdetermined, open to various interpretations

  37. 7. The framework and rationality criteria for RE • Alston: it is pragmatically rational to trust in RE • But is it also epistemically rational? • Thesis: epistemic rationality and (ideal) pragmatic rationality amount to the same. We hold a practice pragmatically rational because we believe it brings us closer to the truth (=epistemic rationality) • How do we judge the pragmatic rationality of beliefs B? – Whether there are no relevant questions open for B! • But: What are relevant questions for RE beliefs? Are there any?

  38. 7. The framework and rationality criteria for RE • Relevant questions for RE beliefs (e.g.): - is it compatible with other beliefs about God? (No anthro- pomorphism, no naïve corporeality, …)- is it compatible with the rest of my orientation framework (ontology, science, own religious tradition (how rational is the latter?) ? • More than Plantinga, Alston, Swinburne see it: Philosophical theology as a corrective to single-sided, naïve accounts of experiences of God. If God is the ultimate explanation of reality, what attributions to him are plausible? • Other pattern of argument: Religion as best explanation of overall experience? • I.e., religious epistemology to be backed by metaphysical considerations! RE not as basic as Plantinga believes.

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