The Menu for Choice

1. The Menu for Choice How do States Make Decisions?

2. I. The state as unitary actor? • Unitary Actors? • Realism and the “National Interest” • What is the “national interest”? • Why does regime type matter?

3. B. “As If” Assumption • Support: Power politics models, situations of constrained choice • Problem: Internal differences matter in unexpected ways – “as if” assumption generates incorrect predictions

4. C. The Puzzle: How does a State Select From the Menu?

5. II. Arrow’s Theorem and the National Interest • Focus: How to aggregate individual interests into social or national interest • Setting and question • Three or more citizens • Three or more outcomes or objectives they must rank: Example: economic growth, human rights, and military security. • Is there a reasonable way for society as a whole to rank the outcomes? Could be anything – voting, polling, mind-reading, etc. Is there any system at all that would be reasonable?

6. C. Notation • Choices or outcomes are indicated by capital letters: A, B, C, etc. • Preferences indicated by use of letters p, i, or r: • Strong preference: If someone prefers one option to another we write: A p B • Indifference: If someone thinks A and B are about equal, we write A i B • Weak preference: If A p B or A i B then A r B. So A r B means “A is at least as good as B”

7. 2. A minimal definition of rationality • Preferences are connected: Given any pair of options, someone can relate them with p, i, or r. • Preferences are transitive: If A r B and B r C then A r C.

8. D. Characteristics of a desirable aggregation technique • Universality: Our technique should apply to any group of rational people, regardless of their specific preferences about A, B, or C.

9. 2. Non-Dictatorship • If Bob says: A p B • But everyone else says B p A • then… • We should not conclude that for society, A p B

10. 3. Unanimity • If everyone agrees that A p B • then… • We should conclude that for society, A p B

11. 4. Collective Rationality • If individuals are rational, our technique should create social preferences that are rational • Remember what this means: connected and transitive preferences

12. 5. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives • Suppose I have the options A, B, and C. I can rank these however I want. One example: A p B p C • Now suppose a new option is available: D. • I must not change the order of A, B, and C relative to each other. • Starting with above example: • D p A p B p C  OK • A p D p B p C  OK • A p B p D p C  OK • A p B p C p D  OK • D p B p A p C  Not OK (B and A swapped places) • Restaurant analogy: Waiter offers chicken or fish. I like chicken better. Waiter comes back and explains there is also beef. I now decide I want the fish. (Not OK)

13. D. Characteristics of a desirable aggregation technique (revisited) • Universality: Applies to people with different values or beliefs • Non-Dictatorship: No one person’s preference outweighs everyone else together • Unanimity: If everyone prefers one option to another, then so should society as a whole • Collective Rationality: Should produce a transitive ranking of options • Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: New options don’t change the relative ranks of earlier options

14. E. Conclusion and Implications • Arrow proved these conditions cannot all be true! • Implications • There are times when there is no single “national interest,” “general will” or “will of the people” • Rational individuals may not make a rational collectivity • Preference cycles and the power of agenda-setting • Voter 1: A p B p C • Voter 2: B p C p A • Voter 3: C p A p B • SOCIETY: • A p B • B p C • C p A!

15. III. Beyond “National Interest” – Opportunity and Willingness Revisited • Reminder: First lecture of class outlined the menu for choice approach • What affects states’ opportunities? • System: Position in hierarchies • Region: Neighborhood effects of regime, trade, and conflict • Dyad: Trade dependence, relative power • State: Power projection capability, stage of development • What about willingness? Need to move BELOW state level of analysis!

16. IV. Selectorate Theory: A Framework for Understanding Willingness • Division of society: • Leader: Decides public policy • Selectorate: set of people with legal right to participate in selection of the government • Democracies: Adult citizens • Monarchies: Royalty or nobles • Some autocracies have large selectorates (single-party states, rigged elections, etc.) Why…? • Winning Coalition: Number of selectorate actually needed to gain/retain power • Democracies: About half of S • Autocracies: Military leaders, key nobles, etc. • Disenfranchised: Powerless

17. Selectorate Theory’s Division Society’s Disenfranchised Selectorate Winning Coalition Leader

18. B. Regime Types: Three combinations W = Size of winning coalition S = Size of selectorate W/S = Regime Type

19. C. Policy Tools • Allocation of resources • Public Goods: National security, prosperity, etc. • Benefit the entire selectorate (S) – both supporters and opponents/defectors • Collective in nature: joint and nonexcludable (economic growth, safety, clean air, etc.) • Private Goods: Benefit supporters only (W) • Leaders prefer to use private goods to remain in power (punish defection)

