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Security Challenges in Hybrid Telephony

Security Challenges in Hybrid Telephony Richard Hovey Communications Systems Analysis Division February 8, 2007 Observations are my own and are not a reflection of views of CSAD or PSHSB. SS7 SIP DNS PBX Broadband Phone Service router IP PBX SSP Hybrid IP-TDM Telephony

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Security Challenges in Hybrid Telephony

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  1. Security Challenges inHybrid Telephony Richard Hovey Communications Systems Analysis Division February 8, 2007 Observations are my own and are not a reflection of views of CSAD or PSHSB.

  2. SS7 SIP DNS PBX Broadband Phone Service router IP PBX SSP Hybrid IP-TDM Telephony Security Issues Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) SignalingInterop Domain Name System Interop (DNS) Routing Interop (BGP) IP PBX IP Network TDM Network Smartphone Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  3. Security Challenges in Hybrid Telephony Outline • Perspectives on telecom convergence • "Very-Next" Generation c.2007-2010 • Telephony on the commodity Internet • Tutorial: basic SIP signaling • SIP Security challenges • Hybrid Telephony IP – TDM • Tutorial: basic SS7 signaling; SIP – SS7 Interworking • SIP-SS7 security challenges • Emerging components & concerns • Open Source IP PBX • Smartphone Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  4. Security Challenges in Hybrid Telephony Advisory Message • The Sky isn't exactly falling… • …but the Sea Level is rising. • Net effect: The Sky is getting closer. CSAD Advisory System Severe Risk of Sky Falling High Risk of Sky Falling Significant Risk of Sky Falling General Risk of Sky Falling Low Risk of Sky Falling Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  5. TDM phone net TDM phone net commodity Internet Broadband copper, cable, or fiber satellite distribution ~headend Perspective on Convergence Very-Next Generation Residential Broadband • Today: parallel access to distinct infrastructures • Future: common IP core infrastructure? • Vision of "Carrier ISPs" • First test: adoption of “NGN Release 1” local servers Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  6. IP Network 1 IP Network 2 Control Control SIP SIP DNS LOC Switching Router IP Link IP Link [Voice Path - RTP] IP Link [Signaling Path - SDP] Tutorial: IP-IP Telephony Session Initiation Protocol Signaling (SIP) Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  7. Tutorial: IP-IP Telephony SIP Basics • Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) • Text-based protocol with a readable syntax, similar to HTTP • Used for controlling multimedia sessions over IP (i.e., signaling) • Telephony is a type of audio-only multimedia session • INVITE message • Used to establish a session; analogous to ISUP IAM message • IP-IP phone example (Kevin calls Michael over Internet) INVITE sip:michael@mkpgroup.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 165.135.228.98:5060 Max-Forwards: 50 To: Michael <sip:michael@mkpgroup.com> From: Kevin <sip:kevin@fcc.gov>;tag=8055002911 Content-type: application/sdp Content-length: 142 INVITE sip:michael@mkpgroup.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 165.135.228.98:5060 Max-Forwards: 50 To: Michael <sip:michael@mkpgroup.com> From: Kevin <sip:kevin@fcc.gov>;tag=8055002911 Content-type: application/sdp Content-length: 142 Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  8. ❸DNS Query ❺LS Query ❹INVITE SIP SIP DNS LOC ❼Ringing ➑OK ❻ ❷ Router ❷ INVITE to: sip:michael@mkpgroup.com ➒voice (RTP) ❻INVITE IP Link IP Link [Voice Path] IP Link [Signaling Path] Tutorial: IP-IP Telephony Session Initiation Protocol Signaling (SIP) ❶Kevin "calls" Michael Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  9. IP-based Telephony SIP Signaling -Challenges SIP and Privacy (withholding identity) • Identity carried in SIP URI and optional Display Name e.g.,Kevin <sip:kevin@fcc.gov> • Appears in numerous fields in SIP messages e.g.,From:, Contact:, Reply-to: • Identity Info also appears in e.g.,Via:, Call-Info:, User-Agent:, Organization:, Server: • Some are functional and have to be included • Complicated by intermediary proxy servers that add headers [and can examine the other header content] Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  10. IP-based Telephony SIP Signaling -Challenges • Utility of protecting SIP with encryption? • i.e., protect SIP messages with IP Security (IPsec) at IP Layer • Hop-by-hop impact on Call Set-up time is significant • Almost certainly unacceptable Source: Telcordia • Once connected phone-phone, delay acceptable • About 10% (8 msec) • Implications for NGN? Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  11. IP-based TelephonyVulnerabilities in SIP devices • Dozens of vulnerabilities impacting IP-based telephony • Includes commodity Internet risks at other layers • Attacks on vulnerabilities • can impact confidentiality, integrity, availability • can trigger device hangs, crashes, restarts • Hundreds of SIP devices software implementations • both SIP phones and SIP Servers • Next: some approaches to mitigating risks • Security thru obscurity – don’t reveal implementation • Security thru testing – use test tools to check implementation Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  12. IP-based Telephony IP Telephony Vulnerabilities by Protocol Layer Source: UC Boulder Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  13. IP-based Telephony Security thru Obscurity? • A vulnerable implementation becomes an explicit target • e.g., Windows vulnerabilities • SIP standard defines a "User-Agent" field • announces software version • can turn it off so software details are not revealed • But… turning off explicit identification doesn't really help • sufficient info in protocol responses to determine software • probing technique manipulates headers, log responses • each device has a unique fingerprint • Does suggest some security improvements • e.g., don't respond to non-compliant messages • e.g., randomize fields and attributes Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  14. IP-based Telephony Security thru Obscurity? SIP device fingerprints Source: CMU & IBM Watson Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  15. IP-based Telephony Security thru Testing • Commercially-available VoIP testing tools • “vulnerability scanners” • Inject abnormalities into SIP messages • E.g., one tool: 4500 test cases… • …but only for SIP “INVITE” message • Analysis of seven testing tools • based on lab tests of four tools; claims of three others • even combined, address less than half of known vulnerabilities Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  16. IP-based Telephony IP Telephony Vulnerabilities Addressed by Tools Source: UC Boulder Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  17. IP-based Telephony Denial of Service Attacks • Background • Brute force attacks are much easier than clever exploits • Attack targets • SIP infrastructure (SIP servers, Gateways) • Supporting services (DNS) • End points (SIP phones) • Commercially available solutions for UDP/SYN flooding • But currently none for SIP Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  18. IP-based Telephony Denial of Service Attacks • Carrier-class Analysis • Two types of attacks used: General and VoIP-specific • Bi-directional Speech grade-of-service metrics collected • Results • VoIP-specific attacks effective at low rates against all devices • No service – let alone grade of service - to record • General attacks caused a wide-range of effects • Unexpected: all devices adversely affected by TCP SYN attacks • Conclusions (November 2004): “Keep VoIP on private secured networks (off the public Internet) where practical” “Design DDOS mitigation products to be VoIP-aware” Sprint Adv. Tech. Labs Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  19. acceptable quality▲ IP-based Telephony Denial of Service Attacks Voice Quality during TCP SYN attack on a network element ◄Attack Level 20% of bandwidth Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  20. IP-based Telephony Denial of Service Attacks Current carrier-class work • Addressing perimeter protection problem of VoIP service • Strategy – two detection and mitigation filters • SIP: Rule-based detection and mitigation filters (only valid SIP) • Media: SIP-aware dynamic pinhole filtering (only signaled RTP) Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  21. IP-based Telephony Denial of Service Attacks Columbia U – Verizon Labs Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  22. IP-based Telephony Denial of Service Attacks Carrier-class Prototype • Rely on wire-speed, deep-packet inspection • 300 calls/second;10K-30K concurrent calls • Conclusion (October 2006): “Need to generalize methodology to cover a broader range of cases and apply anomaly detection, pattern recognition and learning systems” Columbia U – Verizon Labs Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  23. ❹Address Complete Message [ACM] ❷IAM ❹ACM ❷ Initial Address Message [IAM] ❺ring tone ❺ring line, transmit Caller ID Tutorial: TDM-TDM TelephonyInter-exchange Signaling (SS7)ISDN User Part (ISUP) Protocol W X ❸number idle? ❶dial digits