Drone Attacks and its implications : Case Study of Pakistan

1. Drone Attacks and its implications:Case Study of Pakistan Muqarrab Akbar PhD student, Glasgow School for Business and Society Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK Muqarra.akbar@gcu.ac.uk

2. Drones • Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) system • Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) • used for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) • most modern technology with wide range of capability • areas where American forces cannot operate overtly • Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan • First time in 2002 Yemen in 2002 ,Salim Sinan al-Harethi, • suspected in 2000 USS Cole bombing in Aden

3. numbers increasing dramatically • in 2001 almost 50 • in 2002 167 • in 2009 over 250 • in 2011 7,000 • Since summer 2011, expanded in Somalia, Libya and Yemen • Before September 11, US had criticised and condemned the Israeli policy of target killing.

4. FATA and Drone Attacks • one of the most dangerous and isolated region of Pakistan • Mountainous • barren and • deep valley areas • Almost 3.3 million population, only 2 percent of Pakistan • poorest regions of the world • per capita income about US $250 per year • 60 percent living below poverty line • code of conduct “Pakhtunwali” • hospitality, generosity, honour, equality, pride, • compensation and retaliation

5. Sanctuary of Al Qaeda and Taliban • training camps and recruitment centres • exploiting the ideological and ethnical affiliations • Pakistan military launched operations in FATA • captured & killed many top leaders of Al-Qaeda and Taliban • peace agreement to pardon local leaders • US started Drone attacks in 2004 • central element of defence and counter-terrorism strategy • most appropriate response • no prospect of negotiation or compromise • Pakistani forces were not willing or unable to launch an operation • US forces were prohibited to operate

6. first drone on Pakistan’s territory on June 18 2004 • target Nek Mohammad • an influential member of TTP • Pakistani military credited itself • fear of public retaliation • Initially the covert drone -“personality strikes” • Bush era • High value target-senior Al-Qaeda members • Only eight in 4 years from 2004-2007.

7. Success of drone caused the increase its number • Last era of Bush • Less signature strikes • 33 in 2008 • Entrance of Obama • frequency of drone attacks proliferated further • “signature strikes” based on “pattern of life” analysis. • 43 in first ten month of 2009 • Only one vital success -- Baitullah Mehsud

8. Drone: A Successful Campaign • more than half of top ranking and high value targets • without endangering American marines or pilots • “the only game in town considered to be the most effective tool and weapon against Al-Qaeda in the war on terror by the intelligence community particularly in the areas across the Pakistani borders.” (Leon Panetta, director of CIA) • From 2004 to 2010 • 60 to 1707 members of Al Qaeda, Taliban and affiliates groups targeted

9. attacks on the ISAF and the United States forces • a plausible prima facie rationale to counter such • Drone is effective because • least obstructive and most precise mean • greater surveillance capability • greater precision to hit the target • avoiding collateral damage

10. Against Drone attacks • Drones only work and gather surveillance on the basis of ‘pattern of life’ information • Their human operators distinguish terrorists from civilians • accuracy, precision depends widely on human intelligence • Killing rather the prosecuting the perpetrators • Exact numbers of militants and innocents killed unknown • Till June 2011-- 1,500 to 2,500 civilians on unknown killed • Accidental killings -- collateral damage is increased

11. Tarnishing social fabrics of society in FATA • During Obama regime • less than 13% of drone killed a militant leaders • only 2% are militant leaders in all fatalities from drone • Pakistani sources –in last three years • about 700 civilian causalities • @ 2 percent with one militant for every almost 50 civilian • UK failed to support drone openly • Germany supports the Pakistani stance

12. Never been criticized before its expansion • causing hostility, resentment across Pakistan • provoking retaliation against the United States • Undermining the Pakistan’s territorial integrity • No transparency and accountability • call of drones due to high civilian causality (David Kilcullen, a former counterinsurgency advisor to Gen. David Petraeus) • Doubt about estimation of civilian causalities • militants collect and buried the dead and told that all of them were innocent civilians