20. D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W • W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high  defect if private goods at less than maximum

21. Large W/S: Democracy and Monarchy/ Junta (Chance of being needed is high)

22. D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W • W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high  defect if private goods at less than maximum • W/S is Small: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is low  defection offers little prospect of increased private goods

23. Small W/S: Autocracy (Chance of being needed is low)

24. D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W • W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high  defect if private goods at less than maximum • W/S is Small: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is low  defection offers little prospect of increased private goods • Small W: Easy to reward/punish defectors • Large W: Hard to reward/punish defectors

25. 5. Institutions and Incentives • Leader wants: Small W (easy to bribe if desired) and large S (very small W/S means defection is unattractive). Result: Corruption possible but not required • Winning coalition wants: Small W (more private goods) and small S (large W/S means leader must devote most resources to bribes). Result: Corruption required. • Selectorate wants: Large W (focus on public goods)  implies Large S. Result: Corruption difficult.

26. E. Evidence for Selectorate Theory • Development: Explains many previous failures (modernization, dependency) • Agrarian elite coalitions reduced productivity (large estates, agricultural protectionism) but… • Urban elite coalitions also reduced productivity (food subsidies, “the Iron Triangle”) • State control  patronage and kickbacks (mere cosmetic differences between “socialist” or “capitalist” autocracies) • Autocracy forces corruption on the leader! Leaders who emphasize public goods are rejected  explains post-colonial development

27. 3. Foreign Policy • Democracies less likely to fight: leaders punished for public policy mistakes • Democracies more free-trade: general benefits of free trade > damage to specific groups

28. Evidence for Selectorate Theory: Democracy and Public Goods

29. 4. Other findings of selectorate theory • Economic/Political freedom associated with greater prosperity (weakly) and life expectancy (moderately) • Leaders in autocracies (Large S/Small W) last longer than those in democracies • Historical move away from monarchies, infrequency of juntas

30. 5. Limits of selectorate theory • Few useful policy recommendations : “Pursue public goods so people re-elect you” is vague • Growth is only one public good – government may opt for social insurance, education, social welfare programs, etc in lieu of economic growth • National security vs. growth? Model has difficulty predicting both at once

31. V. Interest Groups in International Politics • The people matter (selectorate theory says leaders emphasize public goods in democracies) • But politics is messy (“national interest” may not exist, which means public goods only go so far) • So how do interest groups affect leaders’ choices?

32. A. Interest Group Models • Pluralism – Competing groups represented according to numbers and issue salience • Collective Action – Group goal as “public good” • Free-Rider Dilemma: Must use selective incentives to overcome • Implication: Organization necessary for success • Winning Coalition: Many theories argue that leaders are most concerned preserving their coalition (listen to allies before enemies). Example: Bush and Republican support.

33. B. A Framework for Comparison: Who has influence?

34. 1. Individuals

35. 1. Individuals

36. 1. Individuals -- Powerless alone

37. 2. Unorganized Groups

38. 2. Unorganized Groups -- Must be considered, but cannot set agenda

39. 3. Organized groups

40. 3. Organized groups -- Set agenda and affect public opinion

41. 4. Benefits of Organization a. Credible Commitment -- Conditional support b. Outreach -- Publicity, Money, Media Access c. Persuasion -- Information to representatives

42. C. How do interest groups affect international relations? • Collective action model is strongest: Discrete, organized, funded groups have the most influence • Which groups qualify in the US?

43. a. Funding: Which groups give the most money? i. Foreign and Defense Policy Groups: Surprisingly little (< .1% of total funds raised)

45. ii. Industries • Defense = More $ but still behind most industries • Agriculture and Energy = Much more $ • Labor = Even more • Conclusion: Banks > Manufacturing > Labor > Energy and Farm Interests > Defense > Foreign Policy Groups

46. b. Other forms of influence? • Ethnic interest groups: Additional influence in proportion to demographic size (Latinos, Jews, Armenians, etc.) • INGOs: Publicity, but usually limited direct political participation (legal restrictions)

47. c. Don’t forget Salience! • Explains why foreign policy groups have influence beyond funding and numbers: small, intensely interested groups get more than large but distracted groups. • Most influential: Well-funded groups with foreign policy focus (salience) and domestic ethnic base (e.g. AIPAC)

48. VI. Public opinion • Follow the Leader • “Rally ‘Round the Flag”

50. VI. Public opinion • Follow the Leader • “Rally ‘Round the Flag” • Trust in President • Long-term consistency on major issues • Military Operations • Visible costs: Casualties, Money • Perceived National Interest