B A ❻ connect to trunk Subscriber Line Voice Trunk Signaling Link Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  24. Called Party Number parameter Initial Address Message Calling Party Number parameter Charge Number parameter Tutorial: TDM-TDM TelephonyInitial Address Message (IAM) Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  25. SIP DNS Broadband Phone Service router SSP Tutorial: IP-TDM Telephony MGC Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  26. MGC Tutorial: IP-TDM TelephonySIP to SS7 • Media Gateway Controller (MGC) • Also referred to as a "Softswitch" or "Call Agent" • Has logical interfaces facing both networks • Translates between SIP and ISUP messages • SS7 protocol Level 4 (e.g. "INVITE"  "IAM“) • Media Gateway (MG) • Has trunking interfaces facing both networks • Translates between IP and TDM voice streams (i.e. RTPT1) • MGC and MG can be merged in one box or kept separate • Signaling Gateway (SG) • Performs mapping of Signaling Network Messages • SS7 protocol Level 3 • Level 3: controls congestion, balances loads, re-routes traffic Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  27. MGC Tutorial: IP-TDM TelephonySIP to SS7 Questions wrt Media Gateway Controller: • How do they map fields? e.g. "INVITE"  "IAM“? • e.g., "From:" "Calling Party Number“ and "Charge Number" • What call records do they maintain? • significant implications for Authenticating source Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  28. Tutorial: IP-TDM TelephonySIP to SS7 • INVITE message • IP-to-Wireline phone example (Kevin calls Michael from Internet) INVITE sip:+12126441200@ss1.fcc.gov;user=phone SIP/2.0Via: SIP/2.0/UDP client.kevin.fcc.gov:5060Max-Forwards: 50To: Michael <sip:+12126441200@ss1.fcc.gov;user=phone>From: Kevin <sip:+12024180100>;tag=8055002911Content-type: application/sdpContent-length: 142 Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  29. IP SS7 STP SG MGC MGC (NIF) ISUP ISUP M3UA MTP3 M3UA MTP3 MTP2 SCTP MTP2 SCTP MTP1 IP IP MTP1 Tutorial: IP-TDM Telephony SIP to SS7 IP • Signaling Gateway (SG) function • Performs mapping of signaling network messages • SS7 Level 3: congestion, balances loads, traffic re-routing • Transporting SS7 over IP Network TDM • Bottom line: SG can appear as an SS7 SP at the interface Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  30. Tutorial: IP-TDM Phone ServiceSIP-SS7 Signaling Questions? Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  31. IP-TDM Phone ServiceSignaling Interworking Vulnerabilities Background • New players (CLECs) increasing the number of SS7 access points • Signaling Gateway looks like another SS7 SP to an STP • Absence of message integrity and authentication in SS7 • Could use IPSec in hybrid environment – but ends at the SG Recent Analysis (December 2006) • Hijacked or misbehaving SS7 nodes • Open to Signaling Network Management (SNM) injects • Injections towards MGC can disrupt VoIP services • Hijacked or misbehaving Signaling Gateway • Can affect functioning of SS7 network “Threats arising in either network due to misprovisioned or malicious signaling nodes are not confined to that network alone but may affect the other network as well.” GMU - UNT Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  32. IP-TDM Phone ServiceSignaling Interworking Vulnerabilities Critical Management Messages in IP and SS7 networks – just SS7 level 3 Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  33. IP-TDM Phone ServiceSignaling Interworking Vulnerabilities • Only widely deployed security solution • Telcordia’s Gateway Screening Specification • Implemented at gateway STPs • Generally screens out only message headers • Doesn’t check content and structure of most signaling messages • Commercial products to secure SS7 are emerging • Content-based and signal-sequence firewalls • Network Access Meditation (Sevis); • SS7 Security Gatekeeper (Verizon) • Proposed: MTPSec to secure SS7 network layer Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  34. Termination Provider router SSP Asterisk PBX Open Source PBXBe Your Own Phone Company Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  35. Be Your Own Phone CompanyAsterisk – Corporate PBX Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  36. Termination Provider router Asterisk PBX SSP Open Source PBX Spoofing - Service & Do-It-Yourself Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  37. Be Your Own Phone CompanySpoofing - Service & Do-It-Yourself Things to know: • Can use standard SetCallerID(nnnnnnnnnn) command • PBX-like; not efficient for per-call spoofing • Asterisk software is easily patched to do Caller ID spoofing • Add the following lines to extension config file exten => 33,1,Answer exten => 33,2,AGI(cidspoof.agi) • Download the cidspoof.agi script changing line 77 tothe correct username / hostname for VoIP service provider, and copy to /var/lib/asterisk/agi-bin/ • Start Asterisk • Call extension 33, enter number you wish to spoof from, followed by number you wish to spoof to. Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  38. Open Source PBX • Authentication concerns (CPN, BTN) • manipulation now much cheaper • isolation from traceability much greater Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  39. Smartphone SecurityGeneral Outlook • Virus problem seems relatively small and manageable… • Cell phone carriers have strong incentives to keep under control • Cell phone carriers have good control points (e.g., gateways) • Incidents to date haven't been widespread or fast spreading • Many categorized as low-threat "proof of concept" • Q: "Is the Sky Falling?" A: "Probably not; not at the moment." • “But the ocean…” Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  40. Smartphone Security General Outlook • But… cell phones are an increasingly attractive target • Applications becoming more PC-like; e.g., email attachments(smart phones make up about 5% of cell phones) • Operating System uniformity increases appeal to hackers (i.e., Symbian, PocketPC, PalmOS dominate smart phones) • Standard Markup Languages create openings (e.g., java scripts) • Phones increasingly carry sensitive info (e.g., business info) • Phones increasingly can make small financial charges • by accepting "reverse SMS" micropayment charges • i.e., there's a direct link to money • Potential impact of viruses seems high Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  41. Smartphone Security General Outlook Q: “What can mobile viruses do?” • Spread via Bluetooth, MMS • Send SMS messages • Infect files • Enable remote control of the smartphone • Modify or replace icons or system applications • Install “false” or non-operational fonts and applications • Combat antivirus programs • Install other malicious programs • Block memory cards • Steal data Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  42. Smartphone Security Symbian OS… • Dominant smartphone OS (50% of phones shipped) • Allows user to install untrusted code • post-installation antivirus software not as mature as PC • Once installed code has access to all resources • extract phone numbers, email • send SMS, MMS, email; make HTTP connections • dial numbers; connect via Bluetooth • Possible to avoid detection • run in background (server); wait for long idles; delete logs • user unaware of filesystem • Possible to avoid removal, short of reflashing Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  43. Smartphone Security Bluetooth… • Devices • 13% of phones sold worldwide in 2004; 4% in U.S. • Distances • Nominal range is 10 meters (often boosted to 100m) • Hijacking phones has been demonstrated at over a mile • Suggested cipher vulnerabilities • [see Wetzel] • Observation • a "personal networking standard" vulnerable to personal misjudgments and oversights Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  44. PSTN Smartphone Security Creating the Conditions for a Perfect Storm? Internet Bluetooth Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  45. Smartphone SecurityEvolution • By early 2005 main types of mobile viruses had evolved • Very few in last 18-24 months are truly original • Now 31 families, 170 variants. • MMS will eventually become common method of propagation Increase of known mobile malware variants 6/2004 ▲ Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  46. Service ProvidersCyber Security Practice Background • History • Network Reliability & Interoperability Council (NRIC) • NRIC VI & VII: assembled Cybersecurity Best Practices • applicable as appropriate; voluntary, … • more of a checklist where one would like a culture • Stipulation • Technical complexity; industry's superior expertise & resources • Regulation may not result in adoption of underlying philosophy Non-public – for Internal Use Only

  47. Service ProvidersCyber Security Practice • Question • Are ISP businesses "Markets for Lemons" wrt security? • asymmetric information > willingness to pay only average price • above average security will be driven out of the market? • Challenge • Are there approaches to improving security and reliability of infrastructure that benefit both users and providers? • What are the incentives? • Are ISP businesses dynamics and industry sectors different? Non-public – for Internal Use Only

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