13. Public Response • Initially no resentment • Enhanced operation caused anti drone and anti US sentiments • March 2009 – 61 % (International Republican Institute) • 2010 – 75 % (New America Foundation) • 2011 – 97 % (Pew research Center) • 2012 • 17 % supports killing of militants by drones • 94 % considers killing innocent civilians • 74% unnecessary to defend Pakistan from extremist organisations (Pew research Center)

14. Opposition within US • Anne Patterson (US Ambassador to Pakistan) • Cameron Munter (US Ambassador to Pakistan) • Adm. Mullen • Andrew M. Exum (Center for a New American Security) • David Kilcullen (former Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General Petraeus) • No empirical evidences on civilian and militant deaths • Differences in media reports • Killing of already killed • Ilyas Kashmiri in 2009 and again in June 2011

15. Pak- US Drift • From 2004 to 2007 , Pakistan denied US involvement • Shamsi Air Base was provided • Wiki leaks cables revealed Pakistani tacit support • Bilateral relations affected by • Raymond Davis episode (January 27, 2011 ) • Drone strike at Datta Khel ( 38 civilian deaths, March 17, 2011 ) • Salala Check post attack on Pak Army • US agreed to notify Pakistan if targeting more than 20 people. • Pentagon and State department favour restrictions • CIA wants to continue

16. Drone strikes as counter productive • Suicide attack – retaliatory measure and revenge • Emergence of “accidental guerrilla” Phenomenon • survivors converting into suicide bombers (opinion of local people) • Blowback to US forces NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan • Suicide bombing by al-Balawi in Khost • Attempt to explode in Times Square by Faisal Shahzad • Pakistani civilians, army targeted • Attacks on Naval base, military headquarters and Air base • No empirical data only anecdotal evidence

17. Drone Strikes and Suicide Attacks

18. Deaths from Drone and Suicide Attacks

19. Drone attacks and International Law • procedure, operations, criteria of target choosing secret • “the worst kept secret in the history of U.S. foreign policy” (Micah Zenko, Council on Foreign Relations Fellow) • legal and moral status under US domestic and international law • Executive order 12333 prohibits the engaging in assassination • No specific International Law describe about drones • Drone similar as other weapons • American government justifies attacks to eliminate threat to US security.

20. Violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations • No use of force against political independence or territorial integrity of any state • Two exemptions • State give consent to use force on her territory or • Presently not with Pakistan’s consent as objected repeatedly • Host state unwilling to target the threat to attacking state • Launched operation in Swat, Wana and FATA • Even if Pakistan consented • Illegal to kill suspected and innocents without prosecution

21. Violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) • No threat to US from these people • On domestic legal perspective • Violation of Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) • these elements are not involved in September 11 • “whether killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in response to [events] in 2001.” (Christof Heyns, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions) • “they undermine the essential foundations of human rights law”.   ( Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions)

22. Conclusion • Letter of 26 congressmen to Obama regarding drone • Drones are • Strategically important • technical sound • wisdom of using in the area not approachable easily • Collateral damage of drones is • Accelerating violence • Instability in the region

23. Creating more enemies than eliminating • Emergence of Islamic Pashtunistan • Complicating US policy of withdrawal • Fragile relationship between US and Pakistan • Both partners must be eloquent on the issue • Effective use • Minimising the civilian or suspected deaths • Trust building

24. References • Ian Henderson, “Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the Use of Armed Drones.” In Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 13, edited by M.N. Schmitt, Louise Arimatsu and T.McCormack, 134-136. Hague:Springer, 2010. • Michael J. Boyle, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?”, International Affairs 86, no.2 (2010):342. • Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens and Matt Flannes, “Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War”, Middle East Policy XVIII, no. 3(2011):123. • Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the CIA’s Covert Drone Program? New Yorker, 2009, October 26: 5;

25. References cntd.... • Avery Plaw and Matthew S. Fricker, “Tracking the Predators: Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan”, International Studies Perspectives (2012):1–22. • M. E. O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,” Notre Dame Legal Studies Research Paper 43, no. 9 (2009): 2-26. • Brian Williams,“The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–10.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33: 871–892. • New America Foundation. • International Republican Institute • Pew Research Center

26. Thank You

27. Questions ??