Algerian Terrorism Against France, 1954-1962

1. Algerian Terrorism Against France, 1954-1962 PO 483: The Politics of Terrorism

2. Historical Background • Historical Background: • 1830: France conquers Algeria (Empire, Raw Materials) • 1830-1870: Colonization • French Populate Algeria • French Political Control over Algerian Majority (Mélange) • 1870-1940: Slow But Minimal Assimilation • Many Muslims Receive French Education/Citizenship • Many Serve France in WWI (Exposed to Pan-Arab Movement) • Demand Changes, But Ignored

3. Historical Background • World War II • France Conquered; Free France Fights Under De Gaulle • Algerians Offer Assistance, But Demand Full Citizenship Following War • Impossible for French to Comply – Would Make them A Minority in Their Own Territory (Israeli/Palestinian Parallel) • Post War • French Seek to Reclaim Prestige by Reasserting Colonial Control • Indochina Resists (1946-1954) • Algerian Nationalists, Including FLN, Take Note of Vietnam and Press for Independence

4. The FLN Campaign • Strategy: Crenshaw’s “Revolutionary” Terrorism (S/I in Our Typology) • Largely Follows Irgun Template in Final Form • Target Groups • Attacks: French Government & Algerian Elite • Other Crucial Audiences: Indigenous Algerians, Metropolitan France, Arab States • Intended Responses: Shock and Fear on Part of French Government and Algerian Elite (Acquiesce to Independence); Sympathy and Assistance From Other Audiences

5. Strategy (Continued) • Did Not Want to Alienate Algerian Moderates (Elites and General Population), But Convince Them of Righteousness • Wanted to Frighten and Impress French Government & European Population in Algeria, But Not Elicit Crushing Backlash • Wanted to Impress Arab States, But Not Be So Violent and Random As to Make Aid Politically Infeasible Due to International Costs • In the End, The Tactical Operations of The Terrorist Campaign Eventually Satisfied the Most Important of These Strategic Objectives, But Not Without a Great Deal of Trial and Error and Numerous Nuanced Changes in Strategic Approach

6. Strategic/Tactical Phases of FLN Campaign • Phase 1: Initial Attacks (November 1954)– • About 70 Low-Intensity Attacks; Deaths Limited • However, Nearly Destructive Failure • Primitive • Key Administrative Targets in Algeria Largely Untouched – French Were Not Impressed, Decided to Respond With “Efficient Repression” • Some Deaths Were Accidental – Algerian Moderates Were Horrified By Them • No Response By Metropolitan French, Arabs • Government Immediately Took Steps to Eliminate; Utter Failure; Elimination Close at Hand

7. Strategic/Tactical Phases of FLN Campaign • Phase 2: “Compliance” and “Endorsement” Terrorism (1954-56)– • French Response Made Collaboration Attractive; FLN Had to Prevent This By Playing Indigenous Population and French Adm. In Algerian Against One Another • Forbade Behaviors They Felt Were Detrimental to “Islamic Nation” – Punishable By Death (Compliance) • At Roughly The Same Time, Sought to Strike Against Infrastructure, Prestige, and Population of French Occupiers, and Get Them to Strike Back Indiscriminately Against Algerian Subgroup (Endorsement)

8. Strategic/Tactical Phases of FLN Campaign • Effects of Phase 2 on Target Audiences: • Algerian Moderates Began to Lend Support Out of Fear (Growing #s) • Administration Responds with Growing Frustration and Violence • Metropolitan France Still Uninvolved, But Arabs (Egypt) Begin Lending Assistance • Significant Attacks Led to Indiscriminate French Violence Against Algerian Population; Cycle of Violence Served to Help FLN • Additional Numbers Means That Algerians (ALN) Can Develop Uniformed Regiments and Paramilitaries – Higher, More Successful Forms Of Political Violence

9. Strategic/Tactical Phases of FLN Campaign • Phase 3: “Isolation” Terrorism (1957-1962)– • Done in Conjunction With Higher Forms of Violence • Main Purpose: Get Metro French Population to Pressure French to Vacate • Strategy – Random Attacks on French Civilians in Algeria (Causes Outcry in France) • Battle of Algiers (1957) – Harsh French Response – Effective, But Distasteful to Metro France • Late 1958 – FLN Begins Attacking France Proper, Careful to Avoid Supporters • This Strategy Frightened and Alienated Metro France and Impressed Subgroup, Increasing Calls/Support for Independence

10. The French Response To The FLN • French Strategy and Goals: • Convince Algerians and Metropolitan French That French Rule in Algeria is Advantageous • Convince French-Algerian Government That Rule From Paris is Advantageous • Convince Algerian Nationalists That French Rule is Advantageous, or Eliminate Them • Convince International Audiences That French Rule in Algeria is Better for Algeria Than Algerian Rule • French Algeria – Dualist Society: • Settlers – White, Urban, White-Collar Entrepreneurs • Algerians: African/Arab, Rural, Laborers

11. The French and the FLN • Algerian Groups With Whom The French Could Deal: • Liberal Nationalists (Abbas), 1900-1950: Sought “Emancipation” Within French Institutions • Islamists (Ben Badis), 1930-1950: Sought to Restore Muslim Purity to Algeria With Legal Means • Revolutionists (Hadj), 1927-1962: Sought to Gain Independent Algeria, By Violence if Necessary • By 1950, Revolutionists Had Won Over Support From More Liberal Counterparts. Abbas Turned Against Reform Path, and Postwar French Reconsolidation Efforts Increased Algerian Dissatisfaction

12. The French Response • Initial Attacks (November 1954): • 20,000 Additional Troops, Police Dispatched • Search and Destroy Mission Successful in Not Alienating Subgroup Population • French Position: “Algeria is France” (Mitterand) • France Implements Some Reform Measures to Further Placate Moderate Algerians (Soustelle Plan) • Modernize Economy, Housing • Called For French Investment in Algerian Communities • Inclusion of Algerians as French Citizens (Direct Rule) • Limited Effect (FLN Engages in Compliance Terrorism) • Troop Involvement Angers NATO, Interests Metro France

13. The French Response • Culmination of “Endorsement” Terror/Battle of Algiers (1957) • Beginning of “Isolation” Terror; Offensive Against French Population in Algerian Cities • French Response: 500,000 Police and Troops Active; Paratroop Division Ordered to Algiers • Paratroops, Attempting to Conduct Work Suited to Urban Police, Resort to Torture and Random Violence (Elimination of FLN at All Costs) – Effectively Stop Terrorist Campaign by October • Support From French in Algeria, But Alienates Met France (Anti-Torture Campaign), Which Forces Gov’t to Back Off – Breeds Tension • Turns the Last of the Algerian Moderates Against France

14. The French Response • Tension Between French Gov’t (Paris) and French Settlers in Algiers Culminates in Military Leadership in Algiers in May 1958 (Massu as Gov.-Gen.) – Treasonous • De Gaulle Reassumes Power in Paris (Collapse of 4th Republic): Wants to Reassert Parisian Control Over Algeria, But Proposes Algerian Self-Determination • FLN, Almost Defeated, Sees This as Surrender • Massu Recalled as Governor-General in 1960; Settlers Forcibly Take Over Government in Algiers • Bedlam Turns Met France Entirely Against French Algerians (Manifesto of 121) – Material Support for FLN

15. The French Response • 1960-61: De Gaulle Intensifies Campaign for Separate Algeria – Army Radicals Turn Against Him in Attempted Coup (April 1961) • Putsch Fails; Army Loses Willingness to Maintain Control Over Algeria – War Essentially Over • More Radical Algerian Group (OAS) Begins Terrorist Attacks Against French Algerians AND FLN – Does Not Impact FLN, But Forces French Citizens To Leave Algeria Once Conflict Over • Ceasefire in March 1962 • Independence in July 